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561 
The Exclusionary Rule in the Age of 
Blue Data 
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson* 
In Herring v. United States, Chief Justice John Roberts 
reframed the Supreme Court’s understanding of the exclusionary rule: 
“As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter 
deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some 
circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.” The open question 
remains: How can defendants demonstrate sufficient recurring or 
systemic negligence to warrant exclusion? The Supreme Court has 
never answered the question, although the absence of systemic or 
recurring problems has figured prominently in two recent exclusionary 
rule decisions. Without the ability to document recurring failures or 
patterns of police misconduct, courts can dismiss individual 
constitutional violations merely as examples of “isolated negligence.”  
But what if new data-driven surveillance technologies could 
track police-citizen interactions and uncover recurring or systemic 
problems? What if stops and arrests could be data mined to reveal 
systemic racial bias? What if new surveillance technologies could 
record police-citizen stops to monitor patterns of unconstitutional 
practices? What if predictive analytics could identify at-risk officers in 
order to predict future misconduct?  
This Article looks to invert the big data surveillance gaze from 
the citizen to the police. It asks whether the same big data policing 
technologies built to track movements, actions, and patterns of 
criminal activity could be redesigned to foster data-driven police 
accountability. Tracking this “blue data” and studying the systemic 
errors offers concrete answers to the open questions surrounding the 
Supreme Court’s new exclusionary rule.  
 
 *  Professor of Law, UDC David A. Clarke School of Law. Thank you for comments and 
support from Professors Miriam Baer, Rachel Barkow, Paul Butler, Bennett Capers, Cynthia 
Conti-Cook, Sharon Dolovich, Jeffrey Fagan, James Forman, Barry Freidman, Ben Grunwald, 
Bernard Harcourt, David Harris, Eisha Jain, Orin Kerr, Adi Leibovitch, Kate Levine, Anna 
Lvovsky, Shaun Ossei-Owusu, Tracey Meares, Erin Murphy, John Pfaff, Dan Richman, Alice 
Ristrophe, Meghan Ryan, Sarah Seo, David Sklansky, Carol Steiker, Jenia Turner, and Crystal 
Yang. 
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Unquestionably, the use of data mining, surveillance, and 
predictive analytics to target police negligence will face resistance. 
Police officers, administrators, and unions will likely protest the 
invasion of personal and professional privacy it threatens. Yet, any 
resistance is itself revealing and worth studying. This resistance offers 
a provocative thought experiment: How could police objections to new 
forms of surveillance inform community resistance to similar mass 
surveillance technologies? This Article examines how police, courts, 
and litigants will resist a push to police surveillance and what that 
resistance means for current mass surveillance practices, law, and 
policy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Digital technologies are transforming the daily practice of 
policing.1 Big data surveillance technologies and predictive analytics 
offer new methods for police to visualize otherwise hidden patterns of 
criminal activity.2 Data mining assists law enforcement in gathering 
intelligence.3 Predictive policing guides patrols.4 Pervasive 
surveillance monitors the streets.5 Yet, in adopting this data-focused, 
quantified approach to law enforcement, police have inadvertently 
created equally revealing data-driven methods of police accountability. 
The same surveillance technologies that can watch the citizenry can 
also watch the police, and patterns of police misconduct can be 
predicted and analyzed. 
This technological change now holds significant constitutional 
import because of how the Supreme Court has refashioned the 
exclusionary rule, the suppression remedy for police wrongdoing.6 In 
Herring v. United States, Chief Justice John Roberts reframed the 
Supreme Court’s understanding of the exclusionary rule: “As laid out 
in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, 
or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or 
systemic negligence.”7 Yet, despite the significance of “recurring or 
 
 1. ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE, 
AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 4 (2017) (detailing how big data surveillance 
technologies will change the “who,” “where,” “when,” and “how” of the way in which law 
enforcement addresses criminal risk). 
 2. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. 
PA. L. REV. 327, 329 (2015); Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth 
Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 36 (2014). 
 3. See Tal Z. Zarsky, Governmental Data Mining and Its Alternatives, 116 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 285, 287 (2011) (“[L]aw enforcement has shifted to ‘Intelligence Led Policing’ . . . . Rather 
than merely reacting to events and investigating them, law enforcement is trying to preempt 
crime. It does so by gathering intelligence, which includes personal information, closely 
analyzing it, and allocating police resources accordingly . . . .”). 
 4. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY 
L.J. 259, 268–69 (2012) (describing the rise of place-based predictive policing). 
 5. Christopher Slobogin, Rehnquist and Panvasive Searches, 82 MISS. L.J. 307, 307–08 
(2013) (describing panvasive searches arising from new technology).  
 6. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 254 (1983) (“The exclusionary rule is a remedy 
adopted by this Court to effectuate the Fourth Amendment right of citizens ‘to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .’ ”); Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–56 (1961) (“We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures 
in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.”). 
 7. 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009) (emphasis added). 
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systematic” problems in two recent Supreme Court cases,8 the Justices 
did not explain how this could be proven. Equally limiting, the 
ordinary practice of holding relatively brief suppression hearings 
practically forecloses the ability to introduce evidence of systemic or 
recurring policing problems.9 Without the ability to document 
recurring patterns of police misconduct, courts can dismiss individual 
constitutional violations merely as examples of “isolated negligence.”10 
This Article looks to invert the big data surveillance gaze from 
the citizen to the police. It asks whether the same law enforcement 
technologies built to track movements, actions, and patterns of 
criminal activity could also be repurposed to foster data-driven police 
accountability. For example, what if stops and arrests could be data 
mined to reveal systemic racial bias?11 What if predictive analytics 
could identify at-risk officers or police units most likely to be involved 
in recurring, future misconduct?12 What if new surveillance 
technologies could record patterns of police-citizen stops to monitor 
recurring unconstitutional practices?13 What if the entire architecture 
of surveillance designed by law enforcement to surveil citizens could 
be repurposed to identify recurring or systemic problems of police 
violence, racial bias, and unconstitutional actions? Tracking this “blue 
data”14 offers concrete answers to the open questions surrounding the 
Supreme Court’s new application of the exclusionary rule.  
Such futuristic surveillance technology already exists. Police 
routinely search large datasets of biometric, geolocational, and 
consumer information looking for patterns of recurring criminality.15 
Communications, movements, or financial transactions can be 
monitored to observe patterns of suspicious activities.16 In Los 
Angeles, police track “chronic offenders” using social network analysis 
technologies originally used to track international terrorists.17 These 
 
 8. Id.; see also Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016). 
 9. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Constitutional Culpability: Questioning the New 
Exclusionary Rules, 66 FLA. L. REV. 623, 683 (2014) (discussing the resource constraints in 
implementing a two-tiered suppression hearing after Herring). 
 10. The question of recurring violations also impacts private citizens’ ability to file civil 
rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) and the federal government’s ability to investigate 
patterns and practices of police abuse under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012).  
 11. See infra Section II.A.2. 
 12. See infra Section II.B.2. 
 13. See infra Section II.C.2. 
 14. See FERGUSON, supra note 1, at 143–66 (detailing the concept of “blue data”).  
 15. See e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Policing Identity, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1561, 1575–78 (2012) 
(describing biometric collection and searches). 
 16. Zarsky, supra note 3, at 287. 
 17. Sarah Brayne, Big Data Surveillance: The Case of Policing, 82 AM. SOC. REV. 977, 986–
87 (2017); Mark Harris, How Peter Thiel’s Secretive Data Company Pushed into Policing, WIRED 
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growing social network systems link criminal associates in digital 
webs of information that can be mined for investigatory clues.18 
Patterns of criminal activities emerge from scraps of data, allowing 
police to search through it to respond to community needs. 
Video surveillance expands police capabilities to monitor 
wrongdoing. In New York City, approximately nine thousand police 
video cameras digitally record the streets in real time.19 Pattern 
recognition software can automatically alert a central police command 
center to a suspiciously placed bag or track all men wearing blue 
sweatshirts.20 A single search query of the Domain Awareness 
System—the New York City Police Department’s central command 
center—can find all such blue sweatshirts in all locations recorded 
over the last month.21 The city of Los Angeles has added facial 
recognition software to a few police cameras, allowing those who pass 
by to be matched with a database of active warrants.22 In both New 
York City and Los Angeles, thousands of Automated License Plate 
Readers (“ALPR”) record car licenses, marking location, time, and 
direction of travel—all linked to details of the owner.23 Millions of 
license plates are recorded every year and are included in local, 
searchable databases.24 Citizens augment government surveillance 
 
(Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/how-peter-thiels-secretive-data-company-pushed-
into-policing [https://perma.cc/B686-QS2E]. 
 18. See Harris, supra note 17.  
 19. Thomas H. Davenport, How Big Data is Helping NYPD Solve Crimes Faster, FORTUNE 
(July 16, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/17/big-data-nypd-situational-awareness 
[https://perma.cc/TJA5-JMK5].  
 20. See TalkPolitix, New York City - Domain Awareness, YOUTUBE (June 7, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ozUHOHAAhzg [https://perma.cc/N9ZP-SQB4]; see also 
Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 896–901 (2016) (describing the capabilities of automated 
search algorithms).  
 21. TalkPolitix, supra note 20.  
 22. CLARE GARVIE ET AL., THE PERPETUAL LINE-UP: UNREGULATED POLICE FACIAL 
RECOGNITION IN AMERICA (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.perpetuallineup.org/sites/default/ 
files/2016-12/The Perpetual Line-Up - Center on Privacy and Technology at Georgetown Law - 
121616.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EZX-BPVW] [hereinafter PERPETUAL LINE-UP]; Clare Garvie & 
Jonathan Frankle, Facial-Recognition Software Might Have a Racial Bias Problem, ATLANTIC 
(Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/the-underlying-bias-of-
facial-recognition-systems/476991 [https://perma.cc/QVR5-2B7A].  
 23. See Joh, supra note 2, at 48 (“The N.Y.P.D., for instance, has a database of 16 million 
license plates captured from its license plate readers, along with the locations of where the plates 
were photographed.”); Steven D. Seybold, Somebody’s Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-
Collection Technologies, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1029, 1034 (2015) (“ALPR systems can photograph up to 
1,800 license plates per minute, and approximately 10-12 million per day.”). 
 24. Linda Merola & Cynthia Lum, Emerging Surveillance Technologies: Privacy and the 
Case of License Plate Recognition (LPR) Technology, 96 JUDICATURE 119, 119–21 (2012).  
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capabilities by carrying around trackable “smart” devices.25 GPS-
enabled cars record where we drive.26 Geotagging in photographs, 
videos, and WiFi connections reveal where we have been (and what we 
were doing there).27 Public social media accounts can be scraped and 
studied to find patterns of movement and communications.28 Add in 
the digital trails resulting from medical devices, financial applications, 
and fitness trackers, and it is clear that a thick web of trackable self-
surveillance data exists.29  
Predictive targeting allows police to narrow their surveillance 
to specific individuals.30 Police in Chicago use an algorithm to identify 
at-risk individuals in order to predict who might be the victim or 
perpetrator of violence.31 In Manhattan, prosecutors and police 
developed a data-driven “Moneyball” approach to incapacitate 
“primary targets” in particularized blocks or housing units.32 Police in 
 
 25. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects, 
104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 818–23 (2016); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth 
Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 547, 548, 551 (2017); see also Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the 
Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 
93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 114–17 (2014) (discussing the varied capabilities of smartphone sensors). 
 26. Alex Hern, Florida Woman Arrested for Hit-and-Run After Her Car Calls Police, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/dec/07/florida-woman-
arrested-hit-and-run-car-calls-police [https://perma.cc/MH8U-LF7Z]; Ned Potter, Privacy Battles: 
OnStar Says GM Can Record Car’s Use, Even if You Cancel Service, ABC NEWS (Sept. 26, 2011), 
https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/onstar-gm-privacy-terms-company-record-car-information/ 
story?id=14581571 [https://perma.cc/G4JQ-FZCC]. 
 27. Rodolfo Ramirez et al., Location! Location! Location! Data Technologies and the Fourth 
Amendment, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2016, at 19. 
 28. Aaron Cantú, #Followed: How Police Across the Country Are Employing Social Media 
Surveillance, MUCKROCK (May 18, 2016), https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2016/may/ 
18/followed [https://perma.cc/KDX7-E3AR]; Matt Stroud, #Gunfire: Can Twitter Really Help Cops 
Find Crime?, VERGE (Nov. 15, 2013), https://www.theverge.com/2013/11/15/5108058/gunfire-can-
twitter-really-help-cops-find-crime [https://perma.cc/RDV6-W4AR]. 
 29. See Tony Danova, Morgan Stanley: 75 Billion Devices Will Be Connected to the Internet 
of Things by 2020, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 2, 2013), https://www.businessinsider.com/75-billion-
devices-will-be-connected-to-the-internet-by-2020-2013-10 [https://perma.cc/7RJF-SF8K] 
(describing the sheer volume of devices that are, or in the future will be, connected to the 
internet). 
 30. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Prosecution, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 724 
(2016). 
 31. Monica Davey, Chicago Police Try to Predict Who May Shoot or Be Shot, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/us/armed-with-data-chicago-police-try-to-
predict-who-may-shoot-or-be-shot.html [https://perma.cc/TR5H-9YN7]; Josh Kaplan, Predictive 
Policing and the Long Road to Transparency, SOUTHSIDE WKLY. (July 12, 2017), 
https://southsideweekly.com/predictive-policing-long-road-transparency [https://perma.cc/53L8-
27H2]; Nissa Rhee, Can Police Big Data Stop Chicago’s Spike in Crime?, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (June 2, 2016), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2016/0602/Can-police-big-data-
stop-Chicago-s-spike-in-crime [https://perma.cc/RCV7-3F6F].  
 32. Chip Brown, The Data D.A., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2014, at 22, 24–25; To Stem Gun Crime, 
‘Moneyball,’ ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 28, 2015, at A20; Heather Mac Donald, Prosecution 
Gets Smart, CITY J. (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.city-journal.org/html/prosecution-gets-smart-
13663.html [https://perma.cc/LL55-W276]. 
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Los Angeles, Seattle, Miami, Atlanta, and dozens of other big cities 
utilize predictive policing software to target forecasted high-crime 
areas.33 Police patrol these predicted areas for additional physical 
surveillance.34 These new data-driven technologies offer a blueprint 
for a new type of policing. While not yet universally adopted, the 
designs exist and have been growing in many cities.  
This surveillance architecture unquestionably poses significant 
liberty and privacy concerns. As I and others have written, these new 
technologies undermine and distort traditional First and Fourth 
Amendment freedoms in ways we are only just beginning to imagine.35 
But these same technologies also offer a potential solution to the 
current exclusionary rule puzzle. New data surveillance systems built 
by the police can also be used to monitor systemic and recurring police 
practices. In every Big Brother–esque example discussed above, 
technology also captures police-citizen interactions in new and 
revealing ways that can help expose existing police abuses. The great 
 
 33. Ellen Huet, Server And Protect: Predictive Policing Firm PredPol Promises to Map 
Crime Before It Happens, FORBES (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/02/ 
11/predpol-predictive-policing [https://perma.cc/TU4D-LT95]; Mara Hvistendahl, Can “Predictive 
Policing” Prevent Crime Before It Happens?, SCIENCE (Sept. 28, 2016), 
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/09/can-predictive-policing-prevent-crime-it-happens 
[https://perma.cc/66TH-TU4J]; David Robinson & Logan Koepke, Stuck in a Pattern: Early 
Evidence on “Predictive Policing” and Civil Rights, UPTURN (Aug. 2016), https://www.upturn.org/ 
reports/2016/stuck-in-a-pattern/ [https://perma.cc/T456-5BLL].  
 34. Ferguson, supra note 4, at 267–69.  
 35. See sources cited supra notes 1–2, 4; see also, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT 
RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 205 (2007) 
(“[S]urveillance that is not regulated is unreasonable under the Constitution.”); Marc Jonathan 
Blitz et al., Regulating Drones Under the First and Fourth Amendment, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
49, 60 (2015) (“It is clear . . . now is the time to understand the Fourth Amendment restrictions 
of government flight, the First Amendment protections for private flight, and the 
interdependency of between the two.”); Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the 
Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and 
Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1383 (2004) (“It is not only the expansion of video surveillance 
itself that poses a challenge to the viability of the Katz test but also the dramatic changes 
occurring in technologies that supplement and enhance such surveillance.”); David Gray & 
Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 66 (2013) (highlighting 
certain surveillance technologies in use across the country); Stephen Henderson, Fourth 
Amendment Time Machines (and What They Might Say About Police Body Cameras), 18 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 933, 936 (2016) (asking, given the advancements in surveillance technology, how our 
constitutional jurisprudence should respond to bulk capture of information via technology); 
Elizabeth E. Joh, Privacy Protests: Surveillance Evasion and Fourth Amendment Suspicion, 55 
ARIZ. L. REV. 997, 1002 (2013) (discussing “privacy protects,” defined as “actions individuals may 
take to block or thwart surveillance . . . for reasons unrelated to criminal wrongdoing”); Neil 
Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1953 (2013) (“Even in democratic 
societies, the blackmail threat of surveillance is a real one.”); Steven D. Seybold, Note, 
Somebody’s Watching Me: Civilian Oversight of Data-Collection Technologies, 93 TEX. L. REV. 
1029, 1034 (2015) (“Combining surveillance technologies not only allows for more information to 
be collected but also allows for powerful inferences to be drawn from that information; inferences 
that may not have been readily apparent from each individual piece of information by itself.”). 
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irony of the modern surveillance state is that law enforcement 
accidently designed a system that can monitor the police better than 
its citizens. 
The need to reimagine police accountability is a contested 
national issue. The open secret of minority distrust and fear of police 
has loudly revealed itself in a series of self-reinforcing, cascading 
scandals and events.36 The protests arising from the deaths of 
unarmed African American men at the hands of police sparked an 
ongoing national debate over inadequate police accountability.37 Black 
lives, made visible by a pattern of Black deaths, turned police reform 
into a national movement.38 This movement exposed a lack of police 
accountability, made worse by the parallel judicial weakening of 
deterrence-based remedies like the exclusionary rule.39 More 
immediately, the need to reimagine accountability has grown stronger 
still, as the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Civil Rights Division has 
backed away from prioritizing police accountability investigations 
under its new leadership.40  
The time has come to examine new data-driven forms of 
accountability, as law enforcement is beginning to embrace a mass 
 
 36. Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police Officer Is Not 
Indicted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/ferguson-darren-
wilson-shooting-michael-brown-grand-jury.html [https://perma.cc/YG3N-CT9K]; Dana Ford et 
al., Protests Erupt in Wake of Chokehold Death Decision, CNN (Dec. 8, 2014, 8:14 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/04/justice/new-york-grand-jury-chokehold [https://perma.cc/H2WV-
AGJ5]; see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS (2010); PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE (2009); 
DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
(1999). 
 37. Alan Blinder, Walter Scott Shooting Seen as Opening for Civil Suits Against North 
Charleston’s Police Dept., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/us/ 
walter-scott-shooting-turns-michael-slager-into-litigant-as-north-charleston-braces-for-suits.html 
[https://perma.cc/4BEZ-ZBPQ]; Shaila Dewan & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., In Tamir Rice Case, Many 
Errors by Cleveland Police, Then a Fatal One, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/23/us/in-tamir-rice-shooting-in-cleveland-many-errors-by-
police-then-a-fatal-one.html [https://perma.cc/439U-7HPE]; Roger Parloff, Two Deaths: The 
Crucial Difference Between Eric Garner’s Case and Michael Brown’s, FORTUNE (Dec. 5, 2014), 
http://fortune.com/2014/12/05/two-deaths-the-crucial-difference-between-eric-garners-case-and-
michael-browns/ [https://perma.cc/C5YR-M69H]. 
 38. Ferguson Unrest: From Shooting to Nationwide Protests, BBC NEWS (Aug. 10, 2015), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-30193354 [https://perma.cc/JX87-YGUK]. 
 39. See infra Section I.A. 
 40. Eric Lichtblau, Sessions Indicates Justice Department Will Stop Monitoring Troubled 
Police Agencies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/28/us/politics/jeff-
sessions-crime.html [https://perma.cc/6X89-82EZ]; Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Eric Lichtblau, 
Sweeping Federal Review Could Affect Consent Decrees Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/us/justice-department-jeff-sessions-baltimore-police.html 
[https://perma.cc/3QXD-U5UJ]. 
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surveillance mindset.41 Technology has made it temptingly easy to 
monitor and target citizens. But the current technological capabilities 
have also outpaced citizen awareness, providing a moment to stop and 
reflect on the potential impacts before ubiquitous adoption. Serious 
examination of the dual nature of surveillance—on the public and 
police—may help frame a more cautious approach to big data policing 
in the future. 
Part I of this Article examines the question left open by the 
Supreme Court’s recent exclusionary rule cases, Herring v. United 
States42 and Utah v. Strieff.43 Namely, how can defendants 
demonstrate recurring or systemic police negligence? The short 
answer is that under traditional Fourth Amendment law and practice, 
litigants cannot (and in practice do not) regularly meet this burden.44 
Building a record of systemic violations is time-consuming, expensive, 
and taxes the abilities of both lawyers and courts and thus has not 
been a focus of suppression litigation. Yet systemic and recurring 
problems exist in many police forces.45 As seen in media reports, 
scholarly articles, lawsuits, and federal investigations, the problem of 
police violence, racial bias, and constitutional violations must be 
remedied.46  
Part II of the Article examines how big data surveillance tools 
can be redesigned to develop a record of police accountability useful for 
this new exclusionary rule regime. This is the promise of “blue data.”47 
The rise of new technologies to mine data and analyze criminal 
activity can also identify patterns of constitutional violations or police 
misconduct. Additionally, new video and audio surveillance 
technologies can not only monitor the streets but also monitor police 
activities. Finally, new predictive analytics can flag at-risk criminals 
and at-risk police officers with equal ease. By quantifying police 
activities, litigants can begin to visualize patterns of systemic and 
recurring issues and introduce them in Fourth Amendment 
suppression hearings. 
Part III examines the revealing nature of police resistance to 
blue data collection. Obviously, new surveillance technologies will be 
 
 41. See Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Surveillance, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. 
TECH. & POL’Y 281, 285–86 (“[M]any departments across the country are using [certain 
technologies] not just for observational comparison, but also for indiscriminate data collection.”). 
 42. 555 U.S. 135 (2009). 
 43. 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016). 
 44. See infra Section I.C. 
 45. See infra Section I.B.2.  
 46. See infra Section I.B. 
 47. See Ferguson, supra note 1, at 143–66 (detailing the concept of “blue data”). 
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resisted by police officers and administrators concerned about how 
they might impact professional autonomy and criminal investigations. 
These arguments offer a provocative thought experiment: How could 
police objections to new forms of surveillance inform citizen and 
community resistance to similar surveillance technology? It might be 
the case that police resistance to self-surveillance informs citizen 
resistance to mass surveillance. This Part examines how police, 
courts, and litigants will resist a push to police surveillance and what 
that resistance says about current practice, law, and policy priorities.  
In redirecting the target of surveillance from the citizen to the 
police, this Article explores how to meet the Supreme Court’s new 
burden for exclusion. These “blue data” systems—already in 
development—offer a solution to the long-standing problem of police 
accountability. They offer new ways to visualize the recurring and 
systemic gaps in the existing policing system and thus to close the 
widening gap between the Supreme Court’s standards for exclusion 
and the ability to offer proof to meet those standards.  
I. THE LIMITS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND POLICE REFORM 
Since its creation, the exclusionary rule has been criticized by 
judges and scholars.48 The remedy of suppressing evidence recovered 
as a result of a constitutional violation has divided the Supreme Court 
for decades.49 In recent years, a conservative majority has limited the 
availability of the remedy, first through the creation of a patchwork of 
exceptions,50 and later by reconceptualizing the purpose of the 
 
 48. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 151 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing “a more majestic conception” of the Fourth Amendment (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 
514 U.S. 1, 18 (1995)); People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587–89 (N.Y. 1926) (highlighting the 
scrutiny surrounding the doctrine by some courts and pondering why the criminal should “go free 
because the constable has blundered”); Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 951 (1965) (“Another imperative which in my view 
has been too quickly assumed is that the Constitution demands that convictions be automatically 
set aside in every instance in which material evidence obtained in violation of some ‘specific’ of 
the Bill of Rights was received.”); see also Craig M. Bradley, The “Good Faith Exception” Cases: 
Reasonable Exercise in Futility, 60 IND. L.J. 287 (1985); John M. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 70 (1982); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse than 
the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 49–50 (1994); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First 
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 847–52 (1994); Silas Wasserstrom & William J. Mertens, The 
Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a Fair Trial?, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 85 (1984). 
 49. Fourth Amendment—Exclusionary Rule—Deterrence Costs and Benefits—Utah v. 
Strieff—Leading Case, 130 HARV. L. REV. 337 (2016) [hereinafter Utah v. Strieff—Leading Case] 
(“Over the next forty years, the Court stripped away the exclusionary rule’s justification either as 
an individual right or as a means of ensuring judicial integrity.”). 
 50. See, e.g., Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988) (“independent source” 
doctrine); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920–21 (1984) (good faith exception); Nix v. 
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (inevitable discovery doctrine); Wong Sun v. United States, 
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exclusionary rule as only to deter police misconduct.51 In a series of 
cases—Hudson v. Michigan,52 Herring v. United States,53 Davis v. 
United States,54 and Utah v. Strieff55—the Court created a new 
framework with two primary considerations: first, whether the 
officer’s actions were deliberate, reckless, grossly negligent, or the 
result of systemic or recurring negligence,56 and second, whether the 
actions were attenuated from the original constitutional harm.57  
Scholars have ably critiqued the Court’s reasoning, challenging 
the logic, interpretation, and even constitutional theory underpinning 
these decisions.58 In a prior article, I addressed the complexities of 
taking seriously the terms “deliberate,” “reckless,” and “gross 
negligence” when it comes to litigating suppression issues.59 But the 
 
371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963) (attenuation or causation exception); see also Tonja Jacobi, The Law 
and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 656 (2011) (“For advocates 
of the exclusionary rule, the great tragedy of recent jurisprudence has been the erosion of the 
strength of the rule: courts have developed numerous exceptions, a process which has arguably 
steadily eroded Fourth Amendment protections over time.”). 
 51. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2016) (“[E]ven when there is a Fourth 
Amendment violation, this exclusionary rule does not apply when the costs of exclusion outweigh 
its deterrent benefits.”); id. at 2071 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The exclusionary rule serves a 
crucial function—to deter unconstitutional police conduct. By barring the use of illegally 
obtained evidence, courts reduce the temptation for police officers to skirt the Fourth 
Amendment’s requirements.”); Utah v. Strieff—Leading Case, supra note 49, at 343 (“Over the 
next forty years, the Court stripped away the exclusionary rule’s justification either as an 
individual right or as a means of ensuring judicial integrity.”). 
 52. 547 U.S. 586 (2006). 
 53. 555 U.S. 135.  
 54. 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). 
 55. 136 S. Ct. 2056. 
 56. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 137 (noting that arrests based on incorrect beliefs or negligence 
can still constitute Fourth Amendment violations). 
 57. Utah v. Strieff—Leading Case, supra note 49, at 338. 
 58. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States: A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 463, 501–07, 510–11 (2009) (describing history of the exclusionary rule beginning 
before the Revolutionary War); Jeffrey Fagan, Terry’s Original Sin, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 66 
(“[T]he attenuation doctrine applied by the Strieff Court essentially scrubs out reasonableness 
from the Terry formula.”); Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme 
Court’s Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 757, 758 (2009) 
(critiquing the Court’s decision in Herring for complicating Fourth Amendment analyses); David 
Alan Sklansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567, 578 (2008) 
(discussing ongoing informal reforms in police departments); Steiker, supra note 48, at 848 
(arguing for a modernized interpretation of what constitutes reasonableness under the Fourth 
Amendment); James J. Tomkovicz, Hudson v. Michigan and the Future of Fourth Amendment 
Exclusion, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1819, 1832–33, 1848–49, 1880–81 (2008) (describing the variety of 
interpretations lower courts can make in response to the Court’s ruling in Hudson); Craig M. 
Bradley, Red Herring or the Death of the Exclusionary Rule?, TRIAL, Apr. 2009, at 53 (noting the 
difficulty in applying Herring to a broad collection of cases). 
 59. Ferguson, supra note 9, at 683. 
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latter part of that test was left unexamined—the problem of proving 
systemic and recurring negligence.60  
This Part proceeds in three steps. First, it examines two recent 
cases involving unlitigated, but arguably controlling, examples of 
systemic or recurring police errors. In Herring v. United States, the 
Court relied heavily on the fact that no evidence of systemic database 
errors had been included in the trial record.61 In Utah v. Strieff, the 
Court dismissed Strieff’s claim, in part, because no recurring pattern 
of misconduct had been demonstrated.62 In these cases, the Supreme 
Court provided a new framework for exclusion, but little guidance on 
how to prove that patterns of misconduct exist. Second, this Part 
situates the Supreme Court’s focus on systemic or recurring problems 
within a larger national conversation about police reform in America. 
The problem of police reform and deterring police misconduct, 
including unconstitutional stops, racial bias, and excessive force, has 
been demonstrated though a growing collection of investigations, court 
decisions, and media reports.63 Finally, this Part examines why proof 
of systemic and recurring violations rarely makes it into ordinary 
Fourth Amendment suppression hearings. Both law and practice 
conspire to limit the trial record, minimizing the opportunity to 
develop proof of systemic problems. This Part lays out a framework for 
why a new, data-driven, surveillance-oriented approach may better 
respond to the challenge of the modern exclusionary rule doctrine.  
A. Roberts’ Rules of Exclusion 
This Section briefly examines two recent Supreme Court cases 
which suggest that systemic negligence or recurring violations could 
be a trigger for exclusion. While neither case directly involved 
systemic or recurring problems, the Court acknowledged that proof of 
 
 60. Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and 
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 684 (2011):  
A second innovation of Herring, and a corollary to its culpability focus, was its 
adoption of an exclusionary rule test expressly aimed at institutional, in addition to 
individual, misconduct. The Court allowed that even in the face of apparently 
blameless action by a law enforcement officer, evidence of “systemic error” or, phrased 
differently, “systemic negligence,” would justify application of the exclusionary rule. 
Beyond incantation of these apparent terms of art, virtually no explanation is 
provided as to their meaning. Nor, despite the Court’s allusion to precedent, can the 
meaning of these phrases be discerned from prior exclusionary rule decisions, since no 
case prior to Herring had held that systemic Fourth Amendment misconduct could 
provide the basis for a motion to suppress. 
 61. See infra Section I.A.1. 
 62. See infra Section I.A.2. 
 63. See infra Section I.A.2. 
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such a pattern could alter the analysis and thus the outcome of the 
suppression argument.  
1. The Question of Systemic Negligence: Herring v. United States 
Herring v. United States involved a police-database error which 
resulted in the unconstitutional stop and search of Bennie Dean 
Herring.64 Mr. Herring, it appears, had gotten on the wrong side of 
investigator Mark Anderson by informing the local district attorney 
that Anderson had been involved in a recent murder.65 When Herring 
was visiting the Coffee County Sheriff’s Department’s impound lot, 
Anderson decided to determine whether Herring had any open arrest 
warrants.66 First, Anderson asked the Coffee County warrant clerk to 
see if any open warrants existed.67 When none were found, he asked 
the clerk to check with the neighboring Dale County Sheriff’s 
Department.68 The Dale County computer database erroneously 
reported that Herring had an open arrest warrant.69 Apparently, the 
warrant had been recalled, but the computer did not record this fact.70 
Based on that mistaken information, Anderson stopped and searched 
Herring.71 Methamphetamine and a handgun were recovered and 
Herring was arrested.72  
In the subsequent criminal prosecution, Herring moved to 
suppress the evidence, arguing that his Fourth Amendment rights had 
been violated since he had been arrested without a valid arrest 
warrant. Factually, at the time of his stop, there had been no valid 
warrant, and so, as a legal matter, Herring had been arrested without 
justification. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the parties agreed that 
a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred, but focused on whether 
investigator Anderson’s good faith reliance on the Dale County 
database required suppression of the evidence.73  
In a sweeping opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts used 
Herring to reinterpret the rationale for the exclusionary rule. Writing 
for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts canvassed the history of the 
 
 64. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009). 
 65. Id. at 149 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 66. Id.  
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.  
71. Id. at 150.  
 72. Id. at 137 (majority opinion). 
 73. Id. at 139 (“[W]e accept the parties’ assumption that there was a Fourth Amendment 
violation.”). 
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exclusionary rule, examining its utility in exposing flagrant or 
purposeful police violations. He explained that exclusion should not be 
considered an automatic remedy for a constitutional violation:74 “We 
have repeatedly rejected the argument that exclusion is a necessary 
consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation. Instead we have 
focused on the efficacy of the rule in deterring Fourth Amendment 
violations in the future.”75 The key to determining whether the 
exclusionary rule applies, according to Chief Justice Roberts, is to ask 
whether the exclusion will deter future misconduct.76 To further that 
deterrent focus, the Court established a new test: 
To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that 
exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is 
worth the price paid by the justice system. As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule 
serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some 
circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.77  
Because the database error in the case appeared to be an isolated 
mistake, the Court found no need to suppress the evidence recovered 
on Herring.78 
Critical to the Court’s decision in Herring was the lack of 
demonstrated systemic error in the database.79 In fact, the Court 
made this point explicit, stating that it might be reckless to rely on an 
unreliable warrant system if systematic errors were shown.80  
This concern with systemic error animated Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent. As she explained, the fact that the erroneous warrant existed 
for five months without correction, and that there was “no routine 
practice of checking the database for accuracy,” undermined the 
isolated nature of the error.81 More importantly, Justice Ginsburg 
argued that proven errors in arrest databases across the nation 
 
 74. Id. at 137 (pointing out that “suppression is not an automatic consequence of a Fourth 
Amendment violation”). 
 75. Id. at 141 (citations omitted). 
 76. Id. at 137.  
 77. Id. at 144. 
 78. Id. at 137 (holding that “the error was the result of isolated negligence attenuated from 
the arrest”). 
 79. Id. at 147:  
But there is no evidence that errors in Dale County’s system are routine or 
widespread. Officer Anderson testified that he had never had reason to question 
information about a Dale County warrant, . . . and both Sandy Pope and Sharon 
Morgan testified that they could remember no similar miscommunication ever 
happening on their watch . . . . 
 80. Id. at 146 (“If the police have been shown to be reckless in maintaining a warrant 
system, or to have knowingly made false entries to lay the groundwork for future false arrests, 
exclusion would certainly be justified under our cases should such misconduct cause a Fourth 
Amendment violation.”).  
 81. Id. at 154 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
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required the Court to address systemic threats to the Fourth 
Amendment: 
Inaccuracies in expansive, interconnected collections of electronic information raise 
grave concerns for individual liberty. The offense to the dignity of the citizen who is 
arrested, handcuffed, and searched on a public street simply because some bureaucrat 
has failed to maintain an accurate computer data base is evocative of the use of general 
warrants that so outraged the authors of our Bill of Rights.82 
Broadly focusing on the grave consequences of law enforcement’s 
recordkeeping errors,83 Justice Ginsburg concluded that these 
databases pose a considerable risk because they are frequently out of 
date or filled with mistakes.84  
Finally, Justice Ginsburg pointed out the practical problem 
with defendants—mostly indigent—litigating these issues. As she 
wrote, “even when deliberate or reckless conduct is afoot, the Court’s 
assurance will often be an empty promise: How is an impecunious 
defendant to make the required showing?”85 Justice Ginsburg noted 
that discovery would place a substantial administrative burden on 
both the court and law enforcement, and might even include an audit 
of police databases.86 Discovery or any required police-database audit 
would have to be carried out in ordinary, trial court level suppression 
hearings because only in such hearings could defendants evaluate the 
extent of systemic or recurring problems under a negligence theory.  
In addition, there is a more fundamental question at the heart 
of this new requirement. Chief Justice Roberts did not explain what 
the Court meant by the term “negligence” in the context of the 
exclusionary rule, and there has been little judicial commentary on 
the subject.87 Oddly, for such a seemingly sweeping doctrinal change, 
 
 82. Id. at 155–56 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 
23 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).  
 83. See id. at 150 (referring to the gravity of recordkeeping errors in law enforcement). 
 84. Id. at 155 (“Herring’s amici warn that law enforcement databases are insufficiently 
monitored and often out of date. Government reports describe, for example, flaws in [National 
Criminal Information Center (“NCIC”)] databases, terrorist watchlist databases, and databases 
associated with the Federal Government’s employment eligibility verification system.” (citation 
and footnotes omitted)). See generally Wayne A. Logan & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing 
Criminal Justice Data, 101 MINN. L. REV. 541, 542–43 (2016) (detailing how there are 
“significant quality problems with criminal justice databases” and a “blasé acceptance of data 
error and its negative consequences for individuals”). 
 85. Herring, 555 U.S. at 157 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Kit Kinports, Culpability, Deterrence, and the Exclusionary Rule, 21 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 821, 836 (2013) (detailing the flawed conception of negligence revealed in Supreme Court 
exclusionary rule cases). A few clues can be divined from Herring itself. Examining the language 
chosen shows that Chief Justice Roberts used both the term “grossly negligent” and “negligence” 
in the same sentence, the former being understood to be a higher standard than mere negligence. 
Herring, 555 U.S. at 144. In addition, in characterizing the error in Herring, the Court used the 
term “isolated negligence” as a different and seemingly lesser standard than the other terms of 
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the Supreme Court did not provide much detail directing lawyers how 
to actually implement the standard.88  
2. A Lack of Recurring Violations: Utah v. Strieff 
Recurring constitutional violations also played a role in Utah v. 
Strieff.89 At issue was the “normal” or apparently “common practice” of 
Salt Lake City police officers to detain pedestrians without reasonable 
suspicion in order to run warrant checks.90 This unconstitutional (if 
routine) practice played out with the stop and search of Edward 
Joseph Strieff.  
In December 2006, narcotics detective Douglas Fackrell 
received an anonymous tip that a particular house was the source of 
drug dealing.91 Fackrell monitored the house over the course of a 
 
art (i.e., “deliberate,” “reckless,” and “grossly negligent”). Id. at 137. Using the traditional 
methods of interpretation, courts could borrow from civil negligence precedents or criminal 
negligence cases, with each standard possibly resulting in a different outcome. See Ferguson, 
supra note 9, at 653 (outlining different definitions of criminal negligence from California courts 
and the Model Penal Code); Ronen Perry, Re-Torts, 59 ALA. L. REV. 987, 989 (2008): 
Section 3 of the Third Restatement defines “negligence” in cost-benefit terms. The 
initial clause provides that a person acts negligently if he or she does not exercise 
reasonable care under all the circumstances. The next clause stipulates that 
“[p]rimary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the person’s conduct lacks 
reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person’s conduct will result in 
harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of 
precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm. 
(alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).  
 88. For example, with any negligence standard, courts must define a duty of care, and in 
other contexts courts have been quite protective of police in limiting these duties. Police do not 
ordinarily have an affirmative duty to protect individual citizens on the streets. See Town of 
Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005) (finding no police liability for failing to enforce 
a restraining order that resulted in violence); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
489 U.S. 189, 196–202 (1989) (requiring a special relationship before finding a constitutional 
right to government protection in the social services protection context). Yet, the Supreme Court 
also seems to acknowledge that police do have a duty to not violate constitutional rights. This is, 
after all, the theory behind Section 1983 litigation where an individual must show a deprivation 
of constitutional rights. See 42 U.S.C § 1983 (2012). Further, in Herring, the Court implied that 
ignoring systemic negligence would be reckless and open police up to the exclusionary rule 
remedy. Is there a duty of care not to stop or frisk a suspect without adequate legal justification? 
At least at a systemic level, would such violations be sufficient to find negligence? This 
conclusion would create a measure of symmetry with the pattern and practice violations under 
42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012) and municipal liability under 42 U.S.C § 1983.  
 89. 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016). 
 90. Id. at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The Utah Supreme Court described as 
‘ “routine procedure” or “common practice” ’ the decision of Salt Lake City police officers to run 
warrant checks on pedestrians they detained without reasonable suspicion.” (quoting State v. 
Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ¶ 2, 76 P.3d 1159, 1160)); see id. at 2073 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“As 
Fackrell testified, checking for outstanding warrants during a stop is the ‘normal’ practice of 
South Salt Lake City police.”). 
 91. Id. at 2059 (majority opinion). 
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week.92 Fackrell’s observations confirmed his suspicion of illegal 
behavior, and he subsequently stopped Edward Joseph Strieff as he 
left the house.93 At the time of the stop, Fackrell did not know Strieff, 
did not know how long Strieff had been at the targeted house, and had 
no suspicion of Strieff personally.94 After seizing Strieff pursuant to 
Salt Lake City’s common practice of detaining people in order to 
search for open warrants, Fackrell had a police dispatcher run Strieff’s 
name through a database and found he had an existing arrest warrant 
for a traffic violation.95 Fackrell arrested Strieff and in a search 
incident to that arrest recovered methamphetamine and drug 
paraphernalia.96 
Strieff moved to suppress the drug evidence, arguing that 
Fackrell seized him without reasonable suspicion.97 On appeal, the 
State of Utah conceded that Fackrell did not have adequate 
reasonable suspicion to stop Strieff.98 The United States Supreme 
Court assumed without deciding that Strieff was stopped in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment and instead focused on the appropriateness 
of the suppression remedy.99 In an opinion written by Justice Clarence 
Thomas, the Court held that the existence of a valid arrest warrant 
served to attenuate the constitutional violation from the subsequent 
recovery of the drugs.100 In other words, the preexisting lawful 
warrant severed the connection between the constitutional violation 
and the remedy of excluding evidence.101 Applying an attenuation 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 2060. 
 94. See id. (explaining how Fackrell needed to identify himself to Streiff when Fackrell 
made the stop). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 2060. 
 99. Id. at 2062 (assuming without deciding that “Fackrell lacked reasonable suspicion to 
initially stop Strieff”); see id. at 2072 (Kagan, J., dissenting): 
At the suppression hearing, Fackrell acknowledged that the stop was designed for 
investigatory purposes—i.e., to “find out what was going on [in] the house” he had 
been watching, and to figure out “what [Strieff] was doing there.” . . . And Fackrell 
frankly admitted that he had no basis for his action except that Strieff “was coming 
out of the house.” 
 100. Id. at 2064 (majority opinion) (“We hold that the evidence Officer Fackrell seized as part 
of his search incident to arrest is admissible because his discovery of the arrest warrant 
attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized from Strieff 
incident to arrest.”).  
 101. Id. at 2061 (“Evidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional 
police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening 
circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been 
violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.’ ” (quoting Hudson v. 
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006))). 
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analysis first developed in Brown v. Illinois, the Court held that the 
evidence should not be suppressed.102 
Underlying the Court’s ultimate attenuation theory were two 
arguments. First, that detective Fackrell’s constitutional error was at 
worst only negligent.103 Second, that the error was not part of any 
recurring pattern of police misconduct.104 This framing tracked the 
logic in Herring—without purposeful error or recurring negligence, 
suppression would not deter future misconduct, and thus the 
exclusionary rule should not apply.105  
As explained by the majority, detective Fackrell made a good 
faith mistake.106 While he had no particularized or individualized 
suspicion of Strieff, the existing—fortuitous—arrest warrant cleansed 
his constitutional error.107 But critical to this reasoning was the 
absence of evidence of any recurring unconstitutional practice. Justice 
Thomas emphasized that the stop was merely an “isolated incident of 
negligence” stemming from a legitimate investigation, rather than 
part of a systematic problem.108 Justice Thomas’s statement implicitly 
recognized that had there been a systemic or recurring pattern of 
police misconduct, the result might have been different.109  
 
 102. Id. at 2061–64 (“First, we look to the ‘temporal proximity’ between the unconstitutional 
conduct and the discovery of evidence to determine how closely the discovery of evidence followed 
the unconstitutional search. Second, we consider ‘the presence of intervening circumstances.’ 
Third, . . . we examine ‘the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.’ ” (citations omitted) 
(quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603–04 (1975))). 
 103. Id. at 2063 (“Officer Fackrell was at most negligent.”). But see id. at 2068 (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not tolerate an officer’s unreasonable searches 
and seizures just because he did not know any better. Even officers prone to negligence can learn 
from courts that exclude illegally obtained evidence.”). 
 104. Id. at 2063 (majority opinion) (“Moreover, there is no indication that this unlawful stop 
was part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct.”). 
 105. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 147 (explaining that no evidence of widespread errors existed 
in the warrant database). 
 106. “Good faith” here is a term of art borrowed from United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 
(1984), which borrowed the term from civil Section 1983 cases. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 
564 U.S. 229, 238–39 (2011) (describing the use of good faith in the Supreme Court’s 
exclusionary rule cases); see also Laurin, supra note 60, at 739–42 (discussing the concept of 
constitutional borrowing in the context of the exclusionary rule’s adoption of civil tort 
terminology). 
 107. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063: 
In stopping Strieff, Officer Fackrell made two good-faith mistakes. First, he had not 
observed what time Strieff entered the suspected drug house, so he did not know how 
long Strieff had been there. Officer Fackrell thus lacked a sufficient basis to conclude 
that Strieff was a short-term visitor who may have been consummating a drug 
transaction. Second, because he lacked confirmation that Strieff was a short-term 
visitor, Officer Fackrell should have asked Strieff whether he would speak with him, 
instead of demanding that Strieff do so. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 2064: 
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In dissent, Justice Sotomayor made this focus on recurring 
practices explicit. Challenging the majority’s interpretation of the 
evidence and narrow frame of analysis, she asserted that the incident 
was not isolated at all.110 To support the argument that Fackrell’s 
actions were both part of a local practice of unconstitutional stops111 
and part of a national practice of exploiting low-level arrest 
warrants,112 Justice Sotomayor broadened the focus to look at the 
national context detailing recurring and systemic problems of 
unconstitutional stops: 
I do not doubt that most officers act in “good faith” and do not set out to break the law. 
That does not mean these stops are “isolated instance[s] of negligence,” however. Many 
are the product of institutionalized training procedures. The New York City Police 
Department long trained officers to, in the words of a District Judge, “stop and question 
first, develop reasonable suspicion later.”113 
Equally important, Justice Sotomayor faulted the majority for 
failing to articulate how any indigent litigant like Strieff could prove a 
systemic problem.114 She pointed out that there were “countless other 
examples” of situations like Strieff’s, and yet the majority insisted it 
was an isolated incident.115 “Surely,” she asserted, “it should not take 
a federal investigation of Salt Lake County before the Court would 
 
Strieff argues that, because of the prevalence of outstanding arrest warrants in many 
jurisdictions, police will engage in dragnet searches if the exclusionary rule is not 
applied. We think that this outcome is unlikely. Such wanton conduct would expose 
police to civil liability. And in any event, the Brown factors take account of the 
purpose and flagrancy of police misconduct. Were evidence of a dragnet search 
presented here, the application of the Brown factors could be different. But there is no 
evidence that the concerns that Strieff raises with the criminal justice system are 
present in South Salt Lake City, Utah. 
(citations omitted). 
 110. See id. at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (highlighting the prevalence of outstanding 
warrants across the United States). 
 111. See id. at 2069. 
 112. Id. at 2068 (“Justice Department investigations across the country have illustrated how 
these astounding numbers of warrants can be used by police to stop people without cause.”). 
 113. Id. at 2069 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Ligon v. City of New 
York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 537–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), stay granted on other grounds, 736 F.3d 118 
(2d Cir. 2013)); see also id. at 2068: 
The States and Federal Government maintain databases with over 7.8 million 
outstanding warrants, the vast majority of which appear to be for minor offenses. . . . 
The county in this case has had a “backlog” of such warrants. . . . Justice Department 
investigations across the country have illustrated how these astounding numbers of 
warrants can be used by police to stop people without cause. 
(citations omitted); id. at 2073 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“In other words, the department’s 
standard detention procedures—stop, ask for identification, run a check—are partly designed to 
find outstanding warrants. And find them they will, given the staggering number of such 
warrants on the books.”). 
 114. Id. at 2069 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 115. Id. 
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protect someone in Strieff’s position.”116 Echoing Justice Ginsburg’s 
concern in Herring that traditional Fourth Amendment motions 
practice makes proving repeated error too difficult, Justice Sotomayor 
questioned how anyone could prove a systemic violation without 
outside assistance.117 
While clearly diverging in result and reasoning, both the 
majority and dissent appear to recognize that systemic or recurring 
unconstitutional violations would make exclusion more likely. In cases 
of proven recurring police misconduct, exclusion would be an 
appropriate remedy. In fact, even without a deliberate, reckless, or 
grossly negligent act, if a systemic or recurring problem is proven, all 
subsequent negligent unconstitutional actions will warrant 
exclusion.118  
B. The Reality of Recurring Problems 
The Supreme Court’s openness to considering systemic and 
recurring police negligence can be understood, in part, as a response to 
a developing national awareness about police misconduct. During oral 
argument in Strieff, the Justices explicitly brought up facts from the 
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division’s Ferguson Report 
exposing the pattern and practice of unconstitutional policing 
practices in Ferguson, Missouri.119 In dissent, Justice Sotomayor 
specifically referenced the federal litigation declaring the New York 
Police Department’s stop and frisk policy unconstitutional.120 In 
Herring, Justice Ginsberg raised the growing problem of systemic data 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Justice Sotomayor’s dissent concluded with impassioned language citing W.E.B. 
DuBois, James Baldwin, Michelle Alexander, Ta’nehisi Coates, Lani Guinier, and Gerald Torres 
that this absence of police accountability will further racial discrimination and justify 
unconstitutional practices. Id. at 2069–71: 
We must not pretend that the countless people who are routinely targeted by police 
are “isolated.” They are the canaries in the coal mine whose deaths, civil and literal, 
warn us that no one can breathe in this atmosphere. They are the ones who recognize 
that unlawful police stops corrode all our civil liberties and threaten all our lives. 
Until their voices matter too, our justice system will continue to be anything but. 
(citation omitted) (citing LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY 274–83 (2002)). 
 118. See Laurin, supra note 60, at 687 (detailing how the exclusionary rule serves to deter 
recurring or systemic negligence in some circumstances). 
 119. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (No. 14-1373) (discussing the 
fact that approximately eighty percent of the minority population in Ferguson had an 
outstanding municipal warrant, making the stop-and-identify practice quite tempting).  
 120. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2069 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Ligon v. City of New York, 
925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 537–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)). 
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error.121 Obviously, these national issues and well-publicized 
investigations involved particular police departments at particular 
moments in time, but the documented problems of unconstitutional 
stops, racial bias, and excessive use of force suggest a reason for 
concern.122  
Much has been written on police reform in the last few years.123 
This Section briefly examines two related but opposing problems with 
police accountability: first, a lack of data about policing in general124 
and, second, the repeated findings of systemic and recurring problems 
in specific investigations into particular police departments.125 Both 
this general lack of knowledge and the specific concern about 
recurring problems inspire this Article’s attempt to find new 
 
 121. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 155 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(“Herring’s amici warn that law enforcement databases are insufficiently monitored and often 
out of date.”). 
 122. See generally Kami Chavis Simmons, Cooperative Federalism and Police Reform: Using 
Congressional Spending Power to Promote Police Accountability, 62 ALA. L. REV. 351, 357 (2011) 
(“Despite the many efforts to reform local police departments and to increase police 
accountability, police misconduct and corruption persist in the United States.”); Samuel Walker, 
Institutionalizing Police Accountability Reforms: The Problem of Making Police Reforms Endure, 
32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 57, 76–77 (2012) (discussing early intervention (“EI”) systems, 
which provide data to identify officers with performance problems, as emerging as a powerful 
police accountability tool). 
 123. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from 
New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 272–73 (2006) 
(discussing empirical studies of broken window policing); Tracey L. Meares, The Law and Social 
Science of Stop and Frisk, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 335, 341 (2014) (concluding that police 
stops in New York City correlated more to racial composition of a neighborhood than crime rate); 
Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in the 
Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 496 
(2008) (arguing that police violence in the United States is a systematic problem); David Alan 
Sklansky, Not Your Father’s Police Department: Making Sense of the New Demographics of Law 
Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209, 1213–15 (2006) (discussing how racial 
minorities compose a significantly increased share of urban police forces since the 1960s); David 
Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1742 (2005) [hereinafter 
Sklansky, Police and Democracy] (providing a history of police reform); Samuel Walker, 
Governing the American Police: Wrestling with the Problems of Democracy, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
615, 618 (detailing how law enforcement is organized in the United States). 
 124. See, e.g., Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 
1119, 1121 (2013) (arguing that “today we still lack enough information about what the police do 
to shape their conduct effectively”). 
 125. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 2–3 (Mar. 15, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/ 
attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7NS-9CSB] 
[hereinafter DOJ FERGUSON REPORT] (finding the Ferguson Police Department’s policy to have 
been geared toward aggressive enforcement, with officers demanding compliance when they lack 
legal authority); CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE 
CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 24 (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download 
[https://perma.cc/U4CT-49ZN] [hereinafter DOJ BALTIMORE REPORT] (finding that the Baltimore 
Police Department (“BPD”) “engages in a pattern or practice of making stops, searches, and 
arrests in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and Section 14141”). 
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technological ways to expose, identify, and monitor police misconduct, 
which is the subject of Part II.  
1. The Fragmented Nature of Police Data 
As a constitutional matter, policing is studied in fragments. We 
know what detective Fackrell did when he stopped Edward Strieff, but 
not what he did before, or after, or any other day of his career. The 
record established facts without context about routine practice, 
training, or comparative circumstances.126 This fragmented moment of 
time is further split by the localized nature of policing. There are 
approximately eighteen thousand separate police forces in the United 
States, each with different protocols, rules, and cultures.127 What one 
detective does in Salt Lake City may not be done in Miami, or 
Minneapolis, or Missoula. 
If courts cannot track what police do on the streets, one might 
think that governments might systemically monitor police practices. 
But federal and state efforts to collect data have been similarly 
fragmented. Professor Rachel Harmon has expressed dismay at the 
lack of state and federal data on police.128 Particularly in the states, 
which extensively regulate police, one might expect more information 
about police actions. But that is not the case. Even federal data is far 
too limited to provide any meaningful assistance to the government in 
its oversight of police activity.129 Police leaders do not always 
encourage transparency,130 and police unions131 and other employment 
 
 126. This myopic approach has been exposed by scholars who understand policing as a 
product of systemic choices and strategies and not isolated incidents. See Tracey L. Meares, 
Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not 
an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 162 (2015) (“[W]hile the Court in Terry authorized police 
intervention in an individual incident when a police officer possesses less than probable cause to 
believe that an armed individual is involved in a crime, in reality stop-and-frisk is more typically 
carried out by a police force en masse as a program.”). 
 127. Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 
1843 (2015) (“Policing in the United States is a diffuse business. . . . [M]uch of policing occurs at 
the local level. There are just under 18,000 separate police forces in the United States, and some 
765,000 sworn officers.”). 
 128. Harmon, supra note 124, at 1129. 
 129. See id. at 1122, 1132–33 (“[W]hile existing federal law and agency efforts provide for 
some data collection about policing, those efforts are flawed, stymied by institutional and legal 
limitations.”). 
 130. Id. at 1129: 
In practice, police chiefs and other local government actors often limit rather than 
promote information availability. Cities and police departments sometimes actively 
inhibit the collection of information about police by, for example, requiring secrecy 
when they settle civil suits for police misconduct or discouraging citizens from filing 
complaints about officer conduct. 
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or privacy laws further restrict access to information regarding alleged 
officer misconduct.132 Municipalities that suffer the financial liability 
for police misconduct remain unenthused about collecting data as it 
could be used against them in court.133 And even when certain 
jurisdictions do collect data, or better yet, restructure their police force 
to focus on data collection and analysis,134 this data is not integrated 
or compared nationally to other police departments.135  
In the context of addressing allegations of racial profiling, a few 
data collection systems have been imposed by court order.136 In terms 
of systemic abuse of unconstitutional stops and frisks, some data has 
been revealed through civil rights lawsuits.137 Regarding structural 
 
 131. Stephen Rushin, Using Data to Reduce Police Violence, 57 B.C. L. REV. 117, 153 (2016) 
(“[C]ollective bargaining and civil service protections inadvertently discourage police 
management from responding forcefully to misconduct.”); Walker, supra note 122, at 72: 
Collective bargaining agreements, for example, contain provisions related to the 
investigation of alleged officer misconduct (whether on the basis of a citizen complaint 
or an internally generated complaint) that impede a timely and thorough 
investigation. Officer appeals of discipline, meanwhile, may involve procedures that 
tend to increase the likelihood of disciplinary sanctions being mitigated or overturned. 
(footnote omitted). 
 132. Harmon, supra note 124, at 1133 (2013) (“[S]tates not only do little to encourage police 
departments to produce information about policing that does exist, they also often restrict public 
access to it through privacy laws and exemptions from open records statutes.”). 
 133. See Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in Section 
1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 31 (2000) (“Municipalities generally write off the 
misconduct of an individual officer to the ‘bad apple theory,’ under which municipal governments 
or their agencies attribute misconduct to aberrant behavior by a single ‘bad apple,’ thereby 
deflecting attention from systemic and institutional factors contributing to recurring 
constitutional deprivations.”); Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role 
of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1063–64 (2010) 
(explaining that in many jurisdictions police departments will suspend internal review of citizen 
complaints if the department is sued). 
 134. See James J. Willis et al., Making Sense of COMPSTAT: A Theory-Based Analysis of 
Organizational Change in Three Police Departments, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 147, 148 (2007) 
(introducing a data collection tool employed by the New York City Police Department to reduce 
crime by keeping officers accountable for crime reduction). 
 135. Harmon, supra note 124, at 1129 (“Even when departments collect information, they 
may do so in ways that make it impossible to aggregate the records or compare them with data 
from other departments. Departments often, for example, keep only paper files and use 
anomalous report forms and categories . . . .”). 
 136. Mary D. Fan, Panopticism for Police: Structural Reform Bargaining and Police 
Regulation by Data-Driven Surveillance, 87 WASH. L. REV. 93, 127 (2012) (“Many of the reforms 
in cases involving recurrent problems such as excessive force or racial targeting call for police to 
report uses of force, demographic information, and bases for investigative stops and searches. 
The methods of regulation and remedies are shifting to information and data-driven surveillance 
of police practices.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 137. Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2011) (order approving 
settlement agreement, class certification, and consent decree), https://www.aclupa.org/download 
_file/view_inline/744/198 [https://perma.cc/8Q5S-VZ55]; Plaintiffs’ First Report to Court and 
Master on Stop and Frisk Practices at 7, Bailey, No. 10-5952 (Nov. 4, 2010), 
https://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/contract-economic-organization/ 
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change and consent degrees, the data collection piece has been 
imposed by federal sanction.138 Even when it comes to law 
enforcement’s ultimate power—use of deadly force—no national 
system exists to track police use of force or killings.139 This absence 
forced the United States Attorney General140 and the Director of the 
FBI141 to separately admit embarrassment at not being able to provide 
the statistics to interested parties.142 Instead, the stories of police 
violence—both tragic and justified—become part of an anecdotal and 
fragmented policing landscape.143  
 
files/Bailey First Report_final version.docx [https://perma.cc/T4HB-XQR7]; David A. Harris, 
Across the Hudson: Taking the Stop and Frisk Debate Beyond New York City, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. 
& PUB. POL’Y 853, 865 (2013): 
But in point of fact, data collection on stops and frisks in the U.S. has been relatively 
rare. . . . All in all, in most police departments there has been virtually no systematic, 
organized effort to collect information on the practice in a way that gives big-picture 
insight into what police are doing. 
 138. Fan, supra note 136, at 127–28 (2012); Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in 
American Police Departments, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1347 (2015) (“[T]he federal government 
can now use equitable relief to force problematic police agencies to adopt significant structural, 
procedural, and policy reforms aimed at curbing misconduct.”). 
 139. Matthew J. Hickman, Alex R. Piquero & Joel H. Garner, Toward a National Estimate of 
Police Use of Nonlethal Force, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 563, 565 (2008) (“[L]ocal, state, and 
federal governments actually collect and report very little information about police use of force, 
much less than about police behavior in general.”); Rob Barry & Coulter Jones, Hundreds of 
Police Killings Are Uncounted in Federal Stats, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 3, 2014, 11:26 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/hundreds-of-police-killings-are-uncounted-in-federal-statistics-
1417577504 [https://perma.cc/PLB2-E9AM]; Wesley Lowery, How Many Police Shootings a Year? 
No One Knows, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/ 
wp/2014/09/08/how-many-police-shootings-a-year-no-one-knows [https://perma.cc/4439-C492]. 
 140. Jon Swaine, Eric Holder Calls Failure to Collect Reliable Data on Police Killings 
Unacceptable, GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jan/15/eric-
holder-no-reliable-fbi-data-police-related-killings [http://perma.cc/3YUB-CFFP] (reporting Eric 
Holder as stating that “[t]he troubling reality is that we lack the ability right now to 
comprehensively track the number of incidents of either uses of force directed at police officers or 
uses of force by police,” and saying “[t]his strikes many – including me – as unacceptable”). 
 141. Michael S. Schmidt, F.B.I. Director Speaks Out on Race and Police Bias, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/13/us/politics/fbi-director-comey-speaks-frankly 
-about-police-view-of-blacks.html [https://perma.cc/HJ5T-6BVQ] (quoting James Comey as 
saying, “It’s ridiculous that I can’t tell you how many people were shot by the police last week, 
last month, last year.”). 
 142. Rushin, supra note 131, at 126 (“It seems incongruent for the federal government to 
keep detailed records on the number of law enforcement officers killed or assaulted in the line of 
duty, but not keep comparable records on citizens killed or assaulted by law enforcement.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 143. Editorial Board, One Thing the U.S. Government Doesn’t Count: How Often Police Kill 
Civilians, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-police-
statistics-20141217-story.html [http://perma.cc/9W9R-4LTC] (“But one thing the government 
doesn’t count, as was spotlighted this summer amid the fallout from Michael Brown’s shooting 
death in Ferguson, Mo., is how often police kill civilians.”); The Counted: People Killed by Police 
in the US, GUARDIAN, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/01/the-
counted-police-killings-us-database (last visited Oct. 19, 2018) [https://perma.cc/3XW6-UMKY] 
(providing a list of each individual killed by police in 2015 and 2016). 
Ferguson_ PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/25/2019  11:10 PM 
2019] EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN THE AGE OF BLUE DATA 585 
2. Evidence of Recurring Problems  
In the absence of good data about policing practices, one could 
hope that recurring patterns of police misconduct would not be 
prevalent. Yet evidence indicates otherwise.144 For example, in civil 
rights lawsuits challenging unconstitutional stops in New York City 
and Philadelphia, repeated Fourth Amendment violations were 
documented.145  
Rather famously, Judge Shira Scheindlin declared the New 
York City Police Department’s (“NYPD”) stop and frisk practice 
unconstitutional, finding that New York City was liable for violating 
plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.146 The court 
found that the City acted with deliberate indifference toward the 
NYPD’s practice of making unconstitutional stops and conducting 
unconstitutional frisks.147 At trial, police data became key to 
establishing the racially discriminatory caste of constitutional 
violations. The trial record showed that the NYPD “made 4.4 million 
stops between January 2004 and June 2012. Over 80% of these 4.4 
million stops were of blacks or Hispanics.”148 Of those stops, 52% 
involved frisks, but a weapon was only recovered 1.5% of the time, 
meaning “in 98.5% of the 2.3 million frisks, no weapon was found.”149 
 
 144. Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the New York City Police 
Department’s “Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. 
ASS’N 813, 821 (2007) (“In the period for which we had data, the NYPD’s records indicate that 
they were stopping blacks and Hispanics more often than whites, in comparison to both the 
populations of these groups and the best estimates of the rate of crimes committed by each 
group.”); K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives From Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive 
Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 276–80 (2009) (discussing 
the various downfalls associated with zero-tolerance policing). 
 145. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The City acted 
with deliberate indifference toward the NYPD’s practice of making unconstitutional stops and 
conducting unconstitutional frisks.”); Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 492–510 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (providing evidence of nine independent police stops illustrating misconduct); 
Davis v. City of New York, 902 F. Supp. 2d 405, 412–30 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (providing seven unique 
instances of NPYD misconduct); Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 
2011) (order approving settlement agreement, class certification, and consent decree), 
https://www.aclupa.org/download_file/view_inline/744/198 [https://perma.cc/8Q5S-VZ55]; Daniels 
v. City of New York, 198 F.R.D. 409, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (documenting allegations of misconduct 
in as many as 18,000 instances). 
 146. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 562 (finding that out of nineteen instances, nine stops were 
unconstitutional, five frisks were unconstitutional, and the rest were constitutional stop and 
frisks). 
 147. Id.; see id. at 660 (“The NYPD’s practice of making stops that lack individualized 
reasonable suspicion has been so pervasive and persistent as to become not only a part of the 
NYPD’s standard operating procedure, but a fact of daily life in some New York City 
neighborhoods.”). 
 148. Id. at 556. 
 149. Id. at 558. 
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In only 6% of the stops was a suspect arrested.150 Despite being 
stopped more often, contraband was found less often on Blacks and 
Hispanics compared to Whites.151 While the collected stop data made 
the lawsuit possible, it also demonstrated a pattern of systemic and 
recurring constitutional violations.152 
In Philadelphia, a lawsuit challenged the practice of 
Philadelphia police officers stopping individuals without constitutional 
justification.153 The lawsuit documented a recurring pattern of Fourth 
Amendment violations and resulted in a consent decree requiring 
further monitoring.154 Somewhat troublingly, despite being under 
court-ordered monitoring, “one-half of all stops were made without the 
requisite reasonable suspicion and . . . over one-half of all frisks were 
made without reasonable suspicion.”155 These recurring patterns of 
constitutional violations continued in 2011, 2012, and 2013.156  
 
 150. Id. at 558–59 (“6% of all stops resulted in an arrest, and 6% resulted in a summons. The 
remaining 88% of the 4.4 million stops resulted in no further law enforcement action.”). 
 151. Id. at 559 (“In 52% of the 4.4 million stops, the person stopped was black, in 31% the 
person was Hispanic, and in 10% the person was white. . . . Contraband other than weapons was 
seized in 1.8% of the stops of blacks, 1.7% of the stops of Hispanics, and 2.3% of the stops of 
whites.”). 
 152. See generally Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship Between the Constitutionality and 
Effectiveness of New York City “Stop and Frisk,” 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495, 1541 (2014) (“The NYPD’s 
use of stop-and-frisk to deter people from carrying weapons runs afoul of another constitutional 
provision: the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.”); Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda 
Geller, Following the Script: Narratives of Suspicion in Terry Stops in Street Policing, 82 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 51, 69 (2015) (providing empirical data to demonstrate violations of the Fourth 
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment); Harris, supra note 137, at 854–57 (highlighting the 
case law establishing the NYPD’s systemic violations of the Constitution). 
 153. Complaint, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5925 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2010), 2010 WL 
4662865. 
 154. Bailey, No. 10-5952 (order approving settlement agreement, class certification, and 
consent decree), https://www.aclupa.org/download_file/view_inline/744/198 [https://perma.cc/ 
8Q5S-VZ55] (requiring a “data base [that] shall have the capability to retrieve Information by 
DC number, district, date, race, officer’s actions, and other relevant characteristics necessary to 
effective monitoring of stop and frisk practices”).  
 155. See Plaintiffs’ First Report to Court and Master on Stop and Frisk Practices, supra note 
137, at 7 (emphasis omitted); see id. at 8:  
In sum, over the first six months of 2011, based on the 1426 75-48a forms reviewed by 
counsel (a larger number were reviewed by law students with similar findings), 713 
pedestrian stops were made with reasonable suspicion and 713 were made without 
reasonable suspicion. Of 355 frisks, 165 were with reasonable suspicion and 190 
without reasonable suspicion. 
 156. See sources cited supra note 155; see also Plaintiffs’ Fourth Report to Court and Monitor 
on Stop and Frisk Practices at 7, Bailey, No. 10-5952 (Dec. 3, 2013), https://www.aclupa.org/ 
download_file/view_inline/1529/198 [https://perma.cc/7YZ9-WAE5] (“43% of all stops and over 
50% of all frisks were made without the requisite reasonable suspicion. These results are not 
appreciably different from the data reviews for 2011 and 2012, as set forth in the First, Second, 
and Third Reports.”); Plaintiffs’ Third Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices 
at 8, Bailey, No. 10-5952, https://www.aclupa.org/download_file/view_inline/1015/198 
[https://perma.cc/XHL2-LHYN]:  
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Additionally, a series of investigations by the Department of 
Justice Civil Rights Division uncovered systemic problems touching on 
unconstitutional stops, use of force, and racial discrimination.157 
During 2015 through 2017, the DOJ Civil Rights Division investigated 
the Chicago Police Department (“CPD”),158 the City of Baltimore Police 
Department,159 and the Ferguson Police Department160 and ultimately 
uncovered systemic and recurring constitutional violations that led to 
ongoing federal oversight.161 Read in total, these lengthy, in-depth 
reports offer a devastating critique of local policing practices and an 
equally damning account of the lack of accountability of police 
administrators.  
For example, the DOJ found that Chicago police officers 
“engaged in a pattern or practice of unreasonable force in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment and that the deficiencies in CPD’s training, 
supervision, accountability, and other systems have contributed to 
that pattern or practice.”162 This force was not the product of 
individual “bad apples,” but “largely attributable to systemic 
deficiencies.”163 The misconduct was routine,164 largely ignored by the 
 
It is remarkable that 43-47% of all stops and over 45% of all frisks were made without 
the requisite reasonable suspicion. These results are not appreciably different from 
the data reviews for 2011, as set forth in the First and Second Reports. Thus, tens of 
thousands of persons in Philadelphia continue to be stopped each year (and a 
significant number frisked) without reasonable suspicion. 
 157. Rachel Moran, Ending the Internal Affairs Farce, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 837, 847–48 (2016): 
Recent investigations by the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division have revealed that officers in 
many cities use unconstitutionally excessive force during their encounters with 
minorities, stop and frisk minorities without any legal justification, systematically 
arrest and charge minorities for nonviolent crimes far more aggressively than they 
enforce similar crimes in white communities, and arrest poor minorities—subjecting 
many of them to jail time—for minor unpaid fines. 
 158. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE CHICAGO POLICE 
DEPARTMENT (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download [https://perma.cc/ 
U8W6-6C9G] [hereinafter DOJ CHICAGO REPORT]. 
 159. DOJ BALTIMORE REPORT, supra note 125, at 24. 
 160. DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 125, at 23. 
 161. Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for “Community Engagement” 
Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 794 (2016) (“[T]he Obama 
administration has invigorated the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, with 
particular emphasis placed on the Special Litigation Section’s involvement in police reform. The 
Special Litigation Section has opened thirty-six investigations and signed approximately twenty-
one agreements or intent to reach agreements with various localities.”). 
 162. DOJ CHICAGO REPORT, supra note 158, at 23. 
 163. Id. at 5. 
 164. Id. (“The pattern of unlawful force we found resulted from a collection of poor police 
practices that our investigation indicated are used routinely within CPD.”). 
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city,165 endemic to the force,166 and directed predominantly at people of 
color.167 Practices involving both deadly force168 and nondeadly force169 
violated the Constitution. Traditional accountability mechanisms 
failed to remedy misconduct,170 and police failed to develop training or 
supervision systems to improve the problem.171  
In Baltimore, the DOJ revealed a recurring pattern of 
unconstitutional stops, frisks, and arrests in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.172 Police stopped citizens without reasonable 
suspicion.173 Police frisked individuals without a belief that the person 
was armed and dangerous.174 Police arrested people without cause.175 
In fact, similar to Utah v. Strieff, the DOJ discovered a pattern of 
unconstitutional stops to run warrant checks, finding that officers 
regularly approached, detained, and questioned individuals on the 
sidewalk without reasonable suspicion.176 These unconstitutional 
 
 165. Id. at 7 (“The City received over 30,000 complaints of police misconduct during the five 
years preceding our investigation, but fewer than 2% were sustained, resulting in no discipline in 
98% of these complaints. This is a low sustained rate.”). 
 166. Id. at 8 (“We discovered numerous entrenched, systemic policies and practices that 
undermine police accountability.”). 
 167. Id. at 145 (“Blacks, Latinos, and whites make up approximately equal thirds of the 
population in Chicago, but the raw statistics show that CPD uses force almost ten times more 
often against blacks than against whites.”). 
 168. Id. at 5 (“CPD officers engage in a pattern or practice of using force, including deadly 
force, that is unreasonable.”). 
 169. Id. at 32 (“Although CPD documents generally include insufficient detail of when and 
how officers use force, particularly less-lethal force, our review of CPD records made clear that 
CPD’s pattern of unreasonable force includes unreasonable less-lethal force.”). 
 170. Id. at 47 (“Our investigation confirmed that CPD’s accountability systems are broadly 
ineffective at deterring or detecting misconduct, and at holding officers accountable when they 
violate the law or CPD policy.”). 
 171. Id. at 10 (“CPD’s pattern of unlawful conduct is due in part to deficiencies in CPD’s 
training and supervision. CPD does not provide officers or supervisors with adequate training 
and does not encourage or facilitate adequate supervision of officers in the field.”). 
 172. DOJ BALTIMORE REPORT, supra note 125, at 24 (“We find that BPD engages in a pattern 
or practice of making stops, searches, and arrests in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments and Section 14141.”). 
 173. Id. at 6 (“BPD’s stops often lack reasonable suspicion.”).  
 174. Id. at 30 (“BPD officers commonly frisk people during stops without reasonable 
suspicion that the subject of the frisk is armed and dangerous.”); see id. at 6 (“During stops, BPD 
officers frequently pat-down or frisk individuals as a matter of course, without identifying 
necessary grounds to believe that the person is armed and dangerous. And even where an initial 
frisk is justified, we found that officers often violate the Constitution by exceeding the frisk’s 
permissible scope.”). 
 175. Id. at 34 (“Our investigation likewise found reasonable cause to believe that BPD’s 
approach to street-level crime suppression has contributed to officers making thousands of 
unlawful arrests over the past five years.”). 
 176. Id. at 28 (“Many of the unlawful stops we identified appear motivated at least in part by 
officers’ desire to check whether the stopped individuals have outstanding warrants that would 
allow officers to make an arrest or search individuals in hopes of finding illegal firearms or 
narcotics.”). 
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stops exposed a racial bias.177 As the DOJ found, “[r]acially disparate 
impact is present at every stage of [the Baltimore Police 
Department’s] enforcement actions, from the initial decision to stop 
individuals on Baltimore streets to searches, arrests, and uses of 
force.”178 Again, the DOJ did not find that these recurring 
unconstitutional actions were isolated but instead found them to be 
part of systemic, structural problems.179 Accountability systems 
largely failed,180 and training181 and internal disciplinary systems 
were demonstrated to be woefully lacking.182  
Much has already been written about the Ferguson Police 
Department,183 as the DOJ’s investigation revealed a practice of 
 
 177. Id. at 7 (“BPD disproportionately searches African Americans during stops. BPD 
searched African Americans more frequently during pedestrian and vehicle stops, even though 
searches of African Americans were less likely to discover contraband.”). 
 178. Id.; see also id. (“Citywide, BPD stopped African-American residents three times as 
often as white residents after controlling for the population of the area in which the stops 
occurred.”); id. (“African Americans accounted for 91 percent of the 1,800 people charged solely 
with ‘failure to obey’ or ‘trespassing’; 89 percent of the 1,350 charges for making a false 
statement to an officer; and 84 percent of the 6,500 people arrested for ‘disorderly conduct.’ ”). 
 179. Id. at 10 (“BPD’s systemic constitutional and statutory violations are rooted in 
structural failures. BPD fails to use adequate policies, training, supervision, data collection, 
analysis, and accountability systems, has not engaged adequately with the community it polices, 
and does not provide its officers with the tools needed to police effectively.”). 
 180. Id. (“BPD lacks meaningful accountability systems to deter misconduct. The 
Department does not consistently classify, investigate, adjudicate, and document complaints of 
misconduct according to its own policies and accepted law enforcement standards.”); see also id. 
at 134 (“Moreover, BPD conducts minimal pattern analysis of officer activities. The Department 
does not generate any reports or otherwise track patterns in officers’ stops, searches, arrests, 
uses of force, or community interactions.”). 
 181. Id. at 43 (“BPD exacerbates the risk that its aggressive street enforcement tactics will 
lead to constitutional violations by failing to use effective policies, training, oversight, and 
accountability systems.”). 
 182. Id. at 135: 
Despite BPD’s longstanding notice of concerns about its policing activities and 
problems with its internal accountability systems, the Department has failed to 
implement an adequate EIS or other system for tracking or auditing information 
about officer conduct. Rather, BPD has an early intervention system in name only; 
indeed, BPD commanders admitted to us that the Department’s early intervention 
system is effectively nonfunctional. 
 183. See, e.g., John Felipe Acevedo, Restoring Community Dignity Following Police 
Misconduct, 59 HOW. L.J. 621, 633 (2016) (“The shortcomings of the Ferguson Police Department 
came to public attention following the killing of eighteen year old Michael Brown by police officer 
Darren Wilson.”); Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of the 
Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1502 (2016) (“Ferguson, Missouri presents a concrete example of the 
ease with which predatory policing can become an institutional feature of everyday policing.”); 
S. David Mitchell, Ferguson: Footnote or Transformative Event?, 80 MO. L. REV. 943, 944 (2015) 
(“ ‘Ferguson.’ No longer does this name simply represent the geographical boundaries of a city in 
St. Louis County formed initially by white flight from St. Louis City and that has become 
increasingly African American over time. It has come to represent so much more.” (footnote 
omitted)); Michael Pinard, Poor, Black and “Wanted”: Criminal Justice in Ferguson and 
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prioritizing low-level arrests to generate revenue for the municipal 
government.184 These arrests primarily impacted the African 
American population185 and did little to reduce crime. But the DOJ 
report also demonstrated a systemic bias in the use of force186 and in 
recurring violations of the Fourth Amendment.187 Police stopped 
people without reasonable suspicion as part of a larger system of 
revenue collection.188 As in Chicago and Baltimore, the culture in 
Ferguson created a system that allowed recurring police misconduct.  
These federal investigations offer a deep dive into a few specific 
departments. Because of poor data collection and the limitations of 
civil rights lawsuits and federal investigations, however, we do not 
know the extent of the national problem. But we do know that since 
1994, with the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 14141, the DOJ has opened 69 
investigations and entered into 40 reform agreements.189 Just since 
2012, the DOJ has “opened 11 new pattern-or-practice investigations 
and negotiated 19 new reform agreements since 2012.”190  
These investigations confirm that systemic and recurring 
problems of racial discrimination, unconstitutional stops, and 
excessive force remain issues to be addressed.191 The DOJ revelations 
 
Baltimore, 58 HOW. L.J. 857, 862 (2015) (“Pathetically, at the time of the DOJ investigation, only 
four out of fifty-four police officers in Ferguson were Black.”). 
 184. DOJ FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 125, at 15 (“FPD’s approach to law enforcement, 
shaped by the City’s pressure to raise revenue, has resulted in a pattern and practice of 
constitutional violations.”). 
 185. Id. at 4:  
Ferguson’s law enforcement practices overwhelmingly impact African Americans. 
Data collected by the Ferguson Police Department from 2012 to 2014 shows that 
African Americans account for 85% of vehicle stops, 90% of citations, and 93% of 
arrests made by FPD officers, despite comprising only 67% of Ferguson’s population. 
African Americans are more than twice as likely as white drivers to be searched 
during vehicle stops even after controlling for non-race based variables such as the 
reason the vehicle stop was initiated, but are found in possession of contraband 26% 
less often than white drivers, suggesting officers are impermissibly considering race 
as a factor when determining whether to search. 
 186. Id. at 5 (“Nearly 90% of documented force used by FPD officers was used against 
African Americans.”). 
 187. Id. at 15 (“Officers violate the Fourth Amendment in stopping people without 
reasonable suspicion, arresting them without probable cause, and using unreasonable force.”). 
 188. Id. at 16 (“Frequently, officers stop people without reasonable suspicion or arrest them 
without probable cause. Officers rely heavily on the municipal ‘Failure to Comply’ charge, which 
appears to be facially unconstitutional in part, and is frequently abused in practice.”). 
 189. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION’S PATTERN AND 
PRACTICE POLICE REFORM WORK: 1994-PRESENT 3 (Jan. 2017), https://www.justice.gov/crt/ 
file/922421/download [https://perma.cc/QC3S-A792]; see also id. at 15 (“Of 69 total investigations 
since Section 14141’s enactment, the Division has closed 26 investigations without making a 
formal finding of a pattern or practice.”). 
 190. Id. at 1. 
 191. See I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 852 (2008) 
(“Regardless of whether this race-based policing is intentional or not, there is the continuing 
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offer a glimpse of the promise and potential of better data collecting 
mechanisms as a path to expose systemic or recurring patterns of 
misconduct. And at least in cities with documented patterns of 
unconstitutional stops, like Baltimore, Chicago, or Ferguson, such 
data could be used for individual suppression hearings.192  
C. Difficulties in Litigating Systemic or Recurring Violations 
In the face of recurring police problems, and under the 
Supreme Court’s constitutional command to be concerned with such 
systematic transgressions, the question remains: Why do these issues 
not manifest themselves in ordinary Fourth Amendment suppression 
hearings?  
One answer is that the Supreme Court did not explain how 
these systemic or recurring patterns should be proven in court. The 
trial records in Herring and Strieff offered few clues. In Herring, the 
Dale County clerk had testified—somewhat imprecisely—that 
communication problems had arisen “several times.”193 But because 
Chief Justice Robert’s new test had not yet been written into law, 
there was no reason to expend effort to prove systemic or recurring 
problems at the trial level. The fact that database errors may have 
occurred in prior cases or in other counties did not become part of the 
record because it had not been identified as an important factor 
relevant for exclusion.  
In Strieff, the suppression hearing did not include any 
testimony outside of the arresting officer’s.194 The arguments of the 
parties focused on attenuation due to a lawful warrant, not principles 
of error or deterrence.195 In fact, the motions hearing in Strieff offers a 
revealing example of the sparse nature of these types of hearings.196 
The Strieff suppression hearing consisted of one witness—detective 
 
perception, supported by evidence, that police treat citizens differently based on their race.”); 
Simmons, supra note 122, at 365 (“Empirical evidence supports the view that racial profiling is a 
widespread practice of police officers in many communities.”). 
 192. As detailed in Part III, the utility of collecting such data is that it demonstrates 
systemic or recurring problems. In a particular case involving a particular suppression issue, 
this demonstrated pattern should be admissible to prove the systemic and recurring negligence 
required under Herring.  
 193. United States v. Herring, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1292 (M.D. Ala. 2005), aff’d, 492 F.3d 
1212 (11th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (“To be sure, during the first of two suppression 
hearings, Morgan testified as follows: ‘Q. All right. Ma’am, how many times have you had or has 
Dale County had problems, any problems with communicating about warrants?’ ‘A. Several 
times.’ ”). 
 194. Joint Appendix, Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016) (No. 14-1373), 2015 WL 8146388. 
 195. See id. at *29 (“The issue at this point is going to rest on attenuation.”). 
 196. Id.  
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Fackrell—and a quite limited legal argument consisting of a few 
paragraphs of written text.197 Such practice is quite common with 
most pretrial suppression hearings in relatively low-level criminal 
cases. 
This practical reality creates tension with the Supreme Court’s 
stated concern about systemic or recurring problems. In traditional 
practice, judges might well discourage building a record about 
incidents or problems not germane to the case at hand. In fact, one 
might speculate that if Strieff’s counsel asked questions about other 
times detective Fackrell stopped other people without a warrant, the 
lawyer would have been shut down on relevance grounds.198 One 
might imagine a judge would have been reluctant to grant discovery 
requests for department-wide practices, or internal training materials 
about stops or searches, or even detective Fackrell’s own practice. Yet, 
as the United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court 
acknowledged, this unconstitutional practice was a normal police 
practice in Salt Lake City and would have been ripe for inquiry 
because negative exposure presumably would have had a future 
deterrent effect.199  
In addition to practical reality, such a broadening of the 
inquiry to systemic problems requires time and resources. As both 
Justice Sotomayor and Justice Ginsberg warned, such a burden 
negatively impacts indigent defendants.200 In public defense systems 
already underfunded and overwhelmed with cases and starved of 
proper investigative resources or expert funding, any requirement 
that defense counsel challenge patterns and practices of police 
misconduct would ordinarily be unrealistic.201 Without better sources 
 
 197. Id.  
 198. Relevance is defined in terms of whether the evidence has “any tendency to make a fact 
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 401. Despite the 
term’s broad construct, many judges view evidence about events not related to the defendant in 
court as irrelevant.  
 199. See Strieff, at 2069 (describing running warrant checks as a “ ‘routine procedure’ or 
‘common practice’ ” (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ¶¶ 2, 76 
P.3d 1159, 1160)); see id. at 2073 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“As Fackrell testified, checking for 
outstanding warrants during a stop is the ‘normal’ practice of South Salt Lake City police.”). 
 200. See supra notes 117, 121 and accompanying text.  
 201. See generally Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal 
Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1031–36 (2006) (discussing deficiencies in the 
right to counsel for poor people in criminal cases); JUST. POL’Y INST., SYSTEM OVERLOAD: THE 
COSTS OF UNDER-RESOURCING PUBLIC DEFENSE 6–16 (July 2011), http://www.justicepolicy.org/ 
uploads/justicepolicy/documents/system_overload_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/YHE6-GV7Z] 
(highlighting the ways in which underresourcing hinders adequate public defense); NAT’L RIGHT 
TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED 49–99 (Apr. 2009), http:/www.constitutionproject.org/ 
pdf/139.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6TN-76XX] (exploring impediments to competent defense 
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of police data, one simply cannot expect ordinary, overworked defense 
attorneys to conduct full-scale investigations into pattern and practice 
problems in local police departments for low-level motions hearings.  
Post-Herring there have been a handful of federal cases that 
attempted to take seriously the Supreme Court’s interest in systemic 
or recurring negligence.202 In United States v. Esquivel-Rios, the Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided a case involving an 
incomplete (and misleading) license plate database that resulted in 
the traffic stop of the defendant.203 Before deciding the case, the 
appellate court sent it back to the trial court in order to develop a 
factual record on the scope of negligent recordkeeping.204 At issue was 
the extent of errors in the computerized database.205 The appellate 
court recognized that in order to decide the suppression issue, it 
needed to understand the type and magnitude of errors in the 
database.206  
In other cases, testimony about systemic practices of 
misconduct resulted in the suppression of evidence.207 In yet other 
cases, the lack of evidence of recurring violations allowed the court to 
avoid suppression.208 But the reported cases have thus far been rather 
 
services, such as insufficient funding, excessive caseloads, and lack of performance standards, 
training, and oversight). 
 202. Claire Angelique Nolasco et al., What Herring Hath Wrought: An Analysis of Post-
Herring Cases in the Federal Courts, 38 AM. J. CRIM. L. 221, 233–36 (2011). 
203. 786 F.3d 1299, 1301–03 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 280 (2015). 
 204. Id. at 1301. (“[W]e concluded that the record lacked the quantity and quality of 
information necessary for us to determine whether Mr. Esquivel–Rios’s Fourth Amendment 
rights had been violated. We remanded to allow the district court to reconsider its Fourth 
Amendment ruling in light of our discussion.” (citation omitted)). 
205. Id. at 1301–03. 
206. Id. at 1306 (“Whether the rule applies in any given case, however, is context-dependent. 
In other words, ‘suppression is not an automatic consequence of a Fourth Amendment 
violation.’ ” (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009))). 
 207. See United States v. Edwards, 666 F.3d 877, 886 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he circumstances 
under which Edwards was searched are likely to recur. Indeed, the evidence in this case showed 
that Baltimore City police officers conduct searches inside the underwear of about 50 percent of 
arrestees, in the same general manner as the strip search performed on Edwards.”); see also id. 
at 886 n.7:  
Detective Bailey testified on cross-examination at the suppression hearing, in 
pertinent part, as follows: “Question: So is it customary for Baltimore City police 
officers to search the underwear area or the dip areas of people that are arrested? 
Detective Bailey: I would say it’s about 50 percent of the time, because nobody likes to 
do that search. . . . But if you have reason to believe that there might be something, 
then it’s a good idea to check, because often they do hide things down there.” 
 208. United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 256 (4th Cir. 2012): 
We have no proof before us showing that victims’ DNA profiles or individuals cleared 
of suspicion in an investigation are routinely entered into the local database 
by . . . [Prince George’s County Police Department], or have been entered into the 
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few in number, and the practical and legal barriers have proven 
prohibitive to litigation.209  
Therefore, in the absence of a full federal investigation and in 
recognition of the practical realities of trial practice, a new solution to 
expose systemic misconduct must be conceived. Fortuitously, a 
solution potentially exists in the form of new surveillance technologies 
developed to police the citizenry. These big data technologies involving 
monitoring, predictive analytics, and data mining offer new ways to 
visualize and prove systemic and recurring problems of policing. This 
is the subject of the next Part.  
 
II. BLUE DATA: INVERTING THE ARCHITECTURE OF BIG DATA 
SURVEILLANCE 
In choosing the language “systemic or recurring negligence,” 
the Supreme Court invited defendants to prove a certain type of 
policing problem.210 To know whether police are negligent, one needs 
data on policing practices at both a systemic and individual-officer 
level. This is the promise of “blue data”—quantified information of 
actual police practice in searchable, sortable, and usable formats.  
To envision the potential of blue data, one needs to understand 
the existing big data policing capacities being developed in major U.S. 
cities. These technologies will fundamentally reshape criminal 
investigation by using a combination of data mining, social network 
analysis, and video, audio, sensory, and predictive analytics to 
identify, track, and monitor citizens living in certain neighborhoods.211 
Currently adopted in piecemeal fashion in different cities, the 
technologies exist, have proven effective, and will likely expand in 
sophistication, integration, and reach.  
This Part examines how digital surveillance technologies have 
been used to track those suspected of criminal activities; how these 
same technologies could be used to address the accountability 
 
database in any other instance. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the acts 
here are likely to reoccur.; 
United States v. Campbell, 603 F.3d 1218, 1235 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Defendant has demonstrated 
at most a single instance of an arguably negligent breakdown in communication among the 
WPD. He has not demonstrated what the Supreme Court appears to have indicated is required—
‘recurring or systemic negligence.’ ” (quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 144)). 
 209. As discussed in Section I.C, these barriers involve caseload, cost, and procedural rules 
that limit the development of a factual record to show systemic misconduct. See supra notes 194–
201. 
 210. Herring, 555 U.S. at 144. 
 211. See FERGUSON, supra note 1, at 4. 
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problems of police violence, racial bias, and unconstitutional practices 
raised in Part I; and how proof of those problems could be introduced 
in suppression hearings to show systemic or recurring police 
negligence. While not comprehensive to the vast array of new 
technologies being developed, this Part looks at three widely adopted 
new policing tools: (1) data-mining technologies, (2) monitoring 
technologies, and (3) predictive technologies.  
A. Data-Mining Technologies 
The revolution commonly known as “big data computing” 
involves new capabilities to collect, store, and sort through vast 
quantities of data using sophisticated analytical and machine-learning 
tools.212 The quantity of data being created defies comprehension—the 
only way this amount of information can become practically useful is 
because computing power and analytics have matched its growth.213 
Within this expanding data stream, data mining offers new ways to 
search. In broad terms, data mining offers the ability to target 
particular items of information and visualize patterns of both expected 
and unexpected insights.214  
As to targeting, data mining allows researchers (or 
investigators) to locate a particular data point out of an overwhelming 
amount of information. For example, only digital automation and 
search capabilities could help the FBI match a suspect using facial 
recognition technology from a collection of fifty million mugshots.215 
Without the ability to quickly sort through images, the number of 
photographs would overwhelm traditional, human-matching 
capabilities.  
 
 212. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT 
WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 2 (2013); Kenneth Cukier, Data, Data 
Everywhere, ECONOMIST (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/15557443 
[https://perma.cc/SU2U-PPV8]; Steve Lohr, How Big Data Became So Big, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/business/how-big-data-became-so-big-unboxed.html 
[https://perma.cc/NVX8-YM84]. 
 213. See EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: A REPORT ON ALGORITHMIC SYSTEMS, 
OPPORTUNITY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 5–10 (May 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/ 
default/files/microsites/ostp/2016_0504_data_discrimination.pdf [https://perma.cc/H3BJ-PXS6] 
(introducing the concept of big data and its ramifications). 
 214. See generally Zarsky, supra note 3, at 287 (discussing data mining’s role in “clos[ing] the 
intelligence gap constantly deepening between governments and their new targets”); Note, Data 
Mining, Dog Sniffs, and the Fourth Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 691, 693–94 (2014) (defining 
data mining as the process by which people or algorithms examine data for patterns of useful 
information). 
 215. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-267, FACE RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY: FBI 
SHOULD BETTER ENSURE PRIVACY AND ACCURACY 10 (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.gao.gov/ 
assets/680/677098.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6E6-4S3G]; PERPETUAL LINE-UP, supra note 22.  
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As to pattern recognition, algorithms can be created to find 
suspected criminal activity. For example, most credit card fraud 
warnings and insider trading tips arise because investigators have 
programmed computer algorithms to identify unusual patterns of 
behavior that correlate with criminal activity.216 But sometimes big 
data searches can uncover entirely unexpected correlations.217 In the 
criminal justice space, for example, investigators in Richmond, 
Virginia, found that certain burglaries were more predictive of sexual 
assaults than were prior sexual assaults218 and that sex trafficking 
could be discovered by looking at unusual credit card transactions in 
nail salon operations.219 Whether used to predict consumer or criminal 
activities, the same technologies could be used to crunch, and thus 
comprehend, the accumulated big data.  
1. Mining Criminal Clues 
Law enforcement routinely mines databases for investigatory 
purposes.220 Large criminal justice databases include criminal 
histories and identifying data for millions of people.221 Biometric 
databases with DNA samples, fingerprints, palm prints, photographs, 
and even iris scans allow police to identify suspects with relative 
 
 216. Philip K. Chan et al., Distributed Data Mining in Credit Card Fraud Detection, 14 IEEE 
INTELLIGENT SYS. 67 (1999), http://cs.fit.edu/~pkc/papers/ieee-is99.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ULD-
N3JU]; Peter P. Swire, Privacy and Information Sharing in the War on Terrorism, 51 VILL. L. 
REV. 951, 964 (2006). 
 217. In the consumer space, Walmart discovered that impending hurricanes result in an 
uptick of purchases of strawberry Poptarts and Target learned to predict pregnant women from a 
combination of common household purchases. Cathy O’Neil, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: 
HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 98 (2016); Charles Duhigg, 
How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html [https://perma.cc/T2LK-UX89]; Constance L. Hayes, 
What Wal-Mart Knows About Customers’ Habits, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2004), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/14/business/yourmoney/what-walmart-knows-about-customers 
-habits.html [https://perma.cc/J3QC-U7RW]. 
 218. Colleen McCue & Andre Parker, Connecting the Dots: Data Mining and Predictive 
Analytics in Law Enforcement and Intelligence Analysis, 10 POLICE CHIEF 115, 122 (2003). 
 219. Tierney Sneed, How Big Data Battles Human Trafficking, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 14, 2015), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/01/14/how-big-data-is-being-used-in-the-fight-
against-human-trafficking [https://perma.cc/NB3A-PSG9]. 
 220. See Daniel J. Steinbock, Data Matching, Data Mining, and Due Process, 40 GA. L. REV. 
1, 4 (2005) (“Data mining’s computerized sifting of personal characteristics and behaviors 
(sometimes called ‘pattern matching’) is a more thorough, regular, and extensive version of 
criminal profiling, which has become both more widespread and more controversial in recent 
years.”). 
 221. See generally Logan & Ferguson, supra note 84, at 541 (discussing the growing scope of 
criminal justice data collection). 
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ease.222 Court records, gang and sex offender registries, and other 
digital collections of criminal justice information provide new ways to 
investigate and monitor individuals.223 As traditionally used, these 
databases can be searched for a particular piece of information. If 
police need to match a fingerprint found at a crime scene, they can 
compare the lifted and digitized print with millions of similar 
prints.224 If police need to run a name through the National Criminal 
Information Center to find an address, they have access to millions of 
addresses with a single query.225  
Big data policing rests on the idea of creating databases out of 
the almost incalculable number of variables that determine the 
“where,” “when,” and “what” of criminal activity. In the past few 
decades, crime analysts have been plotting and mapping these crime 
patterns.226 Particular hotspots can be identified by address.227 Crime 
patterns can be identified by neighborhood or block. In doing so, 
recurring problem areas can be visualized and environmental factors 
 
 222. See Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: 
Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 415 (2012) (“[Remote 
Biometric Identification] technologies present capabilities significantly different from that which 
the government has held at any point in U.S. history.”); Logan, supra note 15, at 1575 n.91 
(“ ‘Biometrics’ refers either to biological or physiological characteristics usable for automatic 
recognition of individuals on the basis of such characteristics.” (citing NAT’L SCI. & TECH. 
COUNCIL, PRIVACY & BIOMETRICS: BUILDING A CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION 4 (Apr. 14, 2006), 
http://www.biometrics.gov/Documents/privacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9QH-JYGH])); Daniel J. 
Steinbock, National Identity Cards: Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues, 56 FLA. L. REV. 697, 
704 (2004) (“Biometrics are identification techniques based on some unique, physiological, and 
difficult-to-alienate characteristic.”).  
 223. WAYNE A. LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY 
NOTIFICATION LAWS IN AMERICA 22–30 (2009) (discussing local criminal registration laws). 
 224. Erin Murphy, Databases, Doctrine & Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 803, 806–08 (2010). 
 225. David M. Bierie, National Public Registry of Active-Warrants: A Policy Proposal, 79 
FED. PROB. 27, 28 (2015) (“[NCIC] is the central transactional data system that tracks the 
nation’s warrants. All police agencies can enter their warrants in the system and check the 
system to identify whether a given individual has a warrant.”). 
 226. See generally Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the Fourth Amendment: 
Redrawing “High-Crime Areas,” 63 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 184–86 (2011) (discussing the history of 
crime mapping programs). 
 227. James G. Cameron, Spatial Analysis Tools for Identifying Hotspots, in MAPPING CRIME: 
UNDERSTANDING HOT SPOTS 35, 35 (John E. Eck et al. eds., 2005): 
A central concern of hot spot analyses of crime is assessing the degree of spatial 
randomness observed in the data. Most of the available tools provide different ways of 
determining whether the underlying pattern is uniform over space or whether 
significant clusters or other spatial patterns exist, which are not compatible with 
spatial randomness.;  
John E. Eck, Crime Hot Spots: What They Are, Why We Have Them, and How to Map Them, in 
MAPPING CRIME, supra, at 1, 4 (“The most basic form of a hot spot is a place that has many 
crimes. A place can be an address, street corner, store, house, or any other small location, most of 
which can be seen by a person standing at its center.”).  
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identified.228 As computer power grew, and as data collection 
expanded, so did the capabilities of crime analysts and the 
development of data-crunching systems to help target and predict 
criminal activity in particular places.229 Now crime maps include not 
only the place, time, and type of crime but also a whole host of other 
environmental factors that might increase the risk of future crime.230 
Out of the seeming chaos of individual crimes, a pattern of activity can 
be visualized and addressed.  
In addition to seeing where crime is occurring, a few police 
organizations are proactively trying to create large-scale social 
network analysis datasets that can be queried for clues or 
investigatory leads about who is committing those crimes.231 A good 
example of this data creation is found in the Los Angeles Police 
Department (“LAPD”). The LAPD has partnered with a private 
company—Palantir—to begin collecting data about chronic offenders 
in the city.232 This collection process involves three distinct steps. 
First, police identify particular chronic offenders who are suspected to 
be involved in recurring criminal activity.233 Second, the police 
proactively contact these offenders in an effort to collect personal data 
about them.234 These contacts, recorded on “field interview cards,” 
 
 228. Anthony A. Braga et al., The Relevance of Micro Places to Citywide Robbery Trends: A 
Longitudinal Analysis of Robbery Incidents at Street Corners and Block Faces in Boston, 48 J. 
RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 7, 11 (2011) (“Studies of the spatial distribution of robbery in urban 
environments have also revealed that a small number of micro places generate a 
disproportionate number of robberies. Certain high-risk facilities, such as bars, convenience 
stores, and banks, at particular places also tend to experience a disproportionate amount of 
robbery . . . .”); Lisa Tompson & Michael Townsley, (Looking) Back to the Future: Using Space-
Time Patterns to Better Predict the Location of Street Crime, 12 INT’L J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 23, 
24 (2010) (“Research has repeatedly demonstrated that offenders prefer to return to a location 
associated with a high chance of success instead of choosing random targets.”). 
 229. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1109, 
1126–32 (2017) (“Predictive Policing . . . involved the collection of historical crime data (time, 
place, and type) and the application of an experimental computer algorithm that used data to 
predict likely areas of criminal activity.”). 
 230. Id.  
 231. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, NOLA FOR LIFE: COMPREHENSIVE MURDER REDUCTION 
STRATEGY (Apr. 2016), http://nolaforlife.org/files/n4l-2016-comprehensive-murder-reduction-
strategy-b/ [https://perma.cc/UU4N-Q6NM]; Jason Sheuh, New Orleans Cuts Murder Rate Using 
Data Analytics, GOVTECH.COM (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.govtech.com/data/New-Orleans-Cuts-
Murder-Rate-Using-Data-Analytics.html [https://perma.cc/9DBJ-FV9T] (explaining how the city 
of New Orleans monitors criminal social networks in an effort to reduce crime). 
 232. Sarah Brayne, Big Data Surveillance: The Case of Policing, 82 AM. SOC. REV. 977, 987 
(2017); Matt McFarland, A Rare Look Inside LAPD’s Use of Data, CNN MONEY (Sept. 11, 2017), 
https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/11/technology/future/lapd-big-data-palantir [https://perma.cc/ 
B8QN-W7PA]. 
 233. See Brayne, supra note 232, at 987 (“[Chronic offender field identification cards] are key 
intelligence tools for law enforcement and were one of the first data sources integrated into 
Palantir.”). 
 234. Id. 
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involve collecting information about where they were spotted, who 
they were with, the type of car they were driving, and any other 
identifiable information about the target or his associates.235 Third, 
police load this data into a large central database so that each field 
can be queried.236 As a result, if police want to search for the 
whereabouts of a particular gang member, they are able to access 
information related to where he has been spotted and who he has been 
spotted with over the last year and may then develop a network of 
social and geolocational connections. Each variable can be connected 
to any other variable in the database.  
These data points then serve as the building blocks for a more 
ambitious networked system. The inputted data is combined with 
other crime data, some public government data, and even some 
consumer data to create a searchable network of criminal offenders.237 
Again, each variable can be separately sorted and ordered. If police 
want to track a phone number or address across different groups of 
people, they can find a connecting phone number.238 If police want to 
track all visitors to a suspected house, they can geofence the area to 
identify any car that drives through.239 All of the data is inputted and 
connected through network analysis.240 The computer model for this 
social network technology evolved from developments tracking 
international terrorists who needed to be linked, monitored, and 
watched across different jurisdictions.241  
In terms of search capabilities, police can target a particular 
person (or phone number, or license plate) for investigation. For 
example, a partial license plate number, a partial description, and a 
 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 992–93. 
 237. See id. at 993–96 (explaining how Palantir located a public database on foreclosures and 
added the public information to its system). 
 238. See id. at 994 (describing how the police acquire and connect people to various phone 
numbers). 
 239. Chris Hackett & Michael Grosinger, The Growth of Geofence Tools Within the Mapping 
Technology Sphere, PDVWIRELESS (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.pdvwireless.com/the-growth-of-
geofence-tools-within-the-mapping-technology-sphere [https://perma.cc/P3VA-K29M]. 
 240. Jenna McLaughlin, L.A. Activists Want to Bring Surveillance Conversation Down to 
Earth, INTERCEPT (Apr. 6, 2016, 8:22 AM), https://theintercept.com/2016/04/06/l-a-activists-want-
to-bring-surveillance-conversation-down-to-earth [https://perma.cc/252Z-94A8]. 
241. Mark Harris, How Peter Thiel’s Secretive Data Company Pushed into Policing, WIRED 
(Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/how-peter-thiels-secretive-data-company-pushed-
into-policing [https://perma.cc/B686-QS2E]; Peter Waldman, Lizette Chapman & Jordan 
Robertson, Palantir Knows Everything About You, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 19, 2008), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2018-palantir-peter-thiel [https://perma.cc/7B4M-NPDZ]; 
see also Palantir, Palantir at the Los Angeles Police Department, YOUTUBE (Jan. 25, 2013), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aJ-u7yDwC6g [https://perma.cc/P8WB-BSLC]. 
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tattoo can transform into an actual human target by querying the 
database.  
In terms of patterns, the same network analysis can be used to 
track gang members or others involved in large-scale criminal activity. 
In Chicago, for example, network analysis found that most homicides 
involve rival gangs of young men.242 The circles of retaliatory killings 
can be studied using social network analysis.243 Police can develop a 
database that tracks where, why, and with whom their targets are 
associating. Police can see crime not only as a series of individual acts 
but as part of a larger pattern of relationships and connections. As 
might be expected from the name, “social network analysis” reveals 
hidden connections that otherwise would not be identified.  
As a technical matter, the innovation for policing is the ability 
to break down ordinary life into discrete and searchable variables. 
Repeated problem actors can be identified. Recurring crimes can be 
linked with associated groups. The general point is that these types of 
technologies allow data to be queried in unusual ways to find new 
insights to identify and study crime patterns. Whatever the subject 
matter of the database, the technology allows for new mechanisms to 
manipulate and study the data. While hard questions remain about 
the cost of these systems, the interoperability of linking different 
datasets and the willingness of police to embrace a data-driven 
strategy combine to offer new ways to reduce crime.  
2. Mining Policing Data 
Police officers generate data during every single shift. Location, 
contacts, actions, observations, and arrests are all data points.244 For 
 
 242. TRACEY MEARES, ANDREW V. PAPACHRISTOS & JEFFREY FAGAN, HOMICIDE AND GUN 
VIOLENCE IN CHICAGO: EVALUATION AND SUMMARY OF THE PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS 
PROGRAM (2009), https://www.flintridge.org/newsresources/documents/HomicideandGun 
ViolenceinChicago-EvaluationandSummaryoftheProjectSafeNeighborhoodsProgram-2009.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TMM5-8HFB]; see also David M. Kennedy, Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, 
High-Crime Settings, and a Theory of Prevention, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 449, 459 (1997) (“Finally, 
much crime–violent, drug, property, and domestic–is concentrated in certain 
neighborhoods . . . .”); Tracey Meares, Andrew V. Papachristos & Jeffrey Fagan, Attention Felons: 
Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 223 (2007); 
Andrew V. Papachristos et al., Social Networks and the Risk of Gunshot Injury, 89 J. URB. 
HEALTH 992, 993 (2012) [hereinafter Papachristos et al., Social Networks]; Andrew V. 
Papachristos, Commentary: CPD’s Crucial Choice: Treat Its List As Offenders or as Potential 
Victims?, CHI. TRIB. (July 29, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
news/opinion/commentary/ct-gun-violence-list-chicago-police-murder-perspec-0801-jm-20160729-
story.html [https://perma.cc/SR7C-852Q]. 
 243. See sources cited supra note 242. 
 244. Amy Feldman, How Mark43’s Scott Crouch, 25, Built Software to Help Police 
Departments Keep Cops on the Street, FORBES (Oct. 19, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
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supervisors or communities concerned with police accountability, this 
data is incredibly valuable. Do police stop more people of color? Do 
police stop people more in particular neighborhoods? Is police 
suspicion justified by successful outcomes (e.g., recovering weapons or 
contraband)? With data, police are able to determine if there are 
particular persons or patterns that raise concerns.  
As with collected crime data, police could mine data they 
routinely collect to identify recurring violations of the Constitution 
and study systemic violations through social network analysis. One 
example of data-mining police practices arises from the NYPD stop 
and frisk litigation. As discussed previously, this data analysis 
ultimately led to the stop and frisk practice being declared 
unconstitutional.245 But it also inspired a team of researchers led by 
Professors Sharad Goel, Ravi Shroff, and David Sklansky to examine 
the data to see if they could predict which types of stop and frisks 
would more likely result in the recovery of contraband.246 As they 
explained, data could predict the likelihood that a stop and frisk would 
uncover contraband or other evidence based on the officer’s prior 
knowledge, such as time, location, characteristics of the suspect, and 
the suspicious circumstance at hand.247 The researchers called this 
prediction a “stop-level hit rate,” which can be operationalized to 
predict the probability of recovering a weapon.248 According to analysis 
from the actual NYPD data, “43% of the Terry stops carried out by the 




 245. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“In conclusion, 
I find that the City is liable for violating plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.”); 
Declaration of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. at 2, Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (No. 08 Civ. 01034(SAS)), 
2011 WL 7552634; see also CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., STOP AND FRISK: THE HUMAN IMPACT (2012), 
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/08/the-human-impact-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8RRX-P9AN]; CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., RACIAL DISPARITY IN NYPD STOPS-AND-
FRISKS 1, 10, 15 (Jan. 15, 2009), https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/Report-CCR-
NYPD-Stop-and-Frisk_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8NC-2ZUV].  
 246. Sharad Goel et al., Combatting Police Discrimination in the Age of Big Data, 20 NEW 
CRIM. L. REV. 181 (2017).  
 247. Id. at 187 (“The data can be used to compute the likelihood that any particular stop-
and-frisk will result, for example, in the discovery of particular kinds of evidence . . . .”). 
 248. Id. at 187–88:  
[T]his information is recorded in what the NYPD calls a “UF-250” report, and it can be 
used to estimate a “stop-level hit rate”—the ex ante probability of discovering a 
weapon, based on all the factors that were known to the officer before the Terry stop. 
The stop-level hit rate, or “SHR,” can be thought of as a measure of the strength of the 
evidence supporting the suspicion that the individual to be stopped and frisked has a 
gun. 
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had less than a 1% chance of actually resulting in the discovery of a 
weapon.”249 
The researchers came to this determination through 
sophisticated data analysis of the information already collected by the 
NYPD. Essentially, researchers collected data from NYPD UF-250 
forms, only focusing on information that would have been available to 
officers when making a decision about whether to stop or not.250 They 
then built a computer model that incorporated numerous variables, 
including:  
[D]emographic information about the suspect (sex, race, age, height, weight, and build); 
location of the stop (precinct; inside or outside; and on public transit, in public housing, 
or neither), date and time of the stop (year, month, day of week, and time of day); the 
recorded reasons for the stop (e.g., “furtive movements” or “high crime area”); whether 
the stop was the result of a radio run; whether the officer was in uniform; how long the 
officer observed the suspect before initiating the stop; and the “local hit rate” of stops at 
that location.251 
Then, utilizing this model, researchers examined which of the 472,344 
stops from 2008 through 2010 recovered a weapon.252 By considering 
recovery of a weapon a successful stop, researchers were able to isolate 
the variables that might contribute to successful stops and those 
variables that likely do not. The model included 7,705 predictive 
features.253 This model was then applied to stops for 2011 and 2012, 
under the reasoning that if the predictive model could isolate those 
variables that mattered to effective stops in 2008 through 2010, then 
the researchers should be able to predict the outcome for stops in 2011 
and 2012.254  
The results were impressively accurate. The model predicted 
eighty-three percent of successful stops.255 Equally helpful, the model 
could predict which types of stops would not be successful. For 
example, a stop-hit rate analysis showed some standard police 
 
 249. Id. at 187. 
 250. Id. at 211–12. UF-250 forms are NYPD documents that record the type of stop, the 
justifications for the stop, and the time and place of the stop.  
 251. Id. at 212. 
 252. Id. at 211–12. 
 253. Id. at 212. 
 254. Id.  
 255. Id. at 212–13: 
The results produced by the SHR method are dramatic. First, the model turns out to 
be highly accurate. To evaluate the model, we selected random pairs of cases from 
among the 2011 and 2012 stops where a weapon was ultimately found in exactly one 
stop of the pair. Presented only with the stop-level predictors (and not the outcomes), 
a completely uninformative model would do no better than chance at determining in 
which one of the two stops a weapon was found. In contrast, we found that our SHR 
model correctly picked out the stop with the weapon 83 percent of the time, indicating 
good predictive performance. 
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justifications for a stop, such as “the suspect made furtive 
movements,” did not correlate with the recovery of a weapon.256 The 
ability to predict unsuccessful stops enables the model to assist in 
determining how stop and frisk practices could be redirected to be 
more effective257 and less discriminatory.258  
Three conclusions arise from this experiment in data-mining 
stop and frisk statistics. First, the stop-hit rate could be used to show 
that whole categories of police practice—that is, systemic patterns—
were both ineffective and racially discriminatory.259 Second, the stop-
hit rate could be used retrospectively to determine in particular cases 
whether the officer did in fact have reasonable suspicion to conduct 
the stop and thus empirically support a court’s Fourth Amendment 
conclusion.260 Finally, the stop-hit rate could be used to create a 
predictive tool to assist officers in deciding whether to stop a 
suspect.261 All of these possibilities are now recognized because 
scholars saw the value in studying blue data.  
As another example of the potential to quantify and mine police 
practices, Stanford University Professor Jennifer Eberhardt led a 
team of researchers in a two-year data-driven study of the Oakland 
 
 256. Id. at 188 (“SHR analysis reveals that some of the standard justifications for pedestrian 
stops that the UF-250 has employed—‘furtive movements,’ for example—are unhelpful in 
identifying suspects who actually have weapons; avoiding the use of those factors would make 
stops less discriminatory and more successful.” (citation omitted)). 
 257. Id. (“The SHRs can thus provide a road map for redirecting stop-and-frisk practices to 
make them, simultaneously, less racially lopsided in their impact and more effective at finding 
what the police say they are looking for.”). 
 258. Id. (“But the SHR method does more than that. It pinpoints particular categories of 
Terry stops for CPW that both (a) are relatively unlikely to actually find a weapon, and (b) 
impose an especially disproportionate burden on racial minorities.”).  
 259. Id. (“And these low-odds stops had a heavy racial tilt: 49 percent of the stops of blacks 
fell below the 1 percent probability threshold, as did 34 percent of the stops of Hispanics, 
compared with only 19 percent of the stops of whites.”); see also id. at 215 (“Third, the SHR 
method provides strong, numerical support for the conclusion reached in Floyd: that the stop-
and-frisk practices of the NYPD discriminated against racial minorities, particularly blacks.”). 
 260. Id. at 217: 
Fourth, the SHR method not only allows one to estimate the aggregate number of 
stops that fall below a specified probability threshold, but also yields a quantitative 
measure of the evidence supporting a stop-and-frisk in each particular case, which can 
in turn be used to determine whether “reasonable articulable suspicion” existed. 
 261. Id. at 188 (“More ambitiously, SHR analysis could be used to craft a simple heuristic for 
officers to use on the street to determine which suspects to stop and frisk, drastically reducing 
the disparate impact and increasing the ‘efficiency’ of the searches.”); see also id. at 218: 
Finally—and more speculatively—SHR analysis can be used not just to assess an 
officer’s decision to conduct a Terry stop after the fact, but also to guide that decision 
in the first place. Because the SHR is calculated from information available to the 
officer at the time the decision is made to carry out a stop-and-frisk, the method also 
could be used, in theory, to inform the stop decision. 
Ferguson_ PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/25/2019  11:10 PM 
604 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:2:561 
Police Department.262 Initiated by a federal court order, the project 
sought to examine whether racial bias impacted policing in 
Oakland.263 The methodology involved an intensive data dive into the 
records of the police department, examining stops, arrests, use of 
handcuffs, narrative scripts in police reports, and the language used 
in police stops (obtained from body camera footage).264 In many cases, 
this data is similar to the data described in Professor Sarah Brayne’s 
study, but with the focus inverted from tracking civilians to tracking 
police officers.265 The data showed that Oakland police treated people 
of different races in different and seemingly discriminatory ways.266 
For example, in studying police contacts, the researchers 
examined 28,119 self-initiated police stops over a thirteen-month 
period.267 Each of these stops generated a Field Interview/Stop Data 
Report (“FI/SDR”) which could be broken down into different data 
fields, including “encounter variables,” “officer variables,” and “census 
track variables.”268 Encounter variables included the reason for the 
encounter; the justification for the stop (reasonable suspicion, 
probable cause, traffic violation, probation or parole status, or 
consensual encounter); the time, date, and day of the week that the 
stop occurred; the type of stop (vehicle, pedestrian, or other); and the 
policing area in which the stop occurred, as well as the gender, age, 
 
 262. REBECCA C. HETEY ET AL., DATA FOR CHANGE: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF POLICE, 
STOPS, SEARCHES, HANDCUFFINGS, AND ARRESTS IN OAKLAND, CALIF., 2013-2014 (June 23, 2016), 
https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:by412gh2838/Data%20for%20Change%20%28June%2023%
29.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MSM-5Z4B]. 
 263. Id. at 11 (“In May 2014, the City of Oakland contracted with our team of Stanford 
University researchers to assist the Oakland Police Department (OPD) in complying with a 
federal order to collect and analyze data on OPD officers’ self-initiated stops
 
of pedestrians and 
vehicles by race.” (citation omitted)). 
 264. Id. at 12–26 (providing an overview of the data that the study analyzed); see also id. at 9 
(referencing the researchers’ “[d]evelopment of computational tools to analyze linguistic data 
from body-worn cameras”). 
 265. See supra notes 232–237 and accompanying text (describing the Los Angeles Police 
Department’s collection of data on particular chronic offenders).  
 266. HETEY, supra note 262, at 9: 
Across our research programs, we indeed uncovered evidence that OPD officers treat 
people of different races differently. At the same time, we found little evidence that 
this disparate treatment arose from overt bias or purposeful discrimination. Instead, 
our research suggests that many subtle and unexamined cultural norms, beliefs, and 
practices sustain disparate treatment. 
 267. Id. at 12 (“During this 13-month time period, 28,119 stops were recorded by 510 sworn 
OPD officers.”); id. at 16 (“Members of the OPD are required to complete a stop data form for all 
self-initiated encounters that involve one or more persons subject to detention, arrest, search, or 
request to search.” (citation omitted)). 
 268. Id. at 11 (“Our task was to analyze the reports that OPD officers completed after every 
stop they initiated between April 1, 2013, and April 30, 2014. These reports are called Field 
Interview/Stop Data Reports (FI/SDR), and the information they contain is called stop data.”). 
Ferguson_ PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/25/2019  11:10 PM 
2019] EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN THE AGE OF BLUE DATA 605 
and race of the suspect.269 The system lists officer variables, including 
the officers’ race, gender, age, experience level, type of assignment, 
squad, and a link to the individual employee ID.270 Census tract 
variables included information about the area of the stop, including 
the address where the stop occurred; the area’s crime rate, population 
demographics, total population, population density, and land area; the 
age and race demographics of the population; and the percentage of 
the population living in poverty in the area, among other 
socioeconomic variables.271  
Using this data, researchers were able to study patterns of 
police stops and control for other potential influences. Researchers 
found that police officers stopped more African Americans than 
Whites, even after controlling “for neighborhood crime rates and 
demographics; officer race, gender, and experience; and other factors 
that shape police actions.”272 Despite African Americans only making 
up twenty-eight percent of the population, they were stopped sixty 
percent of the time, nearly three times more than Hispanics, who 
made up the next most common racial group.273  
The same racial disparity could be observed in how police 
treated suspects after they had been stopped. For example, the data 
showed that African American men were handcuffed in one out of 
every four stops, compared to one out of every fifteen stops for White 
men.274 Again, even controlling for neighborhood crime rate, African 
Americans were more likely to be placed in handcuffs.275 Similarly, 
African American men were searched in one out of five stops compared 
to one out of twenty stops of White men.276 Again, even controlling for 
crime rate and the racial makeup of neighborhood, African Americans 
were searched more with no increase in recovered contraband.277 
 
 269. Id. at 49–51. 
 270. Id. at 52–53. 
 271. Id. at 54–60. 
 272. Id. at 10. 
 273. Id. at 14 (“African Americans were the racial group most often stopped . . . . Sixty 
percent of stops, or nearly 17,000 stops, were of African Americans. Stops of African Americans 
were made at a rate of more than three times that of the next most common group, Hispanics.”). 
 274. Id. at 90 (“Excluding arrests, African American men were handcuffed in 1 out of every 4 
stops vs. 1 in every 15 stops for White men.”). 
 275. Id. (“Even controlling for multiple covariates like neighborhood crime rate, African 
Americans were still significantly more likely to be handcuffed (excluding arrests) than Whites 
in 4 out of 5 of Oakland’s policing areas.”). 
 276. Id. at 109 (“Excluding incident to arrest, inventory, and probation/parole searches, 
Black men were searched in 1 out of 5 stops, vs. 1 out of 20 stops for White men.”). 
 277. Id.: 
Even after controlling for a host of factors, including the crime rate and the racial 
demographics of the neighborhood where the stop was made, African Americans were 
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Finally, African Americans were arrested more than one out of every 
six stops versus arrests for only one out of every fourteen White men 
stopped, with the arrest discrepancy most obvious in arrests for traffic 
violations.278  
At a more granular level, researchers found that female officers 
made fewer stops,279 as did more experienced officers.280 Similarly, 
more senior officers arrested less and used handcuffs less, but 
seniority did not have an impact on the number of searches 
conducted.281 The analysis also demonstrated that “Asian officers 
show[ed] less of an African American–White gap in searches.”282 
African American officers, on the other hand, “show[ed] more of an 
African American-White gap in arrests.”283  
This data-mining approach was also applied to the narratives 
of the police reports. As one of the pilot programs, the Stanford 
researchers developed a machine-learning technique to sort through 
the narratives of the FI/SDR.284 This model could quickly sort through 
the different justifications for a traffic stop to see if racial bias could be 
detected in the outcome. Again, racial bias was detected: “These 
analyses uncovered racial disparities in both type and severity of 
stops, with [Oakland Police Department] officers disproportionately 
 
still significantly more likely than Whites to be the subject of such high-discretion 
searches in 3 of Oakland’s 5 policing areas. The African American–White race 
difference was especially pronounced for vehicle stops, stops made because of traffic 
violations, and stops made by officers working special assignments, other than 
violence suppression. We found no race differences in search recovery rates. 
 278. Id. at 140: 
Overall, more than 1 in 6 African American men stopped was arrested vs. only 1 in 14 
White men stopped. Even when controlling for other variables, African Americans 
were still significantly more likely than Whites to be arrested in 2 of Oakland’s 5 
policing areas. The African American-White arrest gap was most pronounced for 
vehicle stops, stops made because of traffic violations, and stops made by officers 
working violence suppression. 
 279. Id. at 158. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. SPARQ, STANFORD UNIV., STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE: RESEARCH INITIATIVES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN OAKLAND, CALIF. 24 (Jennifer 
L. Eberhardt ed., 2016), https://stanford.app.box.com/v/Strategies-for-Change [https://perma.cc/ 
2DGB-3GYG] [hereinafter STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE] (“[W]e then developed advanced natural-
language-processing and machine-learning techniques for coding the narratives in the stop data 
forms. Once refined, these techniques will eliminate the need for human coders, and allow the 
OPD and other law enforcement agencies to analyze large quantities of narrative data cheaply, 
quickly, and reliably.”). 
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stopping African Americans for all types of violations, as well as for 
very minor violations.”285  
The Stanford study focused on racial disparities in policing, 
concluding that the Oakland Police Department’s practices produced 
racially discriminatory outcomes.286 The conclusion is useful to 
demonstrate the potential for data-driven accountability mechanisms 
for policing. The study showed that traditional police data, normally 
used to monitor criminal activity, could be mined to encourage police 
accountability and improve training and oversight.287  
For purposes of this Article, the real insight is in the 
technological capacity to mine police data. While Oakland was just an 
experiment (and one mandated by federal court order), the fact that a 
major U.S. city with thousands of police-citizen interactions could 
collect, sort, and study its policing patterns to find disparate racial 
impacts shows the potential for obtaining other information reflecting 
policing patterns. In addition, social network analysis can show which 
officers are involved in what types of stops, where the officers are 
making those stops, and against whom the stops are made. If one 
wanted to query all police stops in a neighborhood, all police stops 
against a certain gang, or whether a particular unit caused more 
complaints, social network analysis makes that possible. Knowing 
who, where, how, and why suspects were stopped opens up new 
research avenues to understand the choices police make on a daily 
basis. Particular police officers could be targeted for study, and 
patterns relating to experience, gender, or other variables could be 
examined.  
 
 285. Id. at 20: 
To enrich our exploration of police-community relations in Oakland, we first 
developed a coding scheme to analyze these narratives. We then recruited experts to 
use our coding scheme to sort some 1,000 traffic violations from April 2014 by type 
(e.g., moving violations vs. equipment violations) and severity (from minor to severe).  
 286. See HETEY ET AL., supra note 262, at 179: 
To be clear, though: our results do not suggest that OPD officers are “racists.” Our 
mission is not to point fingers at specific individuals, but to explore an institution’s 
effects on its communities, particularly its communities of color. Our exploration 
revealed that racial disparities in the OPD’s activities are widespread and systemic. 
 287. See id.: 
These findings are not evidence of a few or even many bad apples, but of pervasive 
cultural norms—the unwritten rules of how to behave—about how to police people of 
different races. Focusing on individual officers, rather than on the culture as a whole, 
will likely allow racial disparities in policing to persist. Put another way, focusing on 
the individual officer may let law enforcement agencies, especially their leaders, off 
the hook too easily. Instead, to combat racial disparities in the treatment of 
community members, law enforce[ment] agencies must challenge the cultural beliefs, 
policies, practices, and norms that encourage disparate treatment. 
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While two experiments in data-rich policing environments 
cannot be used to predict the future of blue data, they do show the 
potential of data-driven accountability. While limited in scope and 
purpose, the ability to mine datasets for insights can be adapted to 
other police departments. While still early in its development, new 
data-mining techniques can provide new ways to visualize these 
constitutionally problematic practices. In fact, as will be discussed in 
the next Section, these data-driven insights might provide evidence of 
the systemic and recurring problems needed to fulfill the Supreme 
Court’s new exclusionary test.  
3. Mining Exclusion  
Mined data can reveal patterns of racial discrimination and 
unconstitutional stops. If the Supreme Court’s new test requires 
defendants to show systemic or recurring negligence, imagine how 
suppression hearings might play out in Oakland, New York City, or 
Baltimore, where systemic problems have been documented. After all, 
in a five-year period, Baltimore police stopped over three hundred 
thousand people.288 Almost half of the stops took place in two small, 
predominantly African-American districts that contained only eleven 
percent of the city’s population.289 According to the DOJ, many of 
those stops took place in violation of the Fourth Amendment with 
stops based on less than reasonable suspicion.290 More than ninety-
four percent of the stops did not result in a citation or an arrest, 
meaning no contraband was recovered from suspicionless stops.291 
Again, following the Supreme Court’s guidance in Herring, an 
unconstitutional stop connected to a systemic or recurring pattern 
warrants suppression. 
 
 288. DOJ BALTIMORE REPORT, supra note 125, at 5 (“BPD officers recorded over 300,000 
pedestrian stops from January 2010–May 2015, and the true number of BPD’s stops during this 
period is likely far higher due to under-reporting.”).  
 289. Id. at 6 (“BPD’s pedestrian stops are concentrated on a small portion of Baltimore 
residents. BPD made roughly 44 percent of its stops in two small, predominantly African-
American districts that contain only 11 percent of the City’s population.”). 
 290. Id. (“BPD’s stops often lack reasonable suspicion. Our review of incident reports and 
interviews with officers and community members found that officers regularly approach 
individuals standing or walking on City sidewalks to detain and question them and check for 
outstanding warrants, despite lacking reasonable suspicion to do so.”).  
 291. Id. (“Only 3.7 percent of pedestrian stops resulted in officers issuing a citation or 
making an arrest. And, as noted below, many of those arrested based upon pedestrian stops had 
their charges dismissed upon initial review by either supervisors at BPD’s Central Booking or 
local prosecutors.”). 
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The Stanford study focused on racial bias, a subject of 
relevance, if not a direct relation to Fourth Amendment practice.292 
But the same type of data analysis could focus on the justifications for 
why Oakland police stopped an individual, as the stop-hit-ratio 
researchers did with the NYPD data.293 Once collected, the data could 
be queried to show the events that transpired, the justifications for the 
stop, and the result of the stop. Following Herring, this data could be 
introduced in a Fourth Amendment suppression hearing to effectuate 
the exclusionary rule. 
Take as an example facts from one of the plaintiffs in the 
NYPD Floyd stop and frisk litigation.294 Devin Almonor, a thirteen-
year-old teenager, was stopped, frisked, detained in handcuffs, and 
taken to a police station without reasonable suspicion.295 Almonor’s 
stop arose from a series of 911 calls reporting a fight in progress with 
the potential of armed juveniles in a particular geographic location.296 
When police arrived at that location, Almonor and a friend were seen 
walking up the street.297 There was no description of the suspects 
except that the juveniles were Black youth.298 Police forcefully put 
Almonor over the hood of a police car, handcuffed him, searched him, 
and eventually took him to the police station. Ultimately, no 
contraband was recovered and the case was dismissed.299  
But now consider the analysis if marijuana had been recovered 
from Almonor and, as with tens of thousands of other narcotics busts, 
the case required a Fourth Amendment suppression hearing. In 
Almonor’s case, Judge Scheindlin found that the stop violated the 
Fourth Amendment—a necessary but, under Herring, not sufficient 
 
 292. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“[T]he Constitution prohibits 
selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. But the constitutional 
basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection 
Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.”); Milton Heumann & Lance Cassak, Profiles in Justice? 
Police Discretion, Symbolic Assailants, and Stereotyping, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 911, 956 (2001) 
(“Under the Court’s reasoning in Whren, race is irrelevant to any issues raised under the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
 293. See supra notes 246–261 and accompanying text (describing the work of Professors 
Goel, Shroff, and Sklansky).  
 294. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 628–30 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. at 628. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. at 628–29. Interestingly and relevant for data-driven policing, despite being 
innocent, Almonor’s personal information was entered into the police database accusing him of 
being suspected of possessing a weapon and resisting arrest. Id. at 629–30 (“Almonor was never 
arrested. The next morning, Officer Dennis filled out a computerized UF–250 and another 
juvenile report worksheet, both of which noted a suspicious bulge.” (citation omitted)). 
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condition for suppression.300 The second step would be to evaluate the 
deterrent value of suppressing the evidence, with one consideration 
being the systemic or recurring nature of the practice. In a traditional 
suppression hearing, all Almoror’s lawyer would be able to show is 
that this case involved an unconstitutional stop. But with evidence of 
a 911 call, a flimsy but matching description, and close proximity to 
“the crime scene,” one could hypothesize a judge finding that the error 
was one of isolated negligence. The stop was unconstitutional, yes, but 
not deliberate, reckless, grossly negligent, or part of a systemic or 
recurring pattern. As a result, the marijuana-possessing defendant 
would lose. 
But now imagine that a data-driven system existed that could 
be mined for police practices. Using a data-focused stop-hit rate, one 
could determine the actual likelihood that a stop would be successful. 
As the researchers concluded after examining the Almonor case, 
“[stop-hit rate] analysis indicates that there was a 3% chance that 
Devin Almonor—a thin, 5 foot, 10 inch 13-year-old black teenager in 
Harlem who ‘fits description’ and was behaving ‘furtively’—would be 
found to have a weapon.”301 This low rate of successful stops might be 
sufficient to show a recurring constitutional problem, since ninety-
seven percent of stops resulted in no finding of contraband.302 Or one 
could examine the rates of all officers recovering contraband in similar 
stops in the city—data on the number of stops, the location of the 
stops, the type of stops, the outcome of those stops, and some figure 
about whether such stops were successful would all be available. In an 
individual case, one could target the rates of a particular officer’s 
successful stops, the particular unit, or the particular police district.  
Similarly, using mined data, one could track patterns of types 
of stops. While of course every stop would need to be evaluated 
individually, it might be possible to show in the aggregate that the 
practice resulted in largely ineffectual searches and thus 
demonstrates a systemic practice of unreasonable stops.303 And if the 
police administrators knew about this practice and did nothing, a 
 
 300. Id. at 630 (“Almonor’s Fourth Amendments rights [were] violated at the inception of 
both the stop and the frisk . . . .”). 
 301. Goel et al., supra note 246, at 217.  
 302. Id. 
 303. See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (“[T]he analysis of the UF–250 database reveals 
that at least 200,000 stops were made without reasonable suspicion.”); Second Supplemental 
Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. at 10 tbl.1, Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (No. 08 Civ. 01034(SAS)); 
Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in 
New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 496 (2000); Meares, supra note 126, at 161; Meares, 
supra note 123, at 342. 
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defendant might be able to show that the police department acted 
negligently in not fixing training, policy, or practices.  
Or consider a scenario similar to Utah v. Strieff but where 
data-mining technologies existed to monitor the patterns of police 
stops. If the question became whether detective Fackrell’s actions 
were part of a systemic or recurring pattern of unconstitutional stops, 
the data could now support that theory. If Utah police recorded all of 
the times they followed the “stop, ask for identification, run a check”304 
tactic, courts would know whether the practice was part of a systemic 
or recurring practice as alleged by the defendant and dissent. 
Independent of detective Fackrell, if others in the Salt Lake City 
Police Department repeatedly engaged in the tactic, this too would 
show a recurring problem warranting suppression. If collected and 
proved, data might change the outcome of the Strieff suppression 
hearing.  
The point is that data mining can offer new insights into 
recurring police problems or systemic practices that fill the proof gap 
under the exclusionary rule, which requires some demonstration of 
systemic or recurring police negligence. Again, the technology exists. 
The data exists. All that is needed is to redirect the focus of the 
technology toward police accountability. 
B. Monitoring Technologies  
Law enforcement is in the information business. Police need 
information about what is happening on the streets, who is 
committing crimes, and where they are taking place, as well as data 
about the patterns of criminal activity and potential threats to the 
community. New surveillance technologies with video, audio, tracking, 
and automated alert capabilities dramatically expand the potential to 
watch what happens on the streets.305 This Section looks at how 
monitoring technologies provide potential mechanisms to surveil 
citizens and the police and establish patterns of systemic or recurring 
misconduct by police.  
 
 304. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2073 (2016) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he department’s 
standard detention procedures—stop, ask for identification, run a check—are partly designed to 
find outstanding warrants.”). 
 305. See, e.g., SLOBOGIN, supra note 35, at 3 (“What is new about today’s surveillance is the 
ease with which it can be conducted; over the past several decades, technological advances have 
vastly expanded the government’s monitoring ability.”); Blitz et al., supra note 35, at 56 (“To 
opponents and skeptics . . . [drones] threaten to usher in Orwellian, ubiquitous surveillance.” 
(citation omitted)); Blitz, supra note 35, at 1383 (describing the expansion of video surveillance 
and the dramatic changes occurring in technologies that supplement and enhance such 
surveillance). 
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1. Monitoring Crime  
In the not so distant future, police will go on patrol in the 
following surveillance environment: A network of linked cameras will 
record public activity on the streets.306 Thousands of camera feeds will 
relay live footage to a central command center.307 All of the video will 
be digitally recorded and thus watchable after the fact to track or 
investigate a crime.308 Automated algorithms programmed to spot 
specific activities (for instance, an abandoned bag or a hand-to-hand 
transaction) will flag particular actions for human observers.309 
Particular objects, people, or activities will remain searchable for 
several weeks after the fact. If a crime is later reported, the entire 
incident, including the path of both perpetrator and victims, can be 
replayed through the series of linked cameras. This data can be 
viewed in real time or saved, creating a perfect investigative “time 
machine”310 to solve the crime.  
 
 306. Gray & Citron, supra note 35, at 66 (“DAS will ensure the surveillance of New Yorkers 
and the city as a whole, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.”); Cara Buckley, Police Plan 
Web of Surveillance for Downtown, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2007/07/09/nyregion/09ring.html [https://perma.cc/Y6P3-2PM9]; Paul Harris, NYPD and 
Microsoft Launch Advanced Citywide Surveillance System, GUARDIAN (Aug. 8, 2012, 4:20 PM), 
http://theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/08/nypd-microsoft-surveillance-system [https://perma.cc/ 
V36V-NWG7?type=image]. 
 307. Davenport, supra note 19 (“[The NYPD’s DAS system] collects and analyzes data from 
sensors—including 9,000 closed circuit TV cameras . . . .”). 
 308. See Amitai Etzioni, A Cyber Age Privacy Doctrine: A Liberal Communitarian Approach, 
10 I/S 641, 659 (2014): 
[Microsoft’s Domain Awareness System] collates thousands of pieces of information 
about the same person from public sources—such as that from the city’s numerous 
CCTV cameras, arrest records, 911 calls, license plate readers, and radiation 
detectors—and makes them easily and instantly accessible to the police. While the 
system does not yet utilize facial recognition, it could be readily expanded to include 
such technology.; 
Joh, supra note 2, at 49: 
The N.Y.P.D. claims that the DAS can track where a car associated with a suspect is 
located, and where it has been in the past days, weeks, or months. The DAS can also 
check license plate numbers, compare them to watch lists, and provide the police with 
immediate access to any criminal history associated with the car owner. 
(citation omitted). 
 309. See Joh, supra note 2, at 49 (“This system gives the police real-time access to 
information that can reveal connections between persons, items, and places in ways that may not 
be obvious to individual crime analysts. The DAS employs video analytic software designed to 
detect threats, such as unattended bags.”); Associated Press, NJ City Leading Way in Crime-
Fighting Tech, CBS NEWS (June 19, 2010, 9:30 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nj-city-
leading-way-in-crime-fighting-tech [https://perma.cc/PU29-JFGW]; Digital Justice, AOL, 
Digisensory Technologies Avista Smart Sensors, YOUTUBE (Sept. 14, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JamGobiS5wg [https://perma.cc/659A-V35Y]. 
 310. Stephen E. Henderson, Fourth Amendment Time Machines (and What They Might Say 
About Police Body Cameras), 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 933, 937 (2016). 
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Overhead, another sort of visual time machine will be 
recording public movements.311 A small plane hovers with 
sophisticated cameras capable of recording entire neighborhoods. 
Multiple cameras, infrared sensors, and night vision track all visible 
objects.312 If a shooting should occur in a local park, the video footage 
can show not only the violence involved but also the paths of the 
participants before and after the incident. All public movement can be 
recorded and saved for future investigative use. 
Police officers entering this surveillance space will wear 
attached body cameras that will record the sights and sounds of their 
interactions.313 If turned on, every statement and scene will be 
recorded for future prosecution.314 But, equally useful, a daily record of 
contacts, conversations, and the community will be recorded for 
investigators. Facial recognition can mark people by place and time.315 
Search capabilities will allow particular faces to be found amid the 
multitudes. Combined, facial recognition and GPS capabilities on 
body-camera systems and department-issued smartphones will track 
 
 311. Monte Reel, Secret Cameras Record Baltimore’s Every Move from Above, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-baltimore-secret-
surveillance [https://perma.cc/8GQK-R95T]. 
 312. See Amitai Etzioni, A Cyber Age Privacy Doctrine: More Coherent, Less Subjective, and 
Operational, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1263, 1297 (2015) (“The planes also carry infrared cameras that 
can track people and cars under foliage and in some buildings.”); Ian Duncan, New Details 
Released About High-Tech Gear FBI Used on Planes to Monitor Freddie Gray Unrest, BALT. SUN 
(Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-fbi-
surveillance-flights-20151030-story.html [https://perma.cc/KS4E-ZZGC] (discussing the FBI’s 
aerial surveillance operation in Baltimore, which captured thirty-six hours of video and infrared 
images). 
 313. See Barak Ariel et al., The Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Use of Force and 
Citizen’s Complaints Against the Police: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 31 J. QUANTITATIVE 
CRIMINOLOGY 509 (2015) (explaining the results of a controlled trial in which officers wore body 
cameras during interactions with the public); David A. Harris, Picture This: Body-Worn Video 
Devices (Head Cams) as Tools for Ensuring Fourth Amendment Compliance by Police, 43 TEX. 
TECH. L. REV. 357 (2010) (advocating for the use of police body cameras during search and 
seizure incidents); Vivian Ho, San Francisco Cops Expected to Get Body-Worn 
Cameras, SFGATE (Apr. 30, 2015, 8:47 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/San-Francisco-
cops-expected-to-get-body-worn-6232517.php [https://perma.cc/59ZA-X3H2] (describing San 
Francisco Mayor Ed Lee’s efforts to equip city police with body cameras).  
 314. See Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera Revolution, 50 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 897, 908 (2017) (characterizing the modern world as a “toutveillance society” 
wherein “everybody is watching everybody” and “everyone has incentive to record or control the 
narrative”). 
 315. See Julia Angwin, Dragnet Nation: A Quest for Privacy, Security, and Freedom in a 
World of Relentless Surveillance: Chapter 1: Hacked, 12 COLO. TECH. L.J. 291, 294 (2014) (“And 
new tracking technologies are just around the corner: companies are building facial recognition 
technology into phones and cameras, technology to monitor your location is being embedded into 
vehicles . . . .”). 
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the location of police patrols and citizens in granular detail.316 Anyone 
who comes into contact with police officers will be caught in this 
recorded web.  
Police-issued computers—including handheld smartphones—
will provide updated information about the neighborhood.317 Criminal 
incidents, calls for service, historic crime patterns, gang rivalries, and 
predictive assessments about the crime forecast of the area will be 
updated in real time and sent to officers trying to assess risk.318 As 
officers patrol, new information providing the context of the places and 
the people they interact with can be instantaneously retrieved. Facial 
recognition technology will augment police identification and allow 
automatic alerts from open arrest warrants in police databases.  
Each of these technologies exists today in some form or another 
in major U.S. cities. They do not all exist together, and may not for 
some time, but the surveillance architecture is real and technically 
possible. In New York City, the Domain Awareness System links more 
than almost ten thousand cameras in a real-time surveillance net.319 
In West Baltimore, Persistent Surveillance System planes flew and 
recorded entire portions of the city.320 In Los Angeles, facial 
recognition cameras record people near Skid Row321 and LAPD officers 
 
 316. See Sidney Fussell, The New Tech That Could Turn Police Body Cams into Nightmare 
Surveillance Tools, GIZMODO (Mar. 9, 2017), https://gizmodo.com/new-ai-could-turn-police-body-
cams-into-nightmare-surve-1792224538 [https://perma.cc/W36W-6WJZ] (describing novel body 
camera technology with surveillance abilities, including facial and object recognition). 
 317. Tim Fleischer, Officers Embrace New Smartphones as Crime Fighting Tools, ABC7NY 
(Aug. 13, 2015), https://abc7ny.com/news/exclusive-officers-embrace-new-smartphones-as-crime-
fighting-tools-/928007 [https://perma.cc/7D8K-N5G3] (discussing the NYPD’s new smartphone 
technology, which provides its thirty-five thousand officers with access to numerous department 
databases, including the Domain Awareness System); Palantir, Palantir Mobile Prototype for 
Law Enforcement, YOUTUBE (Oct. 20, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aRDW_A8eG8g 
[https://perma.cc/Z66B-H3SX] (demonstrating software that allows law enforcement to search 
numerous police databases through a mobile device). 
 318. See Justin Jouvenal, The New Way Police Are Surveilling You: Calculating Your Threat 
“Score,” WASH. POST (Jan. 10., 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/the-
new-way-police-are-surveilling-you-calculating-your-threat-score/2016/01/10/e42bccac-8e15-11e5-
baf4-bdf37355da0c_story.html [https://perma.cc/CQG9-R7ZV] (noting the availability of police 
software that compiles data and scores a suspect’s potential for violence); Maurice Chammah, 
Policing the Future, MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.themarshallproject.org/ 
2016/02/03/policing-the-future [https://perma.cc/PHX6-BJ83] (describing an officer’s use of 
predictive policing technology in Missouri).  
 319. See Davenport, supra note 19; see also I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Surveillance, and 
Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 959, 962 (2013) (describing the surveillance capabilities of 
major urban cities). 
 320. The same company flew planes over the city of Compton in a “secret test of mass 
surveillance.” Conor Friedersdorf, Eyes over Compton: How Police Spied on a Whole City, 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/04/sheriffs-deputy-
compares-drone-surveillance-of-compton-to-big-brother/360954 [https://perma.cc/PR6U-P6LA].  
 321. See Garvie & Frankle, supra note 22 (“In 16 ‘undisclosed locations’ across northern Los 
Angeles, digital eyes watch the public. . . . Using facial-recognition software, the cameras can 
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input those contact cards into the Palantir-designed social network 
tracking system.322 Body cameras have been adopted in dozens of 
jurisdictions, and data-driven patrols are part of even more policing 
strategies.323 In fact, in April 2017, Axon (the company formally 
known as Taser) offered all police officers free body cameras for a year. 
This surveillance state raises obvious and poignant privacy 
concerns. Scholars, including myself, have examined the costs and 
problems of this new reality and even proposed constitutional 
solutions to the growing danger.324 But this Article examines the silver 
lining of such comprehensive surveillance as it relates to police 
accountability: all of this observational data is searchable and thus 
usable to visualize recurring patterns of police misconduct.  
2. Monitoring Police  
Imagine the same police patrol in the same surveillance state, 
but with a focus on tracking police officers and targeting police 
accountability.325 Police administrators want to know what particular 
officers are doing on the streets as well as patterns of police activity.  
Police officers drive into the networked camera field. 
Automated license plate readers identify the patrol car. When the 
officer gets out of her car, every single interaction can be recorded by 
 
recognize individuals from up to 600 feet away.”); Stop LAPD Spying Coalition Visits the 
Regional Fusion Center, PRIVACYSOS (Dec. 17, 2012), https://privacysos.org/blog/stop-lapd-
spying-coalition-visits-the-regional-fusion-center [https://perma.cc/WK9N-5TXQ] (spotlighting a 
Los Angeles–based coalition’s efforts to end dragnet spying within the city).  
 322. See Brayne, supra note 232, at 992 (discussing how Palantir’s technology is used to 
track “person[s] of interest” by the LAPD).  
 323. See supra notes 313–316.  
 324. See e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance As Privacy Pollution: 
Learning from Environmental Impact Statements, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1721 (2015):  
Creating a database recording everyone’s movements allows the state to learn who 
associates with whom. It chills the freedom of association no less than requiring 
organizations to publish their membership lists. A government that has access to 24/7 
information about the movements and habits of people is one that, even when acting 
within the law, has the power to investigate people for their political activities.;  
Gray & Citron, supra note 35, at 66 (noting the comparison between surveillance technology 
used in New York City and “Orwell’s ‘Big Brother’ ”); Steve Mann & Joseph Ferenbok, New 
Media and the Power Politics of Sousveillance in a Surveillance-Dominated World, 11 
SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 18, 26 (2013) (“Foucault’s prisoner metaphor is no longer sufficient to 
describe power relationships mediated by mobile computing and ubiquitous computing enabled 
by new media.”); Richards, supra note 35, at 1953 (“The power effects of surveillance illustrate 
three additional dangers of surveillance: blackmail, discrimination, and persuasion.”); see also 
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Personal Curtilage: Fourth Amendment Security in Public, 55 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1283, 1287 (2014) (“The question remains: does a space, constitutionally protected 
from technologically enhanced surveillance, exist in public?”). 
 325. Capers, supra note 319, at 986; see also Fan, supra note 136, at 102–03 (positing that 
“police panopticism” could increase both visibility and accountability in law enforcement).  
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surveillance cameras in real time. Supervisors can watch the complete 
pattern of interactions, every stop and every search, from the 
command center. Police cars can be tracked from overhead flights. 
GPS tracking can watch where police officers drive or walk or chase. If 
there should be an incident, a complaint, or a lawful arrest at any 
point, supervisors can rewind the video to watch the entire event 
occur. In fact, any of the contacts, stops, or arrests recorded can be 
studied with the ease of replaying a video.  
The same incident will also be recorded on body-worn cameras, 
providing a more officer-centered perspective. This less structured but 
equally revealing footage can track the specific details of each stop or 
arrest.326 If supervisors wanted to search for all of an officer’s past 
arrests, they could pull up each event. If supervisors wanted to study 
each traffic stop, they could review each stop. If they wanted to 
identify patterns of how frisks were conducted, when weapons were 
drawn, when handcuffs were used, or the types of physical contact 
initiated, they need only replace the existing automated search 
capabilities (for example, targeting an abandoned bag) for the type of 
event they wish to review (for example, a protective frisk). All 
searches at a particular corner, all frisks by a particular officer, or all 
stops by a particular unit could be identified and studied with 
algorithmic ease.  
The surveillance capacities of body-worn cameras will increase 
with an increased capacity to search the footage. One company, 
Dextro—recently purchased by Axon/Taser, one of the leading body-
camera companies—has debuted technology that can scan for any 
particular object in the footage.327 As a result, police can, for example, 
search for all Nike swoosh symbols, all baseball caps, or all hand-to-
hand transactions observed over a day or a week.328 The company has 
explained that the process begins once the body camera identifies 
objects and movements. Once identified, the footage creates a timeline 
of when each action or object appears, including timestamps and 
frequency data. This allows law enforcement to reduce the footage to 
the exact time at which the object or motion in question appears and 
add these moments to a searchable database. For instance, law 
 
 326. See, e.g., David A. Harris, How Accountability-Based Policing Can Reinforce—or 
Replace—the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149, 177–78 (2009) 
(presciently discussing the evolution of police body-worn cameras as a method of police 
accountability).  
 327. Fussell, supra note 316.  
 328. See id. (“Dextro scans and pinpoints objects in footage that users are looking for, for 
example, a book, a Nike shoe, lines of text, or a gun. Dextro can also pick up motion information, 
like handshakes or a punch.”). 
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enforcement could search for “officer foot chase” or “traffic stop.”329 
The result would be a timeline of all foot chases, searchable with 
relative ease. This technology can also help with police training, so 
officers can review their decisionmaking strategies.330 This same 
technology will also record place, time, location, and conversations, 
thus limiting the amount of paperwork officers need to complete on a 
daily basis. In doing so, the technology will be responsible for a 
massive database of all police-citizen contacts. With almost four 
thousand police departments using body cameras, this technology will 
potentially offer a game-changing ability to track particular things, 
people, or patterns.331  
The available crime and neighborhood data also provides 
context for the police officer’s actions. In the same way police officers 
can learn to better understand an area because of the reported data, 
so too can supervisors better understand the officers’ decisions 
because of the information provided to officers before the stop.332 
Supervisors will know what the officers knew, what information they 
checked or failed to check, and the reasonableness of their reaction.  
Beyond video footage, audio surveillance capabilities can also 
reveal policing patterns and practices. Professor Eberhardt’s 
investigation into the Oakland Police Department involved monitoring 
the language spoken between police and civilians.333 Because the 
Oakland Police Department used body-worn cameras and because 
those cameras recorded sound, the researchers could create a 
searchable database of audio recordings of police-citizen 
interactions.334  
By tracking data on the tone, content, quality, and types of 
phrases chosen, researchers could observe language patterns that 
differed by race.335 In fact, by studying the use of “apologies” (words 
 
 329. Id.  
 330. See id.: 
An officer’s body camera records an incident in which a cop mistook a cell phone for a 
gun; the software helps pinpoint the precise moments when the cop made a mistake; 
and the video is later used for training. Police departments could potentially analyze 
and compile hundreds of videos for similar purposes.  
 331. Cf. Fan, supra note 314, at 924–28 (explaining the potential for body cameras to 
positively alter the ways in which police departments engage with communities).  
 332. Patterns of crime may influence how officers see and react to particular neighborhoods 
or patrol assignments. It might be the case that tactics in higher-crime areas differ from lower-
crime areas, and tracking those differences could alleviate community tension or improve officer 
training. 
 333. STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE, supra note 284. 
 334. See id. at 15 (describing the author’s “analysis of Oakland Police Department (OPD) 
stop data” in terms of linguistic exchanges).  
 335. Id. 
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and phrases like “excuse me,” “sorry,” and “apologies”), “gratitude” 
(words like “thanks”), “formal titles” (words like “sir” and “ma’am”), 
and police-relevant categories like “police equipment” (words and 
phrases like “breathalyzer,” “radar,” “handcuffs,” and “badge”),336 
researchers could not only see a racial difference but predict—just by 
studying the language—whether the officer was speaking to an 
African American or White suspect.337 The choice of words revealed 
how police routinely provided more information and more procedural 
details to nonminority suspects.338  
The study’s results also open up the possibility to visualize 
patterns of police-citizen interactions. As the researchers summarized: 
One reason that law enforcement agencies do not systematically analyze BWC [body-
worn camera] footage is that they and the public tend to think of the footage as 
evidence, rather than data. Evidence can prove liability or innocence in one specific case, 
but data can show patterns across incidents and possibly be used to change those 
patterns. Studying BWC footage in the aggregate could provide unparalleled insights 
into how police officers typically interact with community members, as well as how to 
improve those interactions.339  
 
 336. Id.: 
To analyze officer language data on a large scale, we first created a set of categories of 
officers’ language use . . . . These categories reflect both linguistics and social 
psychology research, as well as new categories relevant to the particular 
circumstances of police-community interactions. We then count how many officers’ 
utterances contain words or phrases that fit into each category. Finally, we use 
statistical models to understand whether and how officers use these categories 
differently depending on the race of the community member. 
 337. Id.: 
We began with a preliminary question: Can we predict the race of a community 
member simply from the words an officer uses with him or her? To answer this 
question, we created a randomly selected, artificially balanced dataset of stops (N = 
380) with 50% White and 50% African American community members. Then, for each 
interaction, we measured a wide variety of linguistic indicators. These included: 
counts of every word and pair of words, measurements for dozens of linguistic 
categories, the total number of words spoken, the number of questions the officer 
asked, and so on. Because we have the same number of White and African American 
vehicle stops, a tool performing at chance would be 50% accurate at predicting the 
race of the community member from the officer’s language. Yet our model is 68% 
accurate—an improvement of 18% over chance. These results suggest that officers 
speak differently to White versus African American community members. 
 338. Id. at 18: 
After statistically controlling for whether there was a search, the result of the stop, 
and the gender of the community member, we found that OPD officers more often 
used these explanatory words with White community members than they did with 
African American community members. These findings suggest that OPD officers 
more often explain the reason for their stop to White community members . . . . 
 339. Id. at 14 (emphasis added). 
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Such pattern analysis offers new abilities to improve training and 
monitor different implicit or explicit biases that might undermine 
trust in a community.340  
Video footage can expose similar types of patterns. One 
regularly recurring constitutional issue involves whether police 
officers detained a suspect before requesting identification.341 As in 
the Strieff case, the facts can be contested, with different and perhaps 
contradictory understandings of consent, detention, and seizure at 
issue. But with video surveillance, the pattern of such stops could be 
studied and clarifications in trainings and protocols provided. 
Similarly, the question of “furtive movements”—always difficult to 
articulate—could be clarified with video evidence.  
Digital surveillance technologies allow new visibility for 
policing practices that usually operate without much transparency. 
Systems of policing practices can be watched, analyzed, and improved 
in trainings or protocols. And at some point in the future, this 
surveillance will go beyond video into a whole world of wireless and 
biometric data that can be collected and studied to optimize policing 
practices and study policing patterns.  
3. Monitoring Exclusion  
Inverting the surveillance architecture to focus on police 
accountability may or may not have a positive impact on improving 
policing as a profession.342 But these new information sources do 
provide a game-changing innovation to document systemic or 
recurring negligence and thus rework the Supreme Court’s new 
exclusionary rule.  
At both an individual and a programmatic level, systemic and 
recurring issues could be proven in court using available digital 
 
 340. See id.:  
We plan to use these tools to quickly and accurately analyze the words officers use, 
their tone of voice, how many turns they take in their conversations with community 
members, and other indicators of the content and quality of the interaction. In 
combination with other stop data (e.g., the race of the person stopped, the location of 
the stop, the outcome of the stop), these tools will allow law enforcement agencies and 
researchers to examine whether and how police-community interactions unfold 
differently as a function of race. 
 341. One recurring dispute is whether the individual was “seized” for Fourth Amendment 
purposes before the police officer asked for identification or whether it was a consensual 
encounter.  
 342. See Capers, supra note 319, at 978 (“For many communities, public surveillance has the 
potential to do more than simply deter crime and aid in the apprehension of law-breakers. Public 
surveillance can also function to monitor the police, reduce racial profiling, curb police brutality, 
and ultimately increase perceptions of legitimacy.”).  
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footage. Take again the example of detective Fackrell’s stop of Edward 
Joseph Strieff. As the case came before the Supreme Court, there was 
proof of isolated contact but no proof of systemic misconduct or any 
recurring pattern of misconduct.343  
But with the surveillance state watching detective Fackrell, 
litigants could have an answer to whether the stop was part of a 
larger pattern of unconstitutional stops. Litigants could review video 
of Fackrell’s prior stops. Litigants could review audio of all the times 
he asked for identification. In fact, they could search for all the times 
any officer asked for identification. They could divine patterns out of 
individual, fragmented practices. Studying detective Fackrell’s 
movements could show that this incident was, in fact, just an isolated 
mistake, and studying his interactions could demonstrate that his 
misconduct deserves to be viewed with good faith deference. Or the 
review could very well expose a pattern of negligence—again, a low 
legal threshold signifying a failure to abide by a duty of care.344  
More broadly, the same surveillance capabilities might show 
that the general practices of the police department reveal a systemic 
problem. The Supreme Court’s language redefining exclusion appears 
to envision a structural problem akin to the NYPD’s systemic violation 
of rights in their stop and frisk practices or to the type of excessive 
force or unconstitutional stop practices revealed by DOJ Civil Rights 
investigations.345 The issue was not the individual officer’s action but 
the system that encouraged racially discriminatory stops.346 The 
ability to track multiple officers over time using data analytics, 
automated video searches, and audio searches could allow a more 
systemic examination of police practice. The granular ability—offered 
by companies like Dextro—to identify all foot chases, all interactions, 
all frisks, or all physical contacts at particular places along a timeline 
means that daily policing practices can be broken down into 
quantifiable (and thus visible) segments.347 Patterns—for example, of 
requesting identification—could be studied as a stand-alone issue. 
This systemic proof would make any claim of exclusion much stronger. 
Monitoring technologies could also provide capabilities for resolving 
 
 343. Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063–64 (2016); see supra Section I.A.2. 
 344. See Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063 (stating that officer Fackrell was at most negligent).  
 345. See id. at 2063–64; Herring v. U.S., 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009); Floyd v. City of New York, 
959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing NYPD’s systematic violation of rights); see 
supra Section I.B.2. 
 346. See Meares, supra note 126, at 162 (describing the “organizationally determined 
practice of stopping certain ‘sorts’ of people” as “imposed from the top down,” rather than 
“individual incidents”). 
 347. See Fussell, supra note 316 (discussing the novel video-analysis technology, Dextro, 
which uses object and movement identification to create a timeline of body camera footage). 
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whether the particular officer’s actions were deliberate, reckless, or 
grossly negligent and whether the officer told the truth about the 
incident.348  
As discussed in Part III, significant logistical and practical 
challenges exist with respect to this practice of using surveillance 
technologies, but in terms of technical capacity, the monitoring 
technologies of the future will be quite capable of recording and 
revealing systemic and recurring patterns and actions of all kinds.  
C. Predictive Technologies  
Police have long known that particular people drive up crime 
rates.349 Stopping those suspects before they commit the next crime 
has always been a challenge. New predictive technologies offer the 
potential to narrow the list of suspects, using algorithmic forecasts to 
target the highest-risk individuals.350 This Section looks at the 
promise of predictive targeting technologies as a mechanism to 
identify both at-risk suspects as well as at-risk police officers. Officers 
with histories of recurring misconduct can be tracked and targeted. In 
an exclusionary rule regime where failure to act on an identifiable risk 
may be considered negligent, these predictive systems offer another 
tool for proving systemic and recurring negligence within 
departments. 
1. Predicting Criminal Risk 
In a handful of cities across the United States, police have 
begun using algorithmic formulas to rank the most at-risk individuals 
in a community.351 Most famously, the Chicago Police Department 
 
 348. See Melanie D. Wilson, An Exclusionary Rule for Police Lies, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 6 
(2010) (“Technology and its widespread public availability provide increasing opportunities to 
accurately capture police-citizen encounters and to expose police lies.”). 
 349. See, e.g., MEARES ET AL., supra note 242, at 1: 
Data analysis immediately revealed that a very small number of neighborhoods in 
Chicago are responsible for most of the city’s violence trends. The “city’s” crime 
problem is in fact geographically and socially concentrated in a few highly 
impoverished and socially isolated neighborhoods. Data also revealed that most 
victims (and offenders) of gun violence in Chicago tend to be young African American 
men who live in neighborhoods on the West or South sides of the city. 
 350. Ferguson, supra note 30, at 705; see id. at 736 (describing the process of targeting 
individuals with predictive prosecution technologies). 
 351. See ANTHONY A. BRAGA ET AL., SMART APPROACHES TO REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE 12–
13, 19 (2014), https://www.nationalpublicsafetypartnership.org/clearinghouse/Content/Resource 
Documents/SMART Approaches to Reducing Gun Violence.pdf [https://perma.cc/96XT-2UTP]; 
John Eligon & Timothy Williams, Police Program Aims to Pinpoint Those Most Likely to Commit 
Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/25/us/police-program-
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developed the Strategic Subjects List, colloquially known as the “Heat 
List,” to rank the individuals most at risk of violence in the city.352 The 
identified subjects on the Heat List are the people most likely to be 
shot in an act of violence, as well as those most likely to do the 
shooting.353 To be clear, this was not a “most wanted” list based on 
past acts of criminality but rather a predictive judgment that these 
individuals would be at risk in the future.  
The original formula was created by Professor Miles Wernick 
at the Illinois Institute of Technology and consisted largely of “co-
arrestees”—meaning the individuals arrested with suspects arrested 
for violence.354 The theory behind the coarrestee connection was that 
those individuals arrested with violent actors were more at risk for 
being involved in reciprocal acts of gang violence.355 Because many of 
the shootings in Chicago were gang related, this theory of looking at 
the networks of gang members made a great deal of sense.356 In fact, 
 
aims-to-pinpoint-those-most-likely-to-commit-crimes.html [https://perma.cc/Y4DE-B4W6]; Tony 
Rizzo, Amid a Crackdown on Violent Criminals, Kansas City Homicides Sharply Decline, KAN. 
CITY STAR (Jan. 1. 2015), https://www.kansascity.com/news/local/crime/article5304384.html 
[https://perma.cc/GG66-E9R6]. 
 352. Jeremy Gorner, Chicago Police Use ‘Heat List’ as Strategy to Prevent Violence, CHI. TRIB. 
(Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2013-08-21-ct-met-heat-list-
20130821-story.html [http://perma.cc/TTJ9-PZTW]; Mark Guarino, Can Math Stop Murder?, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 20, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2014/0720/Can-math-
stop-murder-video [https://perma.cc/3H3N-YYMX] (“Armed with a plethora of statistics on 
everything from gun violations to individual parole and arrest histories, police here are trying to 
create a national model that will help them predict where shootings might occur and who might 
be involved – both victims and offenders.”); Strategic Subject List, CHI. DATA PORTAL (last 
updated Dec. 7, 2017), https://data.cityofchicago.org/Public-Safety/Strategic-Subject-List/4aki-
r3np [https://perma.cc/EJV4-HUYX]. 
 353. See CHI. POLICE DEP’T, CUSTOM NOTIFICATIONS IN CHICAGO, SPECIAL ORDER S10-05, at 
IV.A (Oct. 6, 2015); Editorial Board, Who Will Kill or Be Killed in Violence-Plagued Chicago? The 
Algorithm Knows., CHI. TRIB. (May 10, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/ 
editorials/ct-gangs-police-loury-algorithm-edit-md-20160510-story.html [https://perma.cc/EX5W-
VNCQ]; Nissa Rhee, Can Police Big Data Stop Chicago’s Spike in Crime?, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (June 2, 2016), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2016/0602/Can-police-big-data-
stop-Chicago-s-spike-in-crime [https://perma.cc/T4AU-U5A3].  
 354. Davey, supra note 31 (discussing Professor Wernick’s original algorithm); see Guarino, 
supra note 352 (describing researchers’ analysis of arrest and homicide records); Jessica 
Saunders et al., Predictions Put into Practice: A Quasi-Experimental Evaluation of Chicago’s 
Predictive Policing Pilot, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 347, 357 (2016) (noting the term “co-
arrestees”). 
 355. See Andrew V. Papachristos & David S. Kirk, Changing the Street Dynamic: Evaluating 
Chicago’s Group Violence Reduction Strategy, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 525, 533 (2015) 
[hereinafter Papachristos & Kirk, Changing the Street Dynamic] (discussing the relationship 
between proximity to violence and risk of becoming a victim or perpetrator); see also Andrew V. 
Papachristos et al., Why Do Criminals Obey the Law? The Influence of Legitimacy and Social 
Networks on Active Gun Offenders, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 436 (2012) (reporting 
that individuals in social networks “saturated” with criminals tend to hold “negative opinions of 
the law”). 
 356. Guarino, supra note 352. 
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the study of networked violence had been demonstrated by social 
scientists in a range of experiments, including a few studies in 
Chicago.357 Essentially, the social science showed that small networks 
of individuals respond to violence with cascading and escalating 
additional violence.358 Put bluntly, the theory was based on the rough 
logic that “if you shoot my friend, I will shoot you and your friend.” 
And since those arrested together were assumed to be involved in 
violent networks together, this linkage served as the proxy for 
predictive risk.  
An updated formula for the Heat List incorporated coarrestees, 
but also included factors such as whether an individual was in a gang, 
had dropped out of school, or was on probation, as well as the 
individual’s connection to victims of shootings.359 The inputs have 
continued to change. In May of 2017, the Chicago Police Department 
explained that the list involved eight variables, “including arrests for 
gun crimes, violent crimes or drugs, the number of times the person 
had been assaulted or shot, age at the time of the last arrest, gang 
membership and a formula that rated whether the person was 
becoming more actively involved in crime.”360 The actual algorithmic 
formula remains a secret, but the idea of looking for risk factors, 
weighting the variables, and using the resulting list as a mechanism 
to target at-risk individuals is generally well understood.361 Once 
identified as being on the Heat List, police were expected to contact 
the identified targets and provide them with custom notification 
letters.362 These custom notification letters, and related in-person 
 
 357. See Papachristos & Kirk, Changing the Street Dynamic, supra note 355, at 533–34 
(surveying studies evaluating the impact of “the focused deterrence approach” on violent crime 
rates). 
 358. See Papachristos et al., Social Networks, supra note 242, at 1000–01 (analogizing a 
Boston case study that explains the relevance of small social networks to the risk of gunshot 
victimization in Chicago). 
 359. Saunders et al., supra note 354, at 357–58 (listing factors used for individual-level 
analysis by Chicago police as “(1) demographics (gender, age at most proximate arrest, race), (2) 
arrest history (number and type), (3) social network variables (number of first- and second-
degree co-arrestees who were victims of homicide), and (4) the risk score generated by IIT,” in 
addition to a “second dataset contain[ing] all recorded police contact with the 17,754 arrestees 
with at least one first- or second-degree association with a homicide victim and law enforcement 
from 1980 through the end of the observation window”). 
 360. Mick Dumke & Frank Main, A Look Inside the Watch List Chicago Police Fought to 
Keep Secret, CHI. SUN-TIMES (May 18, 2017), https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/what-gets-people 
-on-watch-list-chicago-police-fought-to-keep-secret-watchdogs [https://perma.cc/Y64N-Z8VL]. 
 361. See id.  
 362. See CHI. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 353, at IV.D: 
The Custom Notification Letter will be used to inform individuals of the arrest, 
prosecution, and sentencing consequences they may face if they choose to or continue to 
engage in public violence. The letter will be specific to the identified individual and 
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“call-in meetings,” were used to educate and warn the target that the 
police were aware of their connection to violence and that they needed 
to stop their violent ways.363 Similar predictive targeting systems—or 
focused-deterrence programs—have been adopted in New Orleans, 
Chicago, and Kansas City, among other cities.364 
Augmenting the environmental risk factors (including, for 
example, gang membership, unemployment, and neighborhood), more 
sophisticated predictive systems incorporate social media usage to 
predict violence.365 Antigang police units patrol YouTube and Twitter, 
monitoring and interrupting gang feuds that may start on social 
media but end with real bloodshed.366 In addition, social network 
analysis that reveals linkages to various gangs or clues to various 
disputes can be mapped through social media contacts.367 If police 
 
incorporate those factors known about the individual inclusive of prior arrests, impact 
of known associates, and potential sentencing outcomes for future criminal acts. 
(emphasis added). 
 363. Editorial Board, ‘Moneyball’ Crime-Fighting Comes to St. Louis, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (June 26, 2015), https://www.stltoday.com/opinion/editorial/editorial-moneyball-crime-
fighting-comes-to-st-louis/article_e61fbafa-e93c-5062-8d63-cb8ebb71ed53.html [https://perma.cc/ 
M9LT-RJJP] (quoting attorney Jennifer Joyce’s description of “call-in meeting” instructions: 
“Here are the rules. The first group that commits a homicide, the first body that drops, we’re 
coming after you and your friends. The group that does the most violence, we’re coming after 
you.”); Eligon & Williams, supra note 351 (“Call-ins are central to the program. The authorities 
invite about 120 of the group leaders they have identified (25 to 40 usually show up) to hear from 
a range of officials, including the local and federal prosecutors, the police chief and the mayor.”); 
see Editorial Board, supra (“Probation may be revoked, major and minor crimes will be 
prosecuted and so will minor ordinance violations, building code violations and civil issues like 
failure to pay child support.”). 
 364. See NOLA MURDER REDUCTION: TECHNOLOGY TO POWER DATA-DRIVEN PUBLIC HEALTH 
STRATEGIES, PALANTIR 5 (2014) (on file with author); KENNETH J. NOVAK ET AL., KANSAS CITY, 
MISSOURI SMART POLICING INITIATIVE: FROM FOOT PATROL TO FOCUSED DETERRENCE 7–12 
(2015), http://www.strategiesforpolicinginnovation.com/sites/default/files/spotlights/Kansas City 
SPI Spotlight FINAL 2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5E4-53A9]; Davey, supra note 31; Jason Shueh, 
New Orleans Cuts Murder Rate Using Data Analytics, GOV’T TECH. (Oct. 22, 2014), 
http://www.govtech.com/data/New-Orleans-Cuts-Murder-Rate-Using-Data-Analytics.html 
[https://perma.cc/AT9P-WFJ7]. 
 365. See Cheryl Corley, When Social Media Fuels Gang Violence, NPR: ALL TECH 
CONSIDERED (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2015/10/07/ 
446300514/when-social-media-fuels-gang-violence [https://perma.cc/JWQ2-GPWX] (emphasizing 
the importance of using social media to curb gang violence). 
 366. See Ben Austen, Public Enemies: Social Media is Fueling Gang Wars in Chicago, WIRED 
(Sept. 17, 2013), https://www.wired.com/2013/09/gangs-of-social-media [https://perma.cc/VN8H-
Z447] (“Gang enforcement officers in Chicago started looking closely at social media sites about 
three years ago . . . .”); Stroud, supra note 28 (describing various applications that allow police 
officers to use keywords to search for violent social media posts).  
 367. See Cantú, supra note 28 (surveying different police departments that use social media 
software to monitor protests); Elizabeth Dwoskin, Police Are Spending Millions of Dollars to 
Monitor the Social Media of Protesters and Suspects, WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/11/18/police-are-spending-millions-to-
monitor-the-social-media-of-protesters-and-suspects [https://perma.cc/MHU8-PMVV] (describing 
local police departments’ use of software tools to find individuals who brag about committing 
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want to determine gang involvement or the probable location of 
potential violence, social media threats, boasts, and posturing provide 
a good forecast for brewing trouble.368  
Particular crimes have also been examined through the lens of 
predictive analytics. The NYPD used an algorithmic process to 
identify those homes most likely to be sites of domestic violence 
incidents.369 Many domestic violence incidents escalate in severity, but 
with over 263,207 domestic violence calls a year, New York police did 
not know which homes to prioritize for additional attention.370 Using a 
computer system that automatically scanned police reports for 
keywords like “kill,” “alcohol,” or “suicide,” police were able to 
prioritize which homes to visit and proactively respond to potentially 
violent situations.371 Other predictive technologies that target 
particular places or patterns of activity have been developed. Robbery, 
fraud, and human trafficking all leave data trails that can be 
monitored to track and predict future crime.372 The thread connecting 
 
crimes or who post about witnessing criminal activity on social media); John Knefel, Your Social 
Media Posts Are Fueling the Future of Police Surveillance: Activists Use Tech to Fuel Their 
Movements, and Cops Turn to Geofeedia to Aggregate the Data, INVERSE (Nov. 20, 2015), 
https://www.inverse.com/article/8358-your-social-media-posts-are-fueling-the-future-of-police-
surveillance [https://perma.cc/FD3J-FA62] (discussing police monitoring of social media and the 
technology of “geofencing”).  
 368. See Chris J. Chasin, The Revolution Will be Tweeted, but the Tweets Will be 
Subpoenaed: Reimagining Fourth Amendment Privacy to Protect Associational Anonymity, 2014 
U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 27 (2014):  
Social media monitoring has also provided preemptive warnings of illegal activity, 
allowing police to prevent crimes before they begin or to coordinate surveillance to 
catch the criminals in the act. This preventative use is surprisingly common, with 
forty-one percent of surveyed law enforcement officers reporting that they use social 
media to monitor for potential criminal activity.;  
Megan Behrman, Note, When Gangs Go Viral: Using Social Media and Surveillance Cameras to 
Enhance Gang Databases, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 315, 316–17 (2015) (describing the use of social 
media, surveillance tools, and electronic databases to combat gang violence); Joseph Goldstein & 
J. David Goodman, Seeking Clues to Gangs and Crime, Detectives Monitor Internet Rap Videos, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/08/nyregion/seeking-clues-to-gangs-
and-crime-detectives-monitor-internet-rap-videos.html [https://perma.cc/D3XA-PM27] (detailing 
police use of music videos to target suspects). 
 369. See Joseph Goldstein, Police Take on Family Violence to Avert Deaths, N.Y. TIMES (July 
24, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/25/nyregion/police-take-on-family-violence-to-avert-
deaths.html [https://perma.cc/W38J-CL8K]. 
 370. Id.; see also Amanda Hitt & Lynn McLain, Stop the Killing: Potential Courtroom Use of 
a Questionnaire That Predicts the Likelihood That a Victim of Intimate Partner Violence Will be 
Murdered by Her Partner, 24 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 277, 283 (2009) (“Since the late 1970’s, 
as researchers clamored to create instruments that could accurately predict the threat of 
physical violence, over thirty-three IPV screening tools have been created.”). 
 371. Goldstein, supra note 369.  
 372. See Sneed, supra note 219 (detailing how anti–human trafficking groups can harness 
data analysis software to pinpoint location information and victim demographic information); 
Bernhard Warner, Google Turns to Big Data to Unmask Human Traffickers, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 
10, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-04-10/google-turns-to-big-data-to-
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these strategies is that predictive variables showing a potential for 
risk can be identified and, further, that intervention with the person 
or location of that risk can reduce the chance of future crime. 
2. Predicting Police Risk 
Predictive policing technologies generally look outward toward 
the criminal world. But those same risk-identification technologies can 
also be turned inward toward police. In fact, the very same predictive 
analytic techniques can be used to identify at-risk officers most likely 
to be involved in recurring acts of excessive force or professional 
misconduct. 
As a technological matter, there is little difference between 
isolating predictive variables that lead to high-risk behaviors in 
criminals and officers. The technologies measure environmental or 
personal factors that correlate with elevated risk. The variables are 
different, but the underlying theory that certain environmental or 
personal factors result in more risky behaviors remains the same. This 
insight finds support in the long but ineffective history of Early 
Intervention (“EI”) systems designed to identify and correct recurring 
police misconduct.373 For decades, remedial systems to identify at-risk 
officers have been implemented.374 These systems remained largely 
retrospective, looking to past acts (usually limited to complaints, 
accidents, or uses of force) in an effort to correct past bad behavior. 
They also rarely reduced police misconduct, although in many 
instances the EI systems were accompanied by other systemic changes 
to improve police accountability.375  
 
unmask-human-traffickers [https://perma.cc/S9K9-Y2MT] (reporting on the consolidation and 
analysis of data from emergency calls to locate the sources of human trafficking).  
 373. See John A. Shjarback, Emerging Early Intervention Systems: An Agency-Specific Pre-
Post Comparison of Formal Citizen Complaints of Use of Force, POLICING, Mar. 2015, at 1 (“An 
EI system is a non-punitive, data-driven management tool intended to spot officers who exhibit 
performance problems such as frequent use of force incidents and high numbers of citizen 
complaints.”); id. at 9 (“EI systems might have less of an influence on departments than 
previously believed.”); see also id. at 2 (“An EI system is a data-driven management tool used by 
departments as a mechanism for increasing police accountability.”). 
 374. See Harris, supra note 326, at 166: 
Early intervention systems help police departments track the behavior of their 
officers, something difficult to do in the absence of a data-driven, systematic effort. 
The idea originated at least as long ago as 1981, in the seminal report on police by the 
U.S. Civil Rights Commission, Who Is Guarding the Guardians? 
(citing U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WHO IS GUARDING THE GUARDIANS? A REPORT ON POLICE 
PRACTICES (1981)). 
 375. See Shjarback, supra note 373, at 10 (“Overall, departments with emerging EI systems 
did not appear to experience any positive outcomes (e.g. reduced complaint rates of use of force) 
associated with the development and implementation of such systems . . . .”); see also id. at 8 
(showing no improvement for ninety-four departments after implementation of EI systems); id. 
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Predictive models promise something different. Predictive risk 
assessments focus on police misconduct using a host of more 
complicated variables beyond the traditional red flags used for 
problem officers. Building off of some of the same insights used to 
identify criminal actors most at risk for negative outcomes, these 
sophisticated computer models look at systemic environmental risk 
factors that contribute to stress, violence, and poor decisionmaking.  
Professor Rayid Ghani, a data scientist at the University of 
Chicago, decided to test whether big data models could predict 
incidents of avoidable police-citizen conflict.376 With the full 
cooperation of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, Ghani 
sought to predict the variables that might increase the risk of 
potential conflicts between officers and citizens.377  
The predictive model began by collecting the different types of 
official police data corresponding to activities officers engage in on a 
daily basis. For example, data on all police dispatches were recorded, 
including time, location, and type of event.378 Similarly, all formal 
 
(“In the aggregate, departments that have developed and implemented EI systems are generally 
not experiencing lower levels of formal citizen complaints of use of force relative to before the 
systems were employed.”); Robert E. Worden et al., Intervention with Problem Officers: An 
Outcome Evaluation of an EIS Intervention, 40 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 409, 415 (2013) (“The 
evidence that supports the use of EI systems is not strong, and certainly not 
commensurate . . . .”). 
 376. See Michael Gordon, CMPD’s Goal: To Predict Misconduct Before It Can Happen, 
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/ 
crime/inside-courts-blog/article62772592.html [https://perma.cc/7PXE-F7JA] (describing the 
Charlotte-Mecklenberg Police Department’s collaboration with the University of Chicago 
research team in devising a way to better predict police behavior); Ted Gregory, U. of C. 
Researchers Use Data to Predict Police Misconduct, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 18, 2016), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-big-data-police-misconduct-met-20160816-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/22PW-5HH9] (describing the University of Chicago research team’s similar 
work with the Chicago Police Department); Jaeah Lee, How Science Could Help Prevent Police 
Shootings, MOTHER JONES (May/June 2016), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/07/data-
prediction-police-misconduct-shootings [https://perma.cc/PYT5-P2RP] (recounting the 
development of Professor Ghani’s unique big data approach to police-violence prevention). 
 377. Rayid Ghani et al., Identifying Police Officers at Risk of Adverse Events, DATA SCI. FOR 
SOC. GOOD 1 (2016), https://dssg.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/identifying-police-
officers-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/7L7L-SLGS] (“Certain officers, at certain periods of time, can be 
identified as being more at risk of involvement in an adverse event than others.”); see also id. at 2 
(“To improve the current system, we focus on the following prediction task: Given the set of all 
active officers at time t and all data from time periods prior to t, predict which officers will have 
an adverse interaction in the next year.”). 
 378. Id. at 4: 
[The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department’s (“CMPD”)] system creates a 
dispatch event every time an officer is dispatched to a scene—for example, in response 
to a 911 call—and every time an officer reports an action to the department. . . . 
Dispatch records include the time and location of all events, as well as the type of 
event (e.g. robbery) and its priority. Dispatches are often linked in CMPD’s system to 
other types of events, such as arrests or IA cases, that occurred during that dispatch. 
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citations,379 traffic stops,380 and arrests381 were inputted into the 
system with corresponding event data and the suspect’s socioeconomic 
information. Less formal “field interviews” recorded any time a person 
was stopped or frisked and also included data about the event, the 
officer, and the suspect.382  
This event information was combined with more officer-specific 
information. Internal affairs records involving prior complaints, prior 
use of force allegations, vehicle pursuits and accidents, conduct 
violations, injuries, and internal affairs investigations were 
included.383 Actual criminal complaints against officers with all of the 
accompanying location and force details were added.384 Because the 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department had kept information from 
an EI system, a decade’s worth of red flags for particular officers were 
available for review. The information showed all officers who had been 
flagged for having two or more incidents occur in the preceding 180 
days.385 Finally, demographic information from employee records—
 
 379. Id. (“The citations data provides details of each citation written by officers. Each record 
contains the date and type of citation, a code corresponding to the division, and additional meta-
data such as whether the citation was written on paper or electronically.”). 
 380. Id. (“CMPD officers are required to record information about all traffic stops they 
conduct. Records include time, location, the reason for and the outcome of the stop, if the traffic 
stop resulted in the use of force, and the stopped driver’s socio-demographic profile.”). 
 381. Id. (“CMPD records every arrest made by its officers, including when and where the 
arrest took place, what charges were associated, whether a judge deemed the officer to have had 
probable cause, and the suspect’s demographic information.”). 
 382. Id. at 5: 
A “field interview” is the broad name given by CMPD for any event in which a 
pedestrian is stopped and/or frisked, or any time an officer enters or attempts to enter 
the property of an individual. . . . Records contain temporal and spatial information as 
well as information about the demographics about the interviewed person. 
 383. Id. at 3−4 (describing the department’s internal affairs records to include filed 
complaints, as well as when “an officer uses force, engages in a vehicle pursuit, gets into a 
vehicle accident, commits a rule-of-conduct violation, is injured, or conducts a raid and search, 
CMPD creates an IA record”). 
 384. Id. at 4:  
The criminal complaints data provided by CMPD contains records of criminal 
complaints made by citizens. Each record includes a code for the incident, the location 
of the incident, the type of weapons involved if weapons were involved, and details 
about victims and responding officers. It also contains flags that include information 
such as whether the event was associated with gang violence, domestic violence, 
narcotics activity or hate crimes. 
 385. Id. at 5: 
We were also given the history of EIS flags going back over 10 years to 2005. Each 
record identifies the relevant officer and supervisor, the threshold triggered (e.g. more 
than two accidents in a 180 day period or more than three uses of force in an 90 day 
period) and the selected intervention for each flag, which can include training and 
counseling. 
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including education levels, years of experience, race, height, weight, 
and gender386—was inputted along with training records.387 
This event-specific and officer-specific data was then combined 
with neighborhood data. Census data and city data on neighborhood 
characteristics, crime, and economic health were layered in so that 
responses to certain dispatches could be tracked by neighborhood.388 
The final result was a computer model with 423 features that could 
isolate when negative police-citizen incidents would be most likely to 
occur.389  
The predictive model proved quite accurate. As the researchers 
summarized, “Our best performing model is able to flag 12% more 
high-risk officers (true positives), while flagging 32% fewer low-risk 
officers (false positives) compared to the current system.”390 Obvious 
variables—like higher rates of prior adverse incidents—correlated 
with higher risk, but so did unknown variables like the amount of 
vacant land area in a neighborhood391 or whether the dispatch call 
came from a civilian or a fellow officer (the latter corresponding with a 
higher rate of violence).392 More intriguingly, the model showed that 
 
 386. Id. (“The department’s employee information includes demographic information on 
every individual employed by the department, including those that have retired or been fired. 
The data includes officer education levels, years of service, race, height, weight, and other 
persistent qualities of officers.”). 
 387. Id. (“CMPD requires officers to receive rigorous training on a variety of topics, from 
physical fitness to how to interact with members of the public. The department records each 
officer’s training events.”). 
 388. Id.: 
In addition to the data provided by CMPD, we also use publicly available data from 
2010 and 2012 neighborhood quality-of-life studies to understand the geospatial 
context of CMPD events. These studies collect data on many neighborhood features 
including Census/ACS data on neighborhood demographics and data on physical 
characteristics, crime, and economic vitality. 
 389. Id.: 
The goal of the EIS is to predict which officers are likely to have an adverse event in 
the near future. We formulate it as a binary classification problem where the class of 
interest is whether a given officer will have an adverse event in a given period of time 
into the future. . . . Efforts were chiefly geared towards the extraction of these 
features - in total 432 features were used. 
 390. Id. at 6.  
 391. Id.: 
First, significant controls at the neighborhood level exist within the model. Such 
controls have an impact on prediction - for example, vacant land area rates are a 
significant predictor of officer risk. Second, indicators such as the rates of prior 
adverse incidents and sustained complaints indicate cases where IA officials 
previously found officers to be at fault over and above these increased risk rates. 
Combined, these observations provide support for the idea that a subset of officers are 
at particular risk for adverse events, and that an EIS which controls for non-officer 
level factors may be able to find such officers so that interventions can be applied. 
 392. Id. at 8: 
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exposure to high stress incidents like suicides, domestic violence, or 
cases involving young children resulted in a higher risk for a future 
adverse outcome.393 This exposure to trauma figured prominently in 
predicting future incidents.  
The model offered improvements over the old EI systems. The 
prior Charlotte-Mecklenburg EI system had proven to be 
overinclusive,394 flagging almost half of all officers in the prior year.395 
In addition, the old system did not differentiate between the types of 
patrols that officers engaged in, so that midnight shifts in high-crime 
areas were treated equally to more relaxed daytime patrols.396 The 
result was a system both unhelpful to supervisors and easily gamed by 
officers.397  
Finally, the big data insights provide opportunities to change 
police practices to avoid these repeating high-risk incidents and 
improve training.398 The finding about trauma led police to reconsider 
dispatch protocols. Now, a more targeted dispatch system avoids 
sending officers who have recently been exposed to high-stress 
situations to the next triggering crime scene.399 This insight could 
encourage more officer-centric training and counseling services about 
 
“Hot” dispatches initiated by officers themselves (as opposed to citizens by way of 911 
calls), seem more likely to end in adverse outcomes. Indicators of heightened officer 
stress (hours on duty) and aggressive policing style (discretionary arrest rate), seem to 
also have a positive impact on the risk of adverse outcomes. 
 393. Id. at 5 (“Notably among incident sub-types, we track incidents we believe are likely to 
contribute to officer stress, such as events involving suicides, domestic violence, young children, 
gang violence, or narcotics.”). 
 394. Id. at 2: 
Current EISs detect officers at risk of adverse events by observing a number of 
performance indicators and raising a flag when certain selection criteria are met. 
These criteria are usually thresholds on counts of certain kinds of incidents over a 
specified time frame, such as two accidents within 180 days or three uses of force 
within 90 days. 
 395. Id. (indicating that current EI system thresholds fail to consider important factors, 
potentially rendering them overinclusive). 
 396. Id. (“For example, CMPD’s system uses the same thresholds for officers working the 
midnight shift in a high-crime area as an officer working in the business district in the 
morning.”). 
 397. Id. at 3.  
 398. Id. at 2:  
The system described here is the beginning of an effort that has the potential to allow 
police chiefs across the nation to see which of their officers are in need of training, 
counseling, or additional assistance to make them better prepared to deal safely and 
positively with individuals and groups in their communities. 
 399. Id. at 9 (“Our dispatch-level models take the first steps toward predictive risk-based 
dispatch decisions, where an officer who is at higher risk of an adverse incident for that dispatch 
can potentially be held back and a different officer, at a lower risk score, can be dispatched.”). 
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trauma and how to address posttraumatic stress.400 It also could flag 
circumstances that repeatedly create the potential for risk.  
For privacy reasons, Professor Ghani’s team purposely removed 
identifying material from the data and looked for common 
environmental factors as predictors of conflict rather than looking at 
individual “problem officers.” The idea was to identify patterns of 
conflict, as opposed to predicting individuals within those patterns. 
But, while necessary for political acceptance in Charlotte-
Mecklenburg, this limitation does not need to be implemented in the 
future. In fact, the same targeted predictive assessments akin to the 
Heat List could be used to identify particular at-risk officers. 
For example, variables that have made it into various Early 
Warning or EI systems demonstrate data points that could be used to 
target at-risk officers. Professional factors such as prior complaints, 
prior uses of force, unprofessional conduct, or accidents are known red 
flags for behavioral problems (and were confirmed in Professor 
Ghani’s data).401 Personal stressors such as financial difficulties, 
divorce, injury, death in the family, or other losses could all signal a 
higher risk of professional stress. Psychological or medical factors 
resulting from posttraumatic stress, depression, or medical problems 
could also factor into officer reactions. Finally, personal activities—
lifestyle choices and even hobbies402—can influence risk. While none of 
these factors predict police misconduct outright, they might predict 
when a higher risk of police misconduct exists.403 In combination with 
the environmental assessments of Professor Ghani, these predictive 
models could become very accurate.  
 
 400. Id.: 
Our model significantly outperforms the existing system at the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD). Our model also provides risk scores to the 
department, allowing them to more accurately target training, counseling, and other 
interventions toward officers who are at highest risk of having an adverse incident. 
This will allow the department to better allocate resources, reduce the burden on 
supervisors, and reduce unnecessary administrative work of officers who were not at 
risk. 
 401. See Chani et al., supra note 383 (describing the situations in which CMPD creates an 
internal affairs record).  
 402. David J. Krajicek, What’s the Best Way to Weed Out Potential Killer Cops, ALTERNET 
(May 15, 2016), https://www.alternet.org/civil-liberties/whats-best-way-weed-out-potential-killer-
cops [https://perma.cc/23CA-7B58] (discussing a correlation between Muay Thai (a combat 
martial art) and officer violence). But see Cynthia Lee, Race, Policing, and Lethal Force: 
Remedying Shooter Bias with Martial Arts Training, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2016, at 
145, 160−70 (discussing the positive impact of certain martial arts on police training).  
 403. Just as the Heat List does not predict violence but instead merely predicts a higher risk 
of potential violence, any algorithm using these variables will also only predict a “risk” of 
misconduct.  
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In addition, if the predictive models incorporate social media 
postings and other forms of communicative activity, other risk factors 
might emerge. In the DOJ report on the Chicago Police Department, 
the investigators discovered troubling examples of racial and ethnic 
bias in police social media postings.404 As with law enforcement 
monitoring for criminal risk, social media reflects current thinking, 
emotions, and influences of real people in real time. Monitoring bias or 
hate articulated in social media environments might provide red flags 
of future behavioral problems. Obviously, this sort of employee 
surveillance will elicit resistance from rank-and-file officers.405 No 
employee enjoys at-work surveillance, and most would balk at 
supervisors reviewing off-duty, even if publicly accessible, social media 
posts. Ironically, the major complaint by officers was a feeling of 
preemptive punishment for actions they had yet to take—the same 
complaint of communities targeted by predictive policing technologies. 
This tension is discussed further in Part III. 
3. Predicting Exclusion 
A predictive warning system that tracks past officer 
misconduct would be relevant for proving recurring patterns of 
misconduct.406 Evidence about a particular officer flagged for 
repetitive unconstitutional stops would be relevant in a suppression 
hearing to show that the stop at issue was not an act of isolated 
negligence. Had detective Fackrell been flagged as an officer who 
routinely had complaints of unconstitutional stops brought against 
him, this information would fit the definition of “recurring” negligence. 
Several jurisdictions have begun creating such Police Accountability 
 
 404. DOJ CHICAGO REPORT, supra note 158, at 15 (“Moreover, we found that some Chicago 
police officers expressed discriminatory views and intolerance with regard to race, religion, 
gender, and national origin in public social media forums . . . .”); see also id. at 147 (“One officer 
posted a status stating, ‘Hopefully one of these pictures will make the black lives matter activist 
organization feel a whole lot better!’ with two photos attached, including one of two slain black 
men, in the front seats of a car, bloodied, covered in glass.”); id. (“Supervisors posted many of the 
discriminatory posts we found, including one sergeant who posted at least 25 anti-Muslim 
statements and at least 43 other discriminatory posts, and a lieutenant who posted at least five 
anti-immigrant and anti-Latino statements.”); id. (describing an officer “who had posted racist 
comments and had called for a race war on social media forums”). 
 405. See Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105 
CALIF. L. REV. 735 (2017) (discussing the potential privacy violations stemming from modern-day 
worker surveillance technology and describing these innovations as a “decimat[ion] [to] worker 
privacy”). 
 406. See Harris, supra note 326, at 165–66 (“[W]e should use early intervention systems: 
data-driven accountability structures designed to detect, track, and highlight various aspects of 
police officer conduct.”). 
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Databases—or digital “bad cop” lists—with precisely this type of 
information.407  
The identified risk may not only be with individual officers but 
with patterns of departmental misconduct as well. The same 
predictive risk assessment could identify whether particular police 
units possess a heightened risk of violence or exhibit patterns of 
unconstitutional stops. The percentages of constitutional stops 
memorialized in the DOJ reports could be broken down to particular 
units or officers and used as evidence in suppression hearings. 
Obviously, variables such as the type of patrol, neighborhood, and 
time of day would need to be factored in, but this is exactly the type of 
nuance that Professor Ghani’s researchers focused on in their study.408 
Recurring patterns in particular places might give reason to see a 
problem that cannot be excused as isolated negligence.  
In addition, recurring incidents of misconduct could be 
identified and, if not addressed, could lead to liability for negligence. 
For example, if a predictive warning system flagged an officer as likely 
to be involved in unconstitutional misconduct and police 
administrators did not adequately respond to the warning despite a 
duty to train and to develop policies and practices, this failure to act 
could give rise to a negligence claim. Or perhaps if it were shown (as it 
was in Charlotte-Mecklenburg) that responding to a traumatic event 
such as suicide leads to a higher likelihood that the officer’s next 
interaction will be violent and police administrators still assign the 
traumatized officer to the next high-risk situation, it could be argued 
that the police department acted negligently (if not recklessly) in 
ignoring a clear risk. In such a case, there exists a foreseeable risk, an 
alternative option, and a decision to ignore the risk. Such patterns, 
once revealed through data, put the administrators on notice of a 
systemic problem. And if that systemic problem arises in a case before 
a court, then the pattern could be relevant to the exclusionary rule 
decision.  
 
 407. See Cynthia H. Conti-Cook, Defending the Public: Police Accountability in the 
Courtroom, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 1063, 1084 (2016) (“In 2014, The Legal Aid Society 
announced the Cop Accountability Project—anchored by a database for police misconduct—
intended to serve its clients, its attorneys, and the community.”); Jason Tashea, Clicking for 
Complaints: Databases Create Access to Police Misconduct Cases and Offer a Handy Tool for 
Defense Lawyers, 102 A.B.A. J., Feb. 2016, at 17, 18: 
The New York City database houses information on more than 7,000 NYPD officers 
with a paper trail of alleged or proven misconduct. The files come from a number of 
sources, including the news, state and federal lawsuits, criminal decisions, the federal 
court’s PACER database, New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board hearings, 
NYPD Internal Affairs complaints, social media, and Legal Aid Society attorneys’ own 
experiences in court and with clients.  
 408. See supra notes 377–400 and accompanying text (describing Professor Ghani’s study).  
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D. Programmatic Benefit of Blue Data 
In addition to the instrumental benefits discussed above, the 
move toward blue data offers one final, broader benefit to how courts 
think about the Fourth Amendment. Blue data encourages courts to 
think programmatically about the Fourth Amendment.409 
In recent years, scholars have begun to rethink the Fourth 
Amendment as a system of rules to be analyzed separate from the 
individual cases coming before courts for suppression. In Professor 
Daphna Renan’s words, the Fourth Amendment should be understood 
in terms of “programs of surveillance” not in terms of transactional 
acts.410 As such, policing can borrow from administrative law 
principles and be regulated accordingly.411 Professor Tracy Meares 
demonstrated that the NYPD stop and frisk program should be better 
understood as an unconstitutional “program” and not as a series of 
individualized unconstitutional incidents.412 This was also Justice 
Sotomayor’s insight in Strieff, where she wrote that the warrant check 
was part of a system of unconstitutional searches for evidence.413  
Obviously, blue data systems offer new ways to visualize the 
programmatic or systemic nature of police misconduct. Blue data is a 
visualization tool, and courts will thus have the ability to see beyond 
individual actions to systemic conduct, whether through data mining 
or video surveillance or some other technology. Blue data can thus be 
a tool to bolster these new Fourth Amendment theories. 
 More practically, once Fourth Amendment “incidents” are 
thought of as programmatic, it becomes easier to bring claims of 
systemic negligence in court. It may not be possible for police 
administrators to know about unconstitutional “transactions” of 
individual officers, but they can know—and should know—about 
 
 409. See, e.g., Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in 
Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2052 (2016) (explaining that in order to accomplish 
broader institutional awareness, criminal courts must consider “facts about the criminal justice 
system itself, and . . . the institutional behavior of its key actors”). 
 410. Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment As Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. 
REV. 1039, 1041 (2016); see id. at 1042 (“While our Fourth Amendment framework is 
transactional, then, surveillance is increasingly programmatic.”). 
 411. See Christopher Slobogin, Policing As Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 97 (2016) 
(“[A] reframing of panvasive searches and seizures as administrative actions gives significant 
weight to legislative and executive decisionmaking, and it draws from the Court’s precedent.”). 
 412. See Meares, supra note 126, at 162 (arguing that a mass of stop and frisks is not simply 
an aggregation of individual incidents but rather a program in which police “engage in an 
organizationally determined practice of stopping certain ‘sorts’ of people for the stated purpose of 
preventing or deterring crime”). 
 413. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2066 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[The 
warrant check] was part and parcel of the officer’s illegal ‘expedition for evidence in the hope 
that something might turn up.’ ” (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605 (1975))).  
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unconstitutional programs. If administrators become aware of these 
problems, courts can find the requisite negligence. If administrators 
do not know about these recurring problems but should be aware of 
them, courts may find negligence. And if administrators do nothing to 
find out about these problems, courts may still find negligence if the 
administrators had a duty to be aware. Courts could even create an 
affirmative duty to investigate if policing programs continue to 
generate recurring constitutional problems.  
The ability to visualize recurring problems creates legal 
liability for failing to act. In so doing, blue data can provide another 
negligence-related legal avenue to bring suppression claims under the 
Supreme Court’s new application of the exclusionary rule, which 
emphasizes that claims of systemic negligence warrant exclusion 
while claims of isolated negligence do not. In addition, this type of 
systemic misconduct can be used in civil rights actions under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and the federal government’s ability to investigate 
patterns and practices of police abuse under 42 U.S.C. § 14141.414 
III. THE REVEAL OF RESISTANCE 
The use of data mining, surveillance, and predictive analytics 
to target police negligence will likely face resistance. Police officers, 
administrators, and unions will probably protest the invasion of 
personal and professional privacy it threatens. Legal battles will erupt 
over whether (and how) to collect, sort, and introduce evidence from 
these new blue data systems in ordinary suppression hearings. 
Technological hurdles will divide jurisdictions between those 
departments that can turn surveillance technology into methods of 
police accountability and those without that capacity. Police will be 
joined in this criticism of data-driven surveillance by an odd 
consortium of civil liberties groups resistant to erecting the larger 
surveillance architecture and defense lawyers unwilling to concede a 
need for a secondary Herring analysis before suppression. The future 
of the exclusionary rule is already clouded, and the rise of new 
information streams may not make it any clearer.  
Yet, this response of resistance is itself revealing and worth 
studying. Arguments pushing back against surveilling police officers 
also have application to surveilling citizens. The challenges of 
technology and a growing reliance on big data systems suggest 
universal cautions about the dangers and costs of any data-dependent 
system. These issues of professional resistance, legal resistance, and 
 
 414. See supra note 10. 
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technological barriers offer no simple answers but do offer an 
opportunity to rethink how the new exclusionary rule should interact 
with the even newer technologies being developed to assist law 
enforcement. This Part seeks to understand this resistance, unpacking 
the practical realities and possible responses, as well as the insights to 
be gained from examining why there will be—and probably should 
be—serious resistance to blue data.  
A. Police Resistance 
Police accountability measures have faced resistance in the 
past. In fact, one can easily find open resistance in response to many 
prior police accountability proposals.415 Police officers have resisted 
the implementation of early warning systems.416 Police unions have 
resisted releasing officer personnel (i.e., misconduct) records and other 
accountability reforms.417 Police administrations (and cities) have 
pushed back on federal oversight.418 And while some jurisdictions have 
embraced police accountability, many more have fought vocally to stop 
proposed changes. Even in the era of Black Lives Matter, which raised 
consciousness of racial bias and excessive force in policing, the rise of 
the Blue Lives Matter countermovement shows the long-standing 
protective reaction to any public criticism of police misconduct.419  
 
 415. See, e.g., David H. Bayley, Police Reform: Who Done It?, 18 POLICING & SOC’Y 7 (2008) 
(describing how modern reform in policing has been met by resistance); Sklansky, Police and 
Democracy, supra note 123, at 1773–74 (detailing historical aspects of police reform); Steve 
Wilson & Kevin Buckler, The Debate over Police Reform: Examining Minority Support for Citizen 
Oversight and Resistance by Police Unions, 35 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 184, 188 (2010). 
 416. See Harris, supra note 326, at 168 (discussing the professional sanctions that officers 
can face if flagged by an early warning system). 
 417. See Rushin, supra note 131, at 154 (“[C]ollective bargaining and civil service protections 
inadvertently discourage police management from responding forcefully to misconduct.”); 
Walker, supra note 122, at 72: 
Collective bargaining agreements, for example, contain provisions related to the 
investigation of alleged officer misconduct (whether on the basis of a citizen complaint 
or an internally generated complaint) that impede a timely and thorough 
investigation. Officer appeals of discipline, meanwhile, may involve procedures that 
tend to increase the likelihood of disciplinary sanctions being mitigated or overturned.  
 418. See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 453, 533 (2004) (“[E]fforts by outside agencies to collect and analyze information 
in a potentially adversarial framework, such as a § 14141 lawsuit, may lead police officers to be 
defensive and uncooperative.”). But see PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, 
FINAL REPORT 61 (2015), https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E3YS-ULAS] (proposing an increased focus on data collection about policing 
practices). 
 419. See Jim Salter & David A. Lieb, New ‘Blue Lives Matter’ Laws Raise Concern Among 
Activists, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 26, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/f550bca209d6467995530d 
4d82b4fbb7 [https://perma.cc/3XJQ-YBTN] (discussing activists’ reactions to laws permitting 
heightened sentences for people who assault or kill police officers). 
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A proposal to redirect existing data-driven surveillance 
systems toward police accountability will likely meet similar 
resistance. The reasons are fairly obvious. Such a system would 
invade personal privacy, restrict professional autonomy, constrain 
actions and language, and lead to increased supervision, training, and 
potentially negative professional outcomes. Police officers, like most 
employees, would rather avoid the adverse effects of worker 
surveillance, especially when such oversight is couched in 
dehumanizing terms like “predictive analytics” or “data mining.”420 
Such invasive personal investigation could also undermine 
recruitment efforts and employee morale if potential officers did not 
want to have their own lives policed. 
Police resistance exerted in either formal/informal or 
intentional/unintentional ways could undermine the ability to use blue 
data for exclusionary rule purposes. At the front end, since police 
agencies and officers would be responsible for setting up the 
technologies, they could also thwart any application directed toward 
police.421 This resistance could be intentional, inadvertent, or due to 
cost and logistical concerns.  
Similarly, as has been seen with other accountability 
technologies like dashboard cameras or body cameras, police have 
been known to intentionally frustrate the system by turning the 
cameras off.422 Put simply, if police wished to not comply with a data 
collection system or figured out ways to make recovering the data too 
difficult, the information’s utility in suppression hearings would be 
quite limited. If police simply stopped collecting the underlying data, 
blue data would not exist. In both Oakland and New York City, the 
data collection was mandated by a court order. Unquestionably, an 
intentional effort to undermine data collection would undercut the 
value of this Article’s proposal to use such data in suppression 
hearings.  
Inadvertent resistance also occurs when police make errors in 
data collection. The problem of data bias is endemic to all data-driven 
systems, and the difficulties of collecting police data are no different. 
 
 420. See Don Peck, They’re Watching You at Work, ATLANTIC (Dec. 2013), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/12/theyre-watching-you-at-work/354681/ 
[https://perma.cc/J94M-6XZP] (explaining how the use of big data in human resources is 
transforming how employers hire, fire, and promote employees). 
 421. Most of the technologies already exist but are currently directed at civilians and not 
police, demonstrating that, given the choice, police may choose not to have surveillance directed 
toward their professional work.  
 422. See Laurent Sacharoff & Sarah Lustbader, Who Should Own Police Body Camera 
Videos?, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 269, 290 (2017) (recognizing that the “power to stop recording has 
led, in a great many cases, to abuse”). 
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As I have written in other contexts, bad data can corrupt an otherwise 
good data-driven system.423 Ensuring data integrity means adopting 
systems of data collection that are automatic and create automatic 
data trails (so as to see if the data is being manipulated).424 Data 
errors can be compounded by the growing volume of information being 
produced. Every day, every shift, there is more data collected without 
the commensurate resources to manage the accumulating data. 
Because of this volume of data, police may not be able to maintain the 
data systems to a level of accuracy necessary for use in court.  
More practically, police may not be able to afford the cost of 
these new technologies. Big data technologies are expensive. 
Additionally, the data needs to be integrated into existing systems and 
must be updated and its accuracy maintained. Both in terms of having 
the financial ability to invest in the technology and the human 
capacity to use the available amount of data, cost constraints may 
undermine any potential utility. Cost workarounds such as partnering 
with private companies might make sense in terms of efficiency and 
expertise, but the outsourcing of local police power creates real 
dangers.425 Private companies could face ethical problems, conflicts, or 
confidentiality issues, and a growing dependence on private companies 
could undermine local public authority. Cost might thus create a real 
if unintentional barrier to adoption of blue data systems. 
Whatever the practical limitations to implementation, police 
resistance to blue data does reveal a deeper truth about surveillance 
and data-driven suspicion. The natural police resistance to technology 
parallels community resistance to the same technology. Citizens also 
reflexively resist any technology which threatens to invade personal 
privacy, restrict personal autonomy, constrain actions or language, or 
lead to increased surveillance or negative outcomes. Police fears of 
blue data are the fears of big data surveillance more generally.  
One insight from the police pushback to blue data is that this 
resistance might inform how local communities should respond to 
proposed new surveillance technologies. Resistance can be an 
educational moment. The successful push of police unions to thwart 
 
 423. See Ferguson, supra note 2, at 398–400 (discussing issues of accuracy with big data 
collection systems).  
 424. See Miriam H. Baer, Pricing the Fourth Amendment, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1103, 1160 
(2017) (proposing a regime that includes the use of body and dash cameras, periodic audits of 
search data, and imposition of stiff penalties for providing false information for ensuring the 
accurate accounting of the number and types of searches officers perform). 
 425. See Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology Companies on 
Policing, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 126 (2017) (“The continuing influence of surveillance companies 
even after police have purchased their services further removes policing from traditional 
mechanisms of oversight.”). 
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any data accountability project stems from organized efforts framed 
around appeals to fairness, due process, and concerns about personal 
privacy and free expression. Police unions have successfully 
weaponized the fear that a hard-working civil servant may be 
professionally penalized because of an algorithmic judgment of future 
risk. Yet, those same basic fairness issues apply in civilian 
surveillance of targeted communities and can also be used to frame a 
message of resistance.  
In general, however, citizens have lacked the political 
organization and urgency that police advocates have developed. The 
message may be felt but not always heard. This may be changing in a 
few cities where this democratic voice against police surveillance has 
been growing louder.426 In Oakland, a Privacy Advisory Board was 
created to advise the city council on new police surveillance 
technologies,427 and similar surveillance awareness bills have been 
considered in eleven other jurisdictions.428 Seattle enacted one of the 
most comprehensive local surveillance ordinances in the country, 
mandating review of police surveillance technologies.429 On a local 
stage, many groups are coalescing around the idea of ensuring 
transparency and accountability for new data-driven policing 
technologies.430  
 
 426. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Fragmented Surveillance State, SLATE (Nov. 10, 
2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2017/11/the_united_states_ 
fragmented_surveillance_system.html [https://perma.cc/54XX-98UM] (discussing how some cities 
require civilian surveillance over new police technologies). 
 427. See Darwin BondGraham, Oakland Privacy Commission Approves Surveillance 
Transparency and Oversight Law, E. BAY EXPRESS (Jan. 6, 2017), 
https://www.eastbayexpress.com/SevenDays/archives/2017/01/06/oakland-privacy-commission-
approves-surveillance-transparency-and-oversight-law [https://perma.cc/G6FP-5T4U] (detailing 
the proposal for a Surveillance and Community Safety Ordinance which would require “[c]ity 
agencies . . . to seek city council approval before purchasing new technologies, and the law also 
imposes reporting requirements so that the public can evaluate the costs and benefits of 
technologies that monitor and track people”). 
 428. Jessica Anderson, 11 U.S. Cities to Consider Legislation to Require Greater 
Transparency for Police Surveillance Programs, BALT. SUN (Sept. 21, 2016), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-aclu-police-surveillance-
20160921-story.html [https://perma.cc/JJ47-QWE3] (listing other cities that have considered 
surveillance awareness bills, including Seattle, Richmond, and Milkwaukee). 
429. About the Surveillance Ordinance, SEATTLE.GOV, https://www.seattle.gov/tech/ 
initiatives/privacy/surveillance-technologies/about-surveillance-ordinance (last visited Mar. 16, 
2019) [https://perma.cc/72JL-2AF2]. 
 430. See Jose Pagliery, ACLU Unveils Privacy Fight in 16 States, CNN MONEY (Jan. 21, 
2016, 11:53 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/20/technology/aclu-state-privacy-laws 
[https://perma.cc/EN2J-P9CY] (explaining how sixteen states are considering measures to 
protect personal information). 
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To be clear, the symmetry of surveillance resistance431 need not 
be exact. There may be reasons to increase surveillance on citizens but 
not on police. But the fact that police raise reasonable concerns about 
the intrusiveness of surveillance offers a lesson on how to evaluate 
new privacy-invading technologies. The argument that the 
surveillance targets good cops as well as bad also highlights the 
overinclusive nature of public surveillance (targeting innocent citizens 
along with the guilty). The argument about the unfairness of being 
predictively flagged for conduct which has not yet occurred parallels 
the community’s fear of predictive targeting. Arguments about the 
danger of correlative suspicion, as opposed to observed suspicion, raise 
wide-ranging issues of accuracy, transparency, and individualized 
justice. Seen through the eyes of police officers wishing to avoid 
negative professional discipline, the arguments against surveillance 
are sympathetic and meritorious. But that feeling should also transfer 
to communities wishing to avoid the same harms.  
Whether practically feasible or not, as a thought experiment, 
the push for blue data brings in stark relief the concerns of all citizens 
wishing to avoid heightened surveillance. The pushback of police 
resistance offers a powerful example for ordinary citizens also 
concerned with invasive new technologies. If we take seriously the 
resistance to blue data, we may also moderate the rush toward greater 
surveillance. If police fear that predictive analytics are unfair to them, 
then how can one dismiss citizens’ complaints about a similar 
technology?  
In the end, police resistance to blue data may also be 
unavailing. The reason: once public-safety-oriented surveillance 
technologies have been turned against the citizens, it will be difficult 
to hide the data that also captures the police. The always-recording 
cameras exist in parts of New York City. The technology to search for 
each and every stop exists. The data will be available. Big data 
surveillance technologies are largely undiscriminating in who gets 
captured in the net and, once vacuumed up, the data exists for 
enterprising litigants to find. As such, the choice may really be about 
whether to adopt big data surveillance technologies in the first 
instance, recognizing that once adopted these technologies will watch 
everyone. 
Further, in an exclusionary rule regime in which recurring and 
systemic negligence legally matters, incentives exist to use this data 
in suppression hearings. Whether or not police wish to give the data 
 
 431. See Joh, supra note 35, at 1000–02 (describing the rise of antisurveillance methods of 
protest and privacy). 
Ferguson_ PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/25/2019  11:10 PM 
2019] EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN THE AGE OF BLUE DATA 641 
up, it will be demanded and likely produced under court order.432 If 
video of all of detective Fackrell’s past requests for identification 
existed, it may be difficult for a police department not to comply with 
a valid lawful request for the information. If a computer model 
predicted detective Fackrell as someone likely to violate constitutional 
rights and that risk assessment is requested by the defense, the data 
will need to be turned over. Once built, the surveillance systems will 
not be limited only to the police.  
B. Legal Resistance 
In addition to police resisting the creation of blue data systems, 
criminal courts—including judges and litigants—may resist 
developing a record of recurring or systemic negligence. For different 
reasons, judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers may choose a path 
of resistance rather than acquiescence to the introduction of blue data. 
To put the legal burden in context, most suppression hearings 
in criminal cases (suppressing, for example, narcotics, weapons, or 
stolen goods) occur quickly, without a significant amount of pretrial 
litigation. Motions are filed and witnesses are called, but within a 
limited scope. Tactical pressures to limit the amount of evidence 
introduced before trial, as well as relevance considerations, further 
reduce the amount of testimony. At most, each side might call a few 
witnesses to testify to the relevant facts and might make a few 
arguments about the relevant case law governing those facts before 
the proceeding is over. Within this practice, which is fairly standard in 
state courts, the idea of introducing evidence of systemic and 
recurring misconduct becomes quite disruptive, requiring more 
resources, time, and effort for the court system.  
From a trial judge’s perspective, the additional burden of 
applying the Herring test to an ordinary case will be both time-
consuming and confusing. In an earlier article, I examined the 
definitional and practical problems with the Supreme Court’s use of 
“deliberate,” “reckless,” and “grossly negligent” as those terms relates 
to individual officers.433 Similarly, the burden to show systemic or 
 
 432. Or production of the data may be required under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963), or other discovery rules. See, e.g., Conti-Cook, supra note 407, at 1074. 
 433. Ferguson, supra note 9, at 644–56; see also Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 151 
(2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 157–58 n.7 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“It is not clear how 
the Court squares its focus on deliberate conduct with its recognition that application of the 
exclusionary rule does not require inquiry into the mental state of the police.”); Laurin, supra 
note 60, at 727 (“On its face, the Court’s insistence that the standard it articulates be applied 
objectively seems nonsensical: Even if the lowest grade of culpability to trigger exclusion, gross 
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recurring patterns means opening up an ordinarily limited hearing to 
significantly more information. Aggressive defense lawyers will 
demand truncated Section 1983 hearings, developing the same record 
of a custom, policy, or practice, but with blue data evidence. Additional 
witnesses will be needed, including experts, to establish the duty of 
care and a baseline number for “recurring” problems.434 Trial judges 
who would prefer not to be reversed on appeal might be cautious in 
limiting evidence legally necessary to demonstrate recurring or 
systemic problems since the Supreme Court has suggested their 
importance. Findings of fact will need to be longer and will be more 
labor intensive. And all of these decisions will be made in an uncertain 
legal atmosphere, with little clarity about the definitions of 
“recurring,” “systemic,” or even “negligence” in the context of a 
suppression hearing.  
From the defense lawyer’s perspective, the burden of proving 
non-case-related facts may be too taxing to undertake. Defense 
counsel may find it hard enough to litigate the facts at hand, let alone 
all other stops an officer conducted. In busy, urban courthouses, the 
ability to litigate pretrial motions ahead of time may be nonexistent. 
Within this crush of cases, litigating the equivalent of a massive 
structural reform challenge borders on impossible. Even on a small 
scale, the burden of blue data requires additional discovery motions, 
additional time to review hours of footage, and the wherewithal to use 
the available data in one’s case. While technically possible—and 
perhaps even appealing—this change adds real practical difficulties 
for defense attorneys.  
Further, Herring’s change legally weakens the defense’s overall 
constitutional claims. Many defense attorneys may resist the idea that 
Herring imposes a second analytical step for suppression. The 
automatic linkage of a constitutional wrong and the suppression 
remedy has been ingrained in practice for decades, and the idea of 
conceding that automatic linkage is not appealing to defense lawyers. 
It is for that reason, perhaps, that Herring’s second step appears to be 
ignored in many courthouses. While some judges certainly conduct the 
second step of the analysis,435 many simply suppress evidence after 
finding a constitutional violation.  
 
negligence, could be assessed solely by reference to objective factors, proof of reckless or 
deliberate conduct typically requires a subjective inquiry.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 434. An open question is how to define “recurring.” The threshold question will require both 
a numerical answer as well as a temporal answer since the question of recurring within what 
timeframe would also have to be answered.  
 435. See Utah v. Strieff—Leading Case, supra note 49, at 337–38 (explaining that the Utah 
Supreme Court performed the second-step attenuation analysis).  
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From a prosecutor’s perspective, Herring offers a second bite at 
the apple after a constitutional violation. While appealing in theory, if 
recurring or systemic negligence becomes the centerpiece of a motions 
hearing, the entire proceeding shifts from the actions taken by the 
police officer in this particular case to all actions taken in other cases. 
Having to defend, or more likely seek to limit, extraneous information 
about bad policing practices across a city creates a real burden on 
prosecutors. Prosecutors also have too many cases and not enough 
time, so the burden of adding civil litigation-like responsibilities—
culling discovery requests, sorting through data and footage, and the 
like—may be too much. Finally, the introduction of prior police 
misconduct or evidence of systemic behavior raises a concern that this 
information could spill over into trial.436  
These arguments for resistance reveal an underappreciated 
difficulty of the Supreme Court’s new exclusionary rule: as a practical 
matter, this new rule may only serve to confuse trial practice. For 
instance, who has the burden of proving systemic problems—the 
defense or the prosecution? When would the defense get access to 
discovery regarding patterns of misconduct? How specific must the 
patterns of misconduct be (e.g., is a pattern of unconstitutional stops 
relevant to a case involving unconstitutional frisks)? Who would hire 
the experts to interpret the data? What if police are deliberately 
indifferent to bad practices? Given that this data represents 
impeachment evidence, would it be subject to the disclosure 
requirements of Brady v. Maryland?437 And at what level of generality 
(local, city, or state) would the pattern need to be proven?438 
Seemingly, in an effort to restrict the scope of the exclusionary rule 
remedy, the Supreme Court created a test that overburdens trial 
practice. Did the Court intend to turn every suppression hearing into 
a Section 1983 proxy or a pattern and practice investigation? Did the 
Court really want litigants to explore the systems that cause citizen-
police tension across the nation? The dissenting Justices in Herring 
and Strieff make clear that this is the logical conclusion of the 
holdings,439 yet no one seems to know how it would work in practice.  
 
 436. For example, allegations of police misconduct could be used to challenge the credibility 
or veracity of officer testimony as the officers’ felt need to defend the constitutionality of police 
actions could create an incentive to shade their testimony and thus create a form of bias cross-
examination.  
437. 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (requiring prosecutors to disclose all exculpatory evidence to criminal 
defendants prior to trial). 
 438. Thank you to Cynthia Conti-Cook for these insights and many more.  
 439. See supra notes 81–86, 433 and accompanying text.  
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Some might argue that the conservative majority of the 
Supreme Court likely believed the task of proving such recurring 
negligence near impossible, so it did not wrestle with the practicalities 
of implementing such a requirement. But now, enhanced technological 
capacities may have upended that plan by providing proof of recurring 
patterns or systemic problems with relative ease. In fact, the incentive 
exists for the entire defense bar to bring such challenges, because if 
systemic or recurring negligence is shown in certain practices, then 
such a finding will mean suppression in all related cases. For example, 
if Salt Lake City police officers routinely conducted unconstitutional 
stops for identification, all such cases involving that particular 
practice would result in suppression. What began as a narrowing of 
the exclusionary remedy might, in fact, turn out to be a much broader 
mandate to expand court-overseen police accountability practices. 
Every police stop will be analyzed in the context of a larger police 
practice, with particular attention paid to the policies, practice, and 
trainings of the police department at issue. This data collection will 
also be useful for future civil rights cases and federal investigations. 
This in turn raises a different, although related, problem: not 
all jurisdictions will have equally sophisticated technology, leading to 
unequal or divergent applications of blue data accountability. For 
courts tasked with applying constitutional law and the exclusionary 
rule uniformly across the legal system, this reality presents more 
practical problems. Technology costs money and many jurisdictions 
will not or cannot invest the time and capital into developing big data 
policing strategies. There will then exist two tiers of policing systems: 
the technology haves and the technology have-nots. The open question 
will be what to do when big data becomes the preferred mechanism to 
demand police accountability but does not exist in a particular 
jurisdiction.  
Again, these seem to be practical issues that the Court did not 
think through in offering its exclusionary rule pronouncement in 
Herring. Courts and lawyers resisting this change may well show the 
need to rethink Herring’s lessons and to develop new ways to evaluate 
which types of misconduct warrant suppression. In taking Herring 
seriously, courts may realize that it does not work in practice. When 
faced with resistance to the practice on the ground, courts may be 
prompted to reevaluate the future of the exclusionary rule. 
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CONCLUSION 
The idea of data-driven accountability is not new. But the 
convergence of new surveillance and data-driven technologies along 
with the Supreme Court’s requirement to demonstrate recurring or 
systemic problems of police misconduct suggest a new way to visualize 
the exclusionary rule in the age of blue data. A data-driven vision is 
needed now more than ever, as other traditional means of police 
accountability diminish due to a shifting political landscape. This 
vision also fills the “proof gap” that exists when litigating police 
misconduct. In ordinary suppression hearings, civil cases, and civil 
rights investigations, this blue data will assist litigants and courts in 
proving and visualizing large-scale police accountability projects. Even 
if blue data accountability systems are not put in place, the push to 
develop them will offer powerful clues about how citizens and police 
react to new forms of big data surveillance. The reveal of the 
resistance is that all people—citizens and police—have reason to be 
concerned about growing big data surveillance systems.  
 
